Symptom

Abstract

Stephen Ullmann (1951:161) distinguished among four juxtaposed branches of word-study: “(1) the science of names (lexicology if synchronistic, etymology if diachronistic); (2) the science of meanings (semantics); (3) the science of designations (onomasiology); (4) the science of concepts (Begriffslehre).” Although the distinction between designation and meaning, particularly as displayed in the works of German and Swiss semanticists (of the sometimes loosely as well as incorrectly called Trier-Weisgerber School) is far from consistently drawn or ever pellucid, I take it that this alterity depends on whether one’s starting point is the “name,” the “lexeme,” or, more generally, the sign, or whether it is the “concept” or, more generally, the object, i.e., the constellation of properties and relations the sign stands for. If the former, the analysis should yield a semiotic network responsive to the question: what does a given sign signify in contrast and opposition to any other sign within the same system of signs? If the latter, the analysis should reveal the sign by which a given entity is designated within a certain semiotic system. According to Ullmann, the second inquiry “is the cornerstone of Weisgerber’s structure” (ibid.), but I believe that the two questions are indissolubly complementary and, in any case, the whole enterprise critically hinges upon how the investigator parses the sign/object (aliquid/aliquo) antithesis, and what the conjunctive “stands for” (stat pro), in his judgment, entails.