Abstract
As computer systems become more powerful and cheaper they permeate more of our everyday life. With this greater reliance on the automated processing and movement of our personal information comes a duty to demonstrate that computer systems are secure. Unfortuneately refinement which preserves “functional” properties does not necessarily preserve properties concerning the confidentiality of information. In this paper a way of describing confidentiality properties independently from “functional” properties is described. The paper goes on to show when “functionality” and confidentiality can be preserved by refinement.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag London
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O’Halloran, C. (1992). Refinement and Confidentiality. In: Jones, C.B., Shaw, R.C., Denvir, T. (eds) 5th Refinement Workshop. Workshops in Computing. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3550-0_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3550-0_7
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-19752-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-3550-0
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