Skip to main content

Maritime Cross-Border Insolvency and Harmonisation

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Maritime Cross-Border Insolvency
  • 339 Accesses

Abstract

The two previous chapters show that the insolvency laws as well as the maritime laws of Germany, England & Wales and the USA do not fall widely apart, but even minor differences can cause confusion and uncertainty for both practitioners and academics. Especially the treatment of the insolvent debtor, the restructuring tools available, and the legal theories behind the maritime security right of maritime lien are the main sources of legal conflict. Many harmonisation efforts have been enacted to reconcile these differences. In the context of international insolvency, the EU Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency are the most effective and pragmatic harmonisation instruments. Such clear guidelines and regulations are still missing for stipulations on maritime liens and the conflict of laws that these liens are causing. It became evident in the previous chapter that the single state’s catalogues of maritime claims, which are secured by the security interest of maritime liens, are very different and the acceptance and recognition of foreign maritime liens in domestic proceedings varies strongly, with England & Wales taking the most restrictive and the USA the most ship-creditor friendly approach.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See FOCUS Online Schiffsfonds saufen ab – Anleger verlieren zehn Milliarden Euro (25 November 2014) available at http://www.focus.de/finanzen/boerse/fonds/450-geschlossene-fonds-sind-pleite-schiffsfonds-saufen-ab-anleger-verlieren-zehn-milliarden-euro_id_4300137.html (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  2. 2.

    See UNCTAD (2015), p. 36.

  3. 3.

    See for this and the following sentence Seitz (2009), p. 1348.

  4. 4.

    Global bank transfers in USD are usually through New York banks and in 2002 the money transfer through New York was held as a sufficient attachment for the filing of an insolvency proceeding in New York—Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd v. TPI [2002] 310 F.3d, on p. 273.

  5. 5.

    Re Eastwind Maritime Inc. [2009] Bankr. S.D.N.Y., case no. 09-14047.

  6. 6.

    See for this and the following Franks et al. (2017), p. 7.

  7. 7.

    Case 341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. [2006] E.C.R. I-3813.

  8. 8.

    See Smid (2009), p. 70.

  9. 9.

    Case 396/09 Interedile SRL v Fallimento Interedile SRL [2011] E.C.R. I-09915.

  10. 10.

    El Borai (2006), p. 114.

  11. 11.

    See Ragan (2010/2011), p. 150.

  12. 12.

    See for this and the following Ragan (2010/2011), pp. 153, 154.

  13. 13.

    In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. 2006) the court expressly stated: “Thus, if the foreign proceeding is not in the country of the registered office, then the foreign representative has the burden of proof on the question of centre of main interests. Correlatively, if the foreign proceeding is in the country of the registered office, and if there is evidence that the centre of main interests might be elsewhere, then the foreign representative must prove that the centre of main interest is in the same country as the registered office”.

  14. 14.

    As flexible as a shipping company can handle its COMI, as easy it is for maritime creditors to provide evidence for a COMI different from the company’s registered office. The flexibility of the COMI of shipping companies will be discussed in the following section.

  15. 15.

    See El Borai (2006), p. 116.

  16. 16.

    Re Northsea Base Investment Ltd & others [2015] EWHC 121 (Ch).

  17. 17.

    For a comment on the Northsea Base Investment case see: Williams (2015).

  18. 18.

    See Seelinger and Dähnert (2012), p. 243.

  19. 19.

    See above at Sect. 2.1.2.2.5.3.

  20. 20.

    See Bork (2012), p. 281.

  21. 21.

    DeNatale and Mechling (2013).

  22. 22.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 722.

  23. 23.

    A first draft bill on corporate group insolvency and restructuring has been introduced in the German parliament (Bundestag) in January 2014 (BT-Drs. 18/407). Since that first draft no further progress has been made in that particular field of insolvency law.

  24. 24.

    See Paulus (2006/2007), p. 820.

  25. 25.

    In re: Genco Shipping & Trading Limited [2014] 513 B.R. 233.

  26. 26.

    See DeNatale and Mechling (2013).

  27. 27.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 722.

  28. 28.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 742.

  29. 29.

    See for this and the following sentence Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 741.

  30. 30.

    Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. [1984] 38 B.R. 987.

  31. 31.

    DeNatale and Mechling (2013).

  32. 32.

    See for this and the following sentence DeNatale and Mechling (2013).

  33. 33.

    Cases in which US bankruptcy courts authorised the satisfaction of critical vendors: General Maritime [2012] Case No. 11-15285 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.); Omega Navigation Enterprises [2012] Case No. 11-35927 (Bankr. S.D.Tex.); Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. [2011] Case No. 11-13634 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) and B+H Ocean Carriers [2012] Case No. 12-12356 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

  34. 34.

    See DeNatale and Mechling (2013).

  35. 35.

    Seitz (2009), pp. 1349–1351. An illustrative case for a foreign maritime debtor using Chapter 15 procedures to protect its assets against enforcements in the USA is In re Britannia Bulk PLC [2008] Case No. 08-14543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

  36. 36.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), pp. 719–749.

  37. 37.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 726.

  38. 38.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), pp. 727, 728.

  39. 39.

    The data set showed that foreign debtors with a shipping background file motions for joint administration as they include in average 32.7 companies.

  40. 40.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 732.

  41. 41.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), pp. 739, 740.

  42. 42.

    For a detailed display of the English scheme of arrangement see above at Sect. 2.1.2.2.5.3.

  43. 43.

    Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 743.

  44. 44.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 743.

  45. 45.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 744.

  46. 46.

    See Calliess and Hoffmann (2009), p. 120.

  47. 47.

    See Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), p. 721: “By analysing this new dataset, we conclude that the United States Bankruptcy Code is used by foreign debtors in a way that is diametrically opposed to most of the extant thinking on transnational insolvency. In particular, foreign debtors use the American bankruptcy system to impose a global discharge on assets, without the cooperation of any jurisdiction beyond the United States, where the case is pending. This is in complete contrast with the efforts of UNCITRAL to facilitate cross-border cooperation among jurisdictions”.

  48. 48.

    See for this and the following sentence Brambusch (2014).

  49. 49.

    See Brambusch (2014).

  50. 50.

    The reply is available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Work%20In%20Progress/Cross-Border%20Insolvency/2015-04-02%20-%20Answer%20CMI%20Questionnaire%20Cross-Border%20Insolvency%20German%20MLA.pdf (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  51. 51.

    See Tetzlaff in Kirchhof et al. (2013), § 165 marg. no. 25.

  52. 52.

    LG Bremen, Beschl. v. 14.8.2011, (2012), p. 904.

  53. 53.

    See Frege et al. (2015), p. 320, marg. no. 689a.

  54. 54.

    See Vallender in Uhlenbruck (2015), § 21, marg. no. 26.

  55. 55.

    See the commentary to LG Bremen, Beschl. v. 14.8.2011 by B. Joos (2012), p. 388.

  56. 56.

    AG Hamburg (2016) WM, on p. 135, 136.

  57. 57.

    German maritime law practitioners regarded the Bremen court decision as correct in Wolf and Hartenstein (2012).

  58. 58.

    See Thomas (1980), p. 65: “The law of [insolvency] seems to have developed with little regard to the Admiralty proceedings in rem.

  59. 59.

    See Derrington and Turner (2007), p. 202.

  60. 60.

    See Tetley and Wilkins (1998), p. 1134.

  61. 61.

    See In re Aro Co Ltd [1980], Ch. 196.

  62. 62.

    See Derrington and Turner (2007), pp. 202, 203.

  63. 63.

    Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation in Germany) v Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2014] 2 SLR 815, but more recently, the Singapore High Court recognised the South Korean rehabilitation proceedings of Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd in Re Taisoo Suk (as foreign representative of Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd) [2016] SGHC 195. For a detailed review of the Hanjin Shipping insolvency, the most recent insolvency of an internationally operating shipping company, see at Sect. 4.4.4.

  64. 64.

    Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd (South Korea) [2013] 223 FCR 189; Hur v Samsun Logix Corporation [2015] 238 FCR 483; and (The ship) Sea Hawk v Reiter Petroleum Inc [2016] 335 ALR 578.

  65. 65.

    For a general display of the scheme of arrangement see above at Sect. 2.1.2.2.5.3 and for the growing importance of the English jurisdiction available to international restructuring projects see above at the end of Sect. 2.1.2.2.5.3.

  66. 66.

    DeNatale and Mechling (2013).

  67. 67.

    See for the whole analysis Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), pp. 719 seqq.

  68. 68.

    See as a collection of various articles: The Tulane Admiralty Law Institute Symposium on Admiralty Interface: Bankruptcy v. Maritime Rights (1985) 59 Tul. L. Rev., on pp. 1157–1486.

  69. 69.

    Seitz (2009), p. 1341.

  70. 70.

    Falzone (2014), p. 1175.

  71. 71.

    See Weil (1996), p. 200.

  72. 72.

    See Hellenic Lines [1984] AMC, on pp. 1092–1093.

  73. 73.

    In McCullough (2007/2008), p. 491 the author describes this lack of precedent: “Without a clear rule by Congress or the Supreme Court concerning this admiralty jurisdiction issue, one can only guess how a court will rule in any given case”.

  74. 74.

    See Weil (1996), p. 201.

  75. 75.

    Ende (1988), p. 573.

  76. 76.

    See Ende (1988), p. 585.

  77. 77.

    See Ende (1988), p. 591.

  78. 78.

    See Ende (1988), p. 577.

  79. 79.

    See Peck (2013), p. 971.

  80. 80.

    In re Millennium [2005] AMC, on p. 1999.

  81. 81.

    See McCullough (2007/2008), p. 486.

  82. 82.

    See McCullough (2007/2008), p. 471.

  83. 83.

    See In re Millennium [2005] AMC, on p. 2000.

  84. 84.

    See for this and the following sentence Weil (1996), p. 219.

  85. 85.

    See Peck (2013), p. 958.

  86. 86.

    Peck (2013), p. 966.

  87. 87.

    See In re Millennium [2005] AMC, on p. 1999.

  88. 88.

    See In re Muma Services Inc. [2005] 322 B.R., on p. 541.

  89. 89.

    See Seitz (2009), p. 1386.

  90. 90.

    See Peck (2013), p. 966.

  91. 91.

    See Gorman (2014/2015), p. 115.

  92. 92.

    See Ende (1988), pp. 585, 586.

  93. 93.

    See Ende (1988), p. 585.

  94. 94.

    Alwang (1996), pp. 2613, 2642.

  95. 95.

    See for this and the following sentence Alwang (1996), p. 2642.

  96. 96.

    See Alwang (1996), p. 2640.

  97. 97.

    Alwang (1996), p. 2644.

  98. 98.

    See Alwang (1996), p. 2644.

  99. 99.

    For the requirements of a motion for relief from an automatic stay in a Chapter 11 proceeding of a shipping company stipulated in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d) (2) see above on p. 151.

  100. 100.

    See for this and the following Falzone (2014), pp. 1204–1206.

  101. 101.

    For detailed display of the EU Insolvency Regulation see in Sect. 2.2.3.2 and for the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency respectively in Sect. 2.2.3.3.1.

  102. 102.

    See for this and the following sentence Fehrenbach (2014), p. 19; Moss et al. (2009), p. 60.

  103. 103.

    See Berlingieri (2014), p. 5.

  104. 104.

    See for this and the following Svitzer Salvage BB v. Celia Schiffahrtgesellschaft mbH & Co. Reederei KG (2013) Il Diritto Marittimo, on p. 69.

  105. 105.

    See Moss et al. (2009), pp. 61, 62.

  106. 106.

    Underlining emphasis by the author of this book.

  107. 107.

    See Buchanan J in STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd (receivers appointed in South Korea) Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2013] 223 FCR 189.

  108. 108.

    See Soars (2016), p. 16.

  109. 109.

    See Soars (2016), p. 33.

  110. 110.

    See Soars (2016), p. 33.

  111. 111.

    The CMI international working group on Maritime Cross-Border Insolvency specifically proposed this approach—see Davis (2016), pp. 216–218. The proposals of the CMI will be discussed later in this chapter.

  112. 112.

    See Rasmussen (1999/2000), p. 2254.

  113. 113.

    Rasmussen (1999/2000), p. 2254.

  114. 114.

    See Rasmussen (1999/2000), p. 2260.

  115. 115.

    See Rasmussen (1999/2000), p. 2263.

  116. 116.

    See LoPucki (1998/1999), pp. 738, 739.

  117. 117.

    See Rasmussen (1999/2000), p. 2262.

  118. 118.

    Rasmussen (1999/2000), p. 2264.

  119. 119.

    See for this and the following Rasmussen (1999/2000), p. 2273.

  120. 120.

    Mason (2012), p. 107.

  121. 121.

    UNCITRAL (2009).

  122. 122.

    See Mason (2012), pp. 107, 108.

  123. 123.

    Mason (2012), p. 108.

  124. 124.

    Wessels (2008), p. 8.

  125. 125.

    Maxwell Communications Corporation plc (No. 2) [1992] B.C.C. 757 (C.A.).

  126. 126.

    See Weiss (2010/2011), p. 289.

  127. 127.

    Mason (2012), p. 126.

  128. 128.

    See for this and the following on the IWG’s work Davis (2016), pp. 216–218.

  129. 129.

    Davis (2016), p. 217.

  130. 130.

    For the ALI Guidelines see above at Sect. 2.2.3.3.2.

  131. 131.

    See Davis (2016), p. 218.

  132. 132.

    Alwang (1996), p. 2642. Alwang, in support of a special protocol to international insolvency treaties, made the following concluding statement on p. 2646: “An international insolvency treaty must recognize the primacy of admiralty law over the vessel and maritime lienors. A treaty vesting control over the disposition of the debtor’s maritime assets in the same court as the rest of the debtor’s assets will not successfully preclude a foreign court from arresting ships and adjudicating the maritime claims. A provision for the exclusive application of admiralty law merely recognizes and accepts such a result. The consequences of such a provision for the non-maritime parties to the bankruptcy proceeding are minor. Yet, such a practical provision will eliminate the risks placed on maritime lienors, the needless expenses arising from the supervision of maritime lienors in the bankruptcy proceeding, and the increased cost of maritime credit that would result from the application of both laws to the same debt. Drafters of an international insolvency treaty should realize that recognizing the primacy of admiralty law over maritime assets steers the most appropriate course”.

  133. 133.

    Holt Cargo Systems Inc v ABC Containerline NV (Trustees of) [2001] 3 SCR 97, at para. 27:

    The reason for this privileged status for maritime lienholders is entirely practical. The ship may sail under a flag of convenience. Its owners may be difficult to ascertain in a web of corporate relationships (as indeed was the case here, where initially Holt named the wrong corporation as ship owner). Merchant seamen will not work the vessel unless their wages constitute a high priority against the ship. The same is true of others whose work or supplies are essential to the continued voyage. The Master may be embarrassed for lack of funds, but the ship itself is assumed to be worth something and is readily available to provide a measure of security. Reliance on that security was and is vital to maritime commerce. Uncertainty would undermine confidence. The appellant Trustees’ claim to ‘international comity’ in matters of bankruptcy must therefore be weighed against competing considerations of a more ancient and at least equally practical international system - the law of maritime commerce.

  134. 134.

    See Davies (2016), p. 196.

  135. 135.

    Davies calls this “zero sum game: whichever body of law wins, someone will regard the outcome as illegitimate or inappropriate” in Davies (2016), p. 197.

  136. 136.

    Davies (2016), p. 197.

  137. 137.

    Janger (2010/2011), p. 458.

  138. 138.

    See for this and the following Janger (2010/2011), p. 456.

  139. 139.

    For a detailed display of the insolvency priority schemes see for Germany at Sect. 2.1.2.1.3, for England & Wales at Sect. 2.1.2.2.2 and for the USA at Sect. 2.1.2.3.3.

  140. 140.

    See Janger (2010/2011), p. 458.

  141. 141.

    See Davies (2016), pp. 211, 212.

  142. 142.

    See Davies (2016), p. 213.

  143. 143.

    In the recent Hanjin Shipping insolvency the ship Hanjin New Yorkwas released from arrest” after a settlement, see Ang (2016), p. 18.

  144. 144.

    See for this and the following: Goodman (2016).

  145. 145.

    See Hanjin Shipping gets multimillion-dollar loan to unload stranded cargo (2016), The Guardian available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/22/hanjin-shipping-korea-creditor-shareholder-pay-unloaded (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  146. 146.

    By 1 November 2016, the largest industry nations had recognised the South Korean reorganisation proceeding and granted relief from arrest proceedings (Japan, United Kingdom, Singapore, Germany, Belgium, Canada, Australia and USA). In Spain, Italy and France, the Hanjin- administrator had applied for such recognition and granting of relief, see Goodman (2016).

  147. 147.

    See Seoul Central District Court declared Hanjin Shipping bankrupt (2017), Maritime Herald, available at http://www.maritimeherald.com/2017/seoul-central-district-court-declared-hanjin-shipping-bankrupt/ (last visited on 10 June 2018).

  148. 148.

    See above at Sect. 4.4.4.

  149. 149.

    See Franks et al. (2017), p. 8.

  150. 150.

    The maritime creditor friendly approach was confirmed in Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) v Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2014], 2 SLR 815.

  151. 151.

    Re Taisoo Suk (as foreign representative of Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd [2016] SGHC 195, 2 SLR 787.

  152. 152.

    See Ji (2017).

  153. 153.

    The applicant foreign representative of Hanjin argued that the application made was essential part of the series of applications that Hanjin had made across the world to prevent piecemeal and haphazard resolution of the company’s difficulties. Any such disparate treatment would imperil Hanjin’s rehabilitation and there would be a disorderly scramble amongst Hanjin’s creditors to act quickly to seize and/or exercise their lien on vessels and containers which constituted Hanjin’s principle business asset”, Ang (2016), p. 13.

  154. 154.

    See for this and the following: Ji (2017).

  155. 155.

    Alwang (1996), p. 2646.

References

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Göretzlehner, E. (2019). Maritime Cross-Border Insolvency and Harmonisation. In: Maritime Cross-Border Insolvency. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11793-1_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11793-1_4

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-11792-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-11793-1

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics