Abstract
In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of round reduced Keccak-384 for 2 rounds. The best known preimage attack for this variant of Keccak has the time complexity \(2^{129}\). In our analysis, we find a preimage in the time complexity of \(2^{89}\) and almost same memory is required.
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Acknowledgement
We thank the reviewers of Indocrypt-2018 for providing comments which helped in improving the work. In particular, we thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting us to implement the attack on the \(\textsc {Keccak}[r:=400-192, c:=192]\) and also providing insights to further improve the attack. We take it as the future work.
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Kumar, R., Mittal, N., Singh, S. (2018). Cryptanalysis of 2 Round Keccak-384. In: Chakraborty, D., Iwata, T. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2018. INDOCRYPT 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11356. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05378-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05378-9_7
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