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Theoretical Discussion of Vertical Integration and Regulation

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Vertical Integration and Regulation

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Abstract

The core focus of this thesis is to assess the degree of regulation required to ensure the highest level of societal welfare, the lowest (consumer) prices and the most competition on markets. To properly conduct the assessment, all terms need to be defined. As a first step, the general concept of regulation is presented (Sect. 2.1). Afterwards the legal aspects of vertical integration (Sect. 2.2) and the economic aspects of vertical integration (Sect. 2.3) are outlined in order to properly situate the investigation in the body of the existing literature.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Edwards (1953), pp. 404.

  2. 2.

    Hornby and Turnbull (2010).

  3. 3.

    There is no legal consensus on whether or not regulation law refers to a particular source and field of law, see Basedow (2004), pp. 3–20; Voßkuhle (2003), pp. 266–335; Eifert (2006), § 19.

  4. 4.

    See Kühling (2004).

  5. 5.

    See Robinson (1934), pp. 104–120; Stigler (1957), pp. 1–17; Aumann (1964), pp. 39–50; Anderson (1992), Chap. 14.

  6. 6.

    See Engel and Morlok (1998); van Aken (2004), pp. 1–32; Furubotn and Richter (2010); Homann and Suchanek (2005); Denkhaus (2004), pp. 33–60.

  7. 7.

    For more information on the desirable market result according to economists, see the comprehensive body of literature on the Pareto criterium e.g. Pareto (1906).

  8. 8.

    See Hayek (1969).

  9. 9.

    Positive external effects are not considered. They are assumed to be a by-product which is a neat positive development.

  10. 10.

    See Endres (1994); Eskeland (1994), pp. 373–394; Ebert (1991/1992), pp. 154–166; Hurwicz (1995), pp. 49–74; Kahneman et al. (1990), pp. 1325–1348.

  11. 11.

    See Lyon (1996), pp. 227–247; Dehmel (2011).

  12. 12.

    See Schmalensee (1989), pp. 417–436; Niemeier (2002), pp. 37–48.

  13. 13.

    See Crew and Kleindorfer (1996), pp. 211–225.

  14. 14.

    See Taggart (1981), pp. 383–393; Solomon (1970), pp. 65–81; Sherman (1977), pp. 240–248.

  15. 15.

    See Liston (1993), pp. 25–48; Pint (1992), pp. 564–578.

  16. 16.

    See Averch and Johnson (1962), pp. 1052–1069; Spann (1974), pp. 38–52; Bailey and Coleman (1971), pp. 278–292.

  17. 17.

    See Brunekreeft (2003), Chap. 4 Price-cap regulation; Cabral and Riordan (1989), pp. 93–102; Braeutigam and Panzar (1993), pp. 191–198; Cowan (2002), pp. 167–188.

  18. 18.

    See Healy and Palepu (2001), pp. 405–440; Acharya et al. (2009), pp. 89–137; Nicolaides (1992), pp. 113–121.

  19. 19.

    See Fritsch (2011), pp. 198 ff.

  20. 20.

    See Lipsky and Sidak (1998), pp. 1187–1248; Bergman (2001), pp. 403–434; Kezsbom and Goldman (1996), pp. 1–36; Soma et al. (1998), pp. 565–614.

  21. 21.

    This is especially applicable for postal services and the telecommunications sector, see Gabrisch (1996); Elsenbast (1999).

  22. 22.

    See Égert (2009); Smith (1997).

  23. 23.

    See Montoya and Trillas (2009), pp. 113-134; Stern (1997), pp. 67–74.

  24. 24.

    See Kamps (2006), pp. 133–142; Benz (1997), pp. 419–537; Holznagel et al. (2008).

  25. 25.

    See Battis and Kersten (2003), pp. 349-357; Ladeur (2005), pp. 753–764; Schmidt-Assmann (1993), pp. 697–711.

  26. 26.

    See Rockholz (2001); Rutkowsky (1998).

  27. 27.

    See Behrendt et al. (1996), pp. 114–115.

  28. 28.

    See Kümpel and Wittig (2011); Follak (1986).

  29. 29.

    See Kingreen (2005), pp. 505–511.

  30. 30.

    See Gärditz (2005), pp. 490–497; Wieland (1995), pp 315 ff.

  31. 31.

    See Besche (2004); Forster (2007).

  32. 32.

    See Boysen et al. (2007).

  33. 33.

    See Hufen (1994), pp. 2913–2921.

  34. 34.

    See Federal German Constitutional Court Decisions 7, 377; 13, 97; 13, 181; 19, 337; 28, 374; 33, 125; 33, 303; 39, 225; 54, 301; 82, 209; 93, 235.

  35. 35.

    See Badura (2003), pp. 785–800; Wollenschläger (2013), pp. 7–16.

  36. 36.

    See Riedel (2012).

  37. 37.

    See Möllinger (2009).

  38. 38.

    See Altwicker (2011), pp. 364–378.

  39. 39.

    Art. 109 (2) GG.

  40. 40.

    Art. 23 (1) GG.

  41. 41.

    Art. 24 GG.

  42. 42.

    See ECJ, Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos.

  43. 43.

    See Ginsburg (2005), pp. 107–123.

  44. 44.

    See Gugler et al. (2017), pp. 450–478.

  45. 45.

    See Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), pp. 949–995; Doidge et al. (2007), pp. 1–39; Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), pp. 1–33.

  46. 46.

    See Pollitt (2008), pp. 704–713; Steiner (2000), Jamasb and Pollitt (2005), pp. 11–41.

  47. 47.

    See Cave and Martin (1994), pp. 12–20.

  48. 48.

    See Cave (2007), pp. 89–103.

  49. 49.

    Usually the term “enterprise” is used. In this particular circumstance the term “fringe firms” is used as a technical term.

  50. 50.

    Usually the term “enterprise” is used. In this particular circumstance the term “dominant firm” is used as a technical term.

  51. 51.

    See Baumol et al. (1983), pp. 491–496; Scholtka (2005), pp. 2421–2425.

  52. 52.

    See Storr (2006), pp. 1017–1026.

  53. 53.

    See Säcker (2009), pp. 78–85; Brunekreeft (2003).

  54. 54.

    See Federal German Administrative Court (2001), pp. 1399–1407.

  55. 55.

    Knittel (2006), pp. 201–222.

  56. 56.

    See Semigran et al. (2017), pp. E186–E192; Granados et al. (2010), pp. 207–226.

  57. 57.

    See Stahler and Upmann (2008), pp. 611–626.

  58. 58.

    See Pünder (2006), pp. 567–599.

  59. 59.

    See Crocioni and Veljanovski (2003), pp. 28–60; Heimler (2010), pp. 879–890; Gaudin and Saavedra (2014), pp. 157–172.

  60. 60.

    See Carlton (2008), pp. 271–278; Sidak (2008), pp. 279–309; Geradin and O’Donoghue (2005), pp. 355–425; Hou (2014), pp. 43–74.

  61. 61.

    See Jung (2017), pp. 981–1020.

  62. 62.

    See Hart and Tirole (1990), p. 205.

  63. 63.

    For a comprehensive discussion on the effects of vertical integration see Riordan (1998), pp. 1232–1248; Foros and Stehen (2013), pp. 640–661; Hart and Tirole (1990), pp. 205–286; Beard et al. (2001), pp. 319–333; Edwards (1953), pp. 404–410; Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 513–568; Siegwarth Meyer and Wang (2011), pp. 7–11.

  64. 64.

    For more information on game theory see Berninghaus et al. (2010); Strategische Spiele: eine Einführung in die Spieltheorie; Rieck (2007); Holler and Illing (2009).

  65. 65.

    See Devlin (2007), pp. 1111–1151; Watson (1998), pp. 1769–1769; Noel (2016), pp. 287–311.

  66. 66.

    See Maskin and Tirole (1988), pp. 571–599.

  67. 67.

    For the first case see Spengler (1950), pp. 347–352.

  68. 68.

    See Salinger (1988), p. 354; Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 517; Siegwarth Meyer and Wang (2011), p. 8.

  69. 69.

    See Spengler (1950), p. 352.

  70. 70.

    See Edwards (1953), p. 405; Siegwarth Meyer and Wang (2011), p. 7.

  71. 71.

    See Hart and Tirole (1990), p. 213; Yamawake et al. (2018), pp. 1028 ff.

  72. 72.

    See Kim and Nora (2018), pp. 1 ff.

  73. 73.

    See Edwards (1953), p. 410.

  74. 74.

    See Footnote 73.

  75. 75.

    See Edwards (1953), p. 408.

  76. 76.

    See Salinger (1988), p. 349.

  77. 77.

    See Salinger (1988), p. 355.

  78. 78.

    See Normann (2008), pp. 7f.

  79. 79.

    See Footnote 77.

  80. 80.

    See lately Nocke and Rey (2018), pp. 183 ff.

  81. 81.

    See Edwards (1953), p. 409.

  82. 82.

    See Edwards (1953), pp. 406 f.

  83. 83.

    See Normann (2008), p. 30; Siegwarth Meyer and Wang (2011), p. 7.

  84. 84.

    See Rey and Stiglitz (1988), p. 1.

  85. 85.

    See Rey and Stiglitz (1988).

  86. 86.

    See Rey and Stiglitz (1988), p. 4.

  87. 87.

    See Rey and Stiglitz (1988), p. 13 f.

  88. 88.

    See Deneckere et al. (1996), pp. 885–913; Shaffer (1991), pp. 120–135.

  89. 89.

    See Hart and Tirole (1990), pp. 231 f.

  90. 90.

    See Beard et al. (2001), pp. 319–333.

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    Christoph Kleineberg

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Kleineberg, C. (2019). Theoretical Discussion of Vertical Integration and Regulation. In: Vertical Integration and Regulation. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11358-2_2

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