Abstract
We apply a dynamic spatial model to interest group ratings of the members of Congress over the period 1959–1981. Spatial distances between an interest group and the members of Congress are assumed to be monotonic with the ratings. Our pooled cross-sectional time-series data set consists of 203,387 ratings by 59 interest groups. We restrict the spatial coordinates of the interest groups and members of Congress to be polynomial functions of time. Two significant dimensions are recovered: the first dimension, which accounts for approximately 75% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on economic issues; the second dimension, which accounts for approximately an additional 5% of the variance, represents liberal-conservative positions on social issues. Nearly all the interest groups and most members of Congress are ideologically consistent. They are either liberal on both dimensions or conservative on both.
This work was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Information and Politics Conference”, Austin, Texas, 13–15 February 1986. Minor differences in results between this paper and the earlier version reflect the addition of the 1981 data and improvements to the algorithm used for the two- and three-dimensional scalings.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. American Economic Review 78: 796–806.
Beck, N. (1983). Time-varying parameter regression models. American Journal of Political Science 27: 557–600.
Bernhardt, M. D. and Ingberman, D. (1985). Candidate reputations and the incumbency effect. Journal of Public Economics 27: 47–67.
Bullock, C. S. III. (1981). Congressional voting and the 1982 congressional elections. Journal of Politics 45: 767–770.
Cahoon, L. S., Melvin. J., Hinich, M.J. and Ordeshook, P. C. (1978). A statistical multidimensional scaling model based on the spational theory of voting. In P. C. Wang (Ed.), Graphical representation of multidimensional data, 243–278. New York:
Academic Press. Calvert, R. L. (1985). Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidates’ motivations, uncertainty, and convergence. American Journal of Political Science 26: 69–95.
Defays, D. (1978). A short note on a method of seriation. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 31: 49–53.
Dougan, W. R. and Munger, M. C. (1989). The rationality of ideology. Journal of Law and Economics 32: 119–143.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper.
Enelow, J. M. and Hinich, M. J. (1984). The spatial theory of voting: An introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Erikson, R. S., Wright, G. C. and McIver, J. P. (1993). Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American States. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hibbs, D. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467–1487.
Hinich, M. (1978). Some evidence on non-voting in the spatial theory of electoral competition. Public Choice 33: 83–102.
Hinich, M. J. and Munger, M. I. (1994). Ideology and the theory of political choice. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Hinich, M. J. and Pollard, W. (1981). A new approach to the spatial theory of electoral competition. American Journal of Political Science 25: 323–341.
Hinich, M. J. and Roll, R. (1981). Measuring nonstationarity in the parameters of the market model. Research in Finance 3: 1–51.
Hubert, L. and Arabie, P. (1986). Unidimensional scaling and combinatorial optimization. In: de Leeuw et al. (Eds.), Multidimensional data analysis. Leiden: DSWO Press.
Ingberman, D. (1985). Spatial competition with imperfectly informed voters. Mimeo. University of Pennsylvania.
Kalt, J. and Zupan, M. (1984). Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics. American Economic Review 74: 279–300.
Kernell, S. (1973). Is the Senate more liberal than the House? Journal of Politics 35: 332–363.
Khrebiel, K. and Rivers, D. (1985). Congressional roll call strategies: An application of a new test to minimum wage legislation. Paper presented at the 1985 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Ladha, K. K. (1994). A spatial model of legislative voting with perceptual error. Public Choice 68: 151–174.
McCarty, N.M., Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1997). Income redistribution and the realignment of American Politics. Washington, DC: AEI Press.
Ordeshook, P. C. (1976). The spatial theory of elections: A review and a critique. In I. Budge, I. Crewe, and D. Farlie (Eds.), Party identification and beyond. New York: Wiley.
Poole, K. T. (1981). Dimensions of interest group evaluation of the U.S. Senate, 1969–1978. American Journal of Political-Science 25: 49–67.
Poole, K. T. (1984). Least squares metric, unidimensional unfolding. Ps_chometrika 49: 311–323.
Poole, K. T. (1990). Least squares metric, unidimensional scaling of multivariate linear models. Psychometrika 55: 123–149.
Poole, K. T. and Daniels, R. S. (1985). Ideology, party, and voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959–1980. American Political Science Review 79: 373–399.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1984a). U.S. presidential elections: 1968–1980. A spatial analysis. American Journal of Political Science 28: 282–312.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1984b). The polarization of American politics. Journal of Politics 46: 1062–1079.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1985a). A spatial model for legislative roll call analysis. American Journal of Political Science 29: 357–384.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1985b). The unidimensional Congress. Mimeo. Carnegie Mellon University.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1987). The regional realignment of Congress, 1919–1984. In P. Galderisi and R. Simmons (Eds.), Politics in the Intermountain West: Forerunner to realignment Boulder CO: Westview.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1991). Patterns of congressional voting. American Journal of Political Science 35: 228–278.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rabinowitz, G. (1976). A procedure for ordering object pairs consistent with the multidimensional unfolding model. Psychometrika 45: 349–373.
Rivers, D. (1987). Inconsistency of least squares unfolding. Paper presented at the Political Methodology Meetings, Durnham, NC.
Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1987). Modern political economy and the study of regulation. In E.E. Bailey (Ed.), Public regulation: New perspectives on institutions and politics. Cambridge MA: M.I.T. Press.
Snyder, J. M. Jr. (1992). Artificial extremism in interest group ratings. Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 319–345.
Wittman, D. (1983). Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternatives. American Political Science Review 77: 142–157.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Poole, K.T., Rosenthal, H. (1998). The dynamics of interest group evaluations of Congress. In: Hinich, M.J., Munger, M.C. (eds) Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5127-7_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5127-7_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5072-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-5127-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive