Abstract
In this Chapter, I discuss some important issues relating to the delineation of antitrust markets and analysis of competitive effects under the methodology prescribed by the Merger Guidelines. I argue that since most transactions in our economy are between businesses, and that many, if not most businesses are sophisticated purchasers, the price determination process is often better conceptualized as a bargaining process between sellers and purchasers rather than as a competitive or oligopolistic industry selling to a “demand curve.” The Guidelines methodology does not recognize this issue, with the result that markets may often be defined too narrowly. The Chapter then provides an empirical example of an industry for which the usual methodology for defining Guidelines markets would lead to very narrow markets. Empirical estimates of residual demand elasticities, however, indicate that the relevant markets are broad. I interpret this result as some confirmation of the importance of sophisticated buyers in defining relevant markets under the Guidelines.
The author thanks Doug Zona for a great deal of helpful assistance.
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References
Froeb, Luke M. and Gregory J. Werden. 1992. “The Reverse Cellophane Fallacy in Market Delineation.” Review of Industrial Organization 7(2): 241–247.
Scheffman, David T. and Pablo T. Spiller. 1987. “Geographic Market Definition Under the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.” Journal of Law and Economics 30(1):123–148.
Scheffman, David T. and Pablo T. Spiller. 1992. “Buyers’ Strategies, Entry Barriers, and Competition.” Economic Inquiry, 30(3):418–436.
U.S. Department of Justice. 1992. “Department of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines.” April 2, 1992, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104.
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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Scheffman, D.T. (1996). Buyers, Market Power, and Market Definition. In: Coate, M.B., Kleit, A.N. (eds) The Economics of the Antitrust Process. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 22. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1397-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1397-7_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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