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A Taxonomy of Side Channel Attacks on Critical Infrastructures and Relevant Systems

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Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience

Abstract

Information disclosure leads to serious exploits, disruption or damage of critical operations and privacy breaches, both in Critical Infrastructures (CIs) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and in traditional IT systems. Side channel attacks in computer security refer to attacks on data confidentiality through information gained from the physical implementation of a system, rather an attack on the algorithm or software itself. Depending on the source and the type of information leakage, certain general types of side channel attacks have been established: power, electromagnetic, cache, timing, sensor-based, acoustic and memory analysis attacks. Given the sensitive nature of ICS and the vast amount of information stored on IT systems, consequences of side channel attacks can be quite significant. In this paper, we present an extensive survey on side channel attacks that can be implemented either on ICS or traditional systems often used in Critical Infrastructure environments. Presented taxonomies try to take into consideration all major publications of the last decade and present them using three different classification systems to provide an objective form of multi-level taxonomy and a potentially profitable statistical approach. We conclude by discussing open issues and challenges in this context and outline possible future research directions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security & Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFOSEC) Laboratory Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics & Business, Athens, Greece

    Nick Tsalis, Efstratios Vasilellis, Despina Mentzelioti & Theodore Apostolopoulos

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  1. Nick Tsalis
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  2. Efstratios Vasilellis
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  3. Despina Mentzelioti
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  4. Theodore Apostolopoulos
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Correspondence to Efstratios Vasilellis .

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  1. Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece

    Dimitris Gritzalis

  2. Directorate E. Space, Security and Migration European Commission – Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy

    Marianthi Theocharidou

  3. Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece

    George Stergiopoulos

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Tsalis, N., Vasilellis, E., Mentzelioti, D., Apostolopoulos, T. (2019). A Taxonomy of Side Channel Attacks on Critical Infrastructures and Relevant Systems. In: Gritzalis, D., Theocharidou, M., Stergiopoulos, G. (eds) Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00024-0_15

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