Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Independent Individual Decision-Makers in Household Models and the New Home Economics

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Household Economic Behaviors

Part of the book series: International Series on Consumer Science ((ISCS))

Abstract

Much of the recent literature in household economics has been critical of unitary models of household decision-making. Most alternative models currently used are bargaining models and consensual models, including collective models. This paper discusses another alternative: independent individual models of decision-making that do not make any specific assumptions of jointness of decision-making in households. Unitary models are typically associated with Gary Becker, even though most of Becker’s own analyses of the family did not use his unitary model. This is especially the case with the specifically independent individual models presented in his theory of marriage. Decision-making models assuming independent individual household members in the Becker tradition are reminiscent of models of labor markets in which firms and workers are independent decision-makers. As basis for econometric estimations, such models may be preferable to models imposing the structure of a game or a household welfare function.

JEL Code D11 • J00

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The term “unitary” was coined by Browning et al. (1994).

  2. 2.

    References to Becker’s unitary model can be found in articles on a diverse range of applications of household economics, ranging from labor supply – such as Chiappori (1988), Chiappori et al. (2002), Chau et al. (2007) – to fertility (including Tiefenthaler 1999; Klawon and Tiefenthaler 2001), care work (e.g., Bergeron 2009), child labor and school attendance – such as Emerson and Souza (2007) – and demand for pets (see Schwarz et al. 2007).

  3. 3.

    The NHE was called “New” to distinguish applications of household economics based on economic analysis from “Home Economics”, an academic discipline that was then very popular in USA and focused on the training of high school students in practical home management skills, including sewing and woodwork.

  4. 4.

    Note that Becker (1991) is identical to Becker (1981) except for a new introduction.

  5. 5.

    Personal recollection of the author while attending Becker’s workshop in the years 1974–1976.

  6. 6.

    See Grossbard-Shechtman (2001) for more on the history of the NHE.

  7. 7.

    More on these separate models of marriage is found in Grossbard (2010).

  8. 8.

    See Grossbard-Shechtman (2003) for models based on that course.

  9. 9.

    More on this topic in Grossbard (2010, forthcoming).

References

  • Anderson, Richard and Michael Grossman. (2009) “Health and the Household” Review of Economics of the Household 7(3):219–226.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Apps, Patricia F. and Ray Rees. 1988. “Taxation and the Household.” Journal of Public Economics 35:355–369.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Apps, Patricia F. and Ray Rees. (2009), Public Economics and the Household, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 1960. “An Economic Analysis of Fertility.” In National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries, a Conference of the Universities. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 1965. “A Theory of Allocation of Time.” Economic Journal 75:493–515.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 1973. “A Theory of Marriage: Part I.” Journal of Political Economy 81:813–846.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 1974. “A Theory of Social Interactions.” J of Political Economy 82(6): 1063–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 1976. “Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology.” Journal of Economic Literature 14 (3): 817–826.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, first edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 1991. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, second edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. 2006 “Working with Jacob Mincer: Reminiscences of Columbia’s Labor Workshop” in Shoshana Grossbard (ed.), Jacob Mincer: A Pioneer of Modern Labor Economics. New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S., Elizabeth Landes, and Robert Michael. 1977. “An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability.” Journal of Political Economy 85: 1141–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. and H. Gregg Lewis. 1973. “On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality of Children.” Journal of Political Economy 81(2, pt. 2): S279-S288.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergeron, Suzanne. 2009. “An Interpretive Analytics to Move Caring Labor Off the Straight Path” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies - Volume 30, Number 1, pp. 55–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, Barbara R. “Becker’s Theory of the Family: Preposterous Conclusions” Feminist Economics 1(1): 141–150, 1995.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bloemen, Hans G. and Stancanelli, Elena F. G. (2008), “How do spouses allocate time: the impact of wages and income”, IZA DP No. 3679, September.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borjas, George (2009) Labor Economics. New York: McGraw Hill Irwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Browning, Martin, Francois Bourguignon, Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, and Valerie Lechene (1994), “Incomes and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation.” Journal of Political Economy 102(6): 1067–1096.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cain, Glen G. (1966) Married Women in the Labor Force: An Economic Analysis. Chicago: U of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cain, Glen G. and Martin D. Dooley (1976) “Estimation of a Model of Labor Supply, Fertility and Wages of Married Women.” Journal of Political Economy 84 (4): S179-S200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chau, Tak Wai, Hongbin Li, Pak Wai Liu and Junsen Zhang (2007) “Testing the collective model of household labor supply” China Economic Review Volume 18, Issue 4, pp. 389–402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chiappori, P.-A. (1988). Rational household labor supply. Econometrica 56, 63–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin & G. Lacroix. (2002). Marriage market, divorce legislation, and household labor supply. Journal of Political Economy, 110, 37–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chiappori, P.-A., S. Oreffice and C. Quintana-Domeque. (2010). “Fatter attraction : anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market” Paper presented at the IFS workshop, London, June.

    Google Scholar 

  • Connelly R. and J. Kimmel (2010), “Spousal Influences on Parents’ Non-Market Time Choices”, Review of Economics of the Household, Springer on line first.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Ronald Smith (2009), Modern Labor Economics. Addison-Wesley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Emerson, Patrick M. and André Portela Souza (2007) “Child Labor, School Attendance, and Intrahousehold Gender Bias in Brazil” The World Bank Economic Review 2007 21(2):301–316.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freiden, Alan. 1974. “The U.S. Marriage Market.” In Economics of the Family, edited by T.W. Schultz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossbard, Amyra. (1976). “An Economic Analysis of Polygamy: The Case of Maiduguri.” Current Anthropology 17:701–7.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grossbard-Shechtman, Amyra. 1984. “A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labor and Marriage.” Economic Journal 94:863–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana A. 1993. On the Economics of Marriage. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana A. 2001. “The New Home Economics at Columbia and Chicago.” Feminist Economics 7(3): 103–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman (2003). “A Consumer Theory with Competitive Markets for Work in Marriage,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 31(6): 609–645.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shoshana Grossbard. (2010). “How ‘Chicagoan’ are Gary Becker’s Economic Models of Marriage?” J of History of Economic Thought, 32(3): 377–395.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, Michael (1976), “The Correlation between Health and Schooling.” In Household Production and Consumption, edited by N. Terleckyj. New York: Columbia University Press, for the National Bureau of Economic Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, Michael. (2006) “Household production and health” in Shoshana Grossbard (ed.), Jacob Mincer: A Pioneer of Modern Labor Economics. New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katz, Elisabeth (1997) “The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit” Feminist Economics, Vol 3 Number 3, pages 25–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klawon, Emily and Jill Tiefenthaler (2001) “Bargaining over family size: The determinants of fertility in Brazil”, Population Research and Policy Review, 20: 423–440.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keeley, Michael C. 1977. “The Economics of Family Formation.” Economic Inquiry 25:238–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Konrad, Cai and Kjell E. Lommerud (1995). “Family Policies with Non-Cooperative Families.” Scandinavian J of Economics 97(4): 581–601.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak. 1993. “Separate Sphere Bargaining and the Marriage Market.” Journal of Political Economy 101:988–1010.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manser, Marilyn and Murray Brown. 1980. “Marriage and Household Decision Making: a Bargaining Analysis.” International Economic Review 21:31–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McElroy, Marjorie B. and Mary Jane Horney. 1981. “Nash Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand.” International Economic Review 22:333–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McElroy, Marjorie B. 1990. “The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior” Journal of Human Resources 25:559–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Michael, Robert T. 1973. “Education in Non-Market Production.” Journal of Political Economy 81(2): 306–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mincer, Jacob. 1962. “Labor Force Participation of Married Women: a Study of Labor Supply,” in H. Gregg Lewis (ed.) Aspects of Labor Economics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mincer, Jacob. 1963. “Market Prices, Opportunity Costs, and Income Effects,” in C. Christ (ed.) Measurement in Economics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mincer, Jacob. 1993. Studies in Labor Supply: Collected Essays of Jacob Mincer, Volume 2. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robbins, Lionel (1930), “On The Elasticity of Demand For Income in Terms of Efforts.” Economica 10:123–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, Paul. 1956. “Social Indifference Curves.” Quarterly J. of Economics 70(1):1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwarz Peter M., Jennifer L. Troyer, and Jennifer Beck Walker 2007, “Animal House: Economics of Pets and the Household”, Berkeley Electronics Journal of Economic analysis and policy 7(1), Article 35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tiefenthaler, Jill (1999). “The Sectoral Labor Supply of Married Couples in Brazil: Testing theunitary model of household behavior.” J of Pop Econ 1999 12: 591–606

    Google Scholar 

  • Woolley, Frances (1996), “Getting the Better of Becker.” Feminist Economics 2:114-120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woolley, Frances. (2003), “Control over Money in Marriage.” in Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman (ed.) Marriage and the Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I thank the editor, José Alberto Molina, and Elena Stancanelli for helpful comments on the chapter. Conversations with Barry Chiswick and Michael Grossman – two scholars who were part of the development of the NHE – reinforced my view that unitary models played a minor role in the NHE.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA

    Shoshana Grossbard

Authors
  1. Shoshana Grossbard
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shoshana Grossbard .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fac. Cc. Economicas, Depto. Analisis Economico, Universidad Zaragoza, Gran Via 2, Zaragoza, 50005, Spain

    J. A. Molina

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Grossbard, S. (2011). Independent Individual Decision-Makers in Household Models and the New Home Economics. In: Molina, J. (eds) Household Economic Behaviors. International Series on Consumer Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9431-8_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation