Abstract
This chapter deals with the growing interaction between Beijing and Kabul and the proposal for the enlargement of the CPEC into Afghanistan. It elaborates on the current trajectories within Chinese-Afghan relations and sheds light on Beijing’s rising interests in Afghanistan. The underlying Chinese rationale regarding its western neighbourhood will be outlined. In this context, the chapter gives special attention to Afghan-Pakistan relations, the re-emergence of the Taliban and the role of both the US and India in the region. It will be argued that a potential CPEC enlargement into Afghanistan faces fundamental challenges. More concretely, the potential integration of Afghanistan into the larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seems likely to worsen rather than to improve the conditions for the Afghan people. A major engagement of Beijing in Afghanistan within the BRI framework would most likely function as a source for conflict rather than stability and would further undermine regional cooperation.
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Notes
- 1.
The Heart of Asia Conference (Istanbul process) of 2014 supported 64 separate initiatives—ranging from boosting commerce and investment to disaster control and education—created so as to promote Afghanistan’s socioeconomic reconstruction, national security and regional integration (Yunbi, 2014, November 3). For more information on the ‘Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process’, see: http://hoa.gov.af/#move-top
- 2.
For more information on the First Round of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Strategic Dialoguehttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1236606.shtml
- 3.
China became increasingly active in providing aid to Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2013, China provided Afghanistan with a total of 1.5 billion yuan (approximately $240 million) of aid. But in 2014 alone, China provided Afghanistan with 500 million yuan ($80 million) in aid and pledged to provide an additional 1.5 billion yuan ($240 million) until the end of 2017 (Huasheng, 2015). However, this financial support is mostly limited to certain economic projects which serve Chinese interests. Besides financial support, Beijing will provide hundreds of scholarships for Afghan students to study in China and give training to several thousands Afghan professionals in various fields, including counterterrorism, anti-drug trafficking, agriculture, and diplomacy (Huasheng, 2015).
- 4.
This narrow land strip not only connects China with Afghanistan but also separates Tajikistan from Pakistan.
- 5.
- 6.
Founded in 1992, the so-called ‘Northern Alliance’ in Afghanistan, formally known as the ‘United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan’, is a multi-ethnic group, mainly composed of three non-Pashtun ethnic groups Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Hazaras. The initial aim was to overthrow the communist government, later they disintegrated during the civil war and turned than into an anti-Taliban force backed by the US (BBC, 2001, November 13). With the end of the Taliban, the Northern Alliance was dissolved.
- 7.
Besides the establishment of some kind of ‘normalized’ relations between Beijing and the Taliban, the issue of Taliban-Uyghurs ties remained as a contentious issue between both, especially that Uyghurs fighters received training from the Taliban as well as using Afghan soil to conduct terrorist activities in China.
- 8.
See also Sect. 8.6 below.
- 9.
Since some years, Afghanistan has become one of the largest sources of drug trafficking to China (Huasheng, 2012, p. 4).
- 10.
Also known as ‘insider attacks’.
- 11.
Most noteworthy in the given context is that the US invited the Taliban to peace negotiations while at the same time continuing to the target killings their (senior) leaders.
- 12.
Dr. Massouda Jalal, former Minister of Women’s Affairs (2004–2006) and only woman candidate in the 2004 Afghan presidential election in an interview with the author, 25 April 2015 in Bonn.
- 13.
For example, besides getting the chance to open a political office in Doha (Clark, 2013, June 19), the Taliban continued to attack Afghan and international forces.
- 14.
The Pentagon, the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense, were also entrusted with new legal (war-fighting) authorities by the White House, which subsequently initiated a process of empowering the local command of the US Forces in Afghanistan (US Forces Afghanistan/Resolute Support’ at the tactical level as well as the reduction of Washington’s habits of micro-managing its forces abroad, especially in Afghanistan (Diamond, 2017, June 26; Wolf, 2017b, August 23).
- 15.
It is reported that the US Air Force dropped 4361 bombs in Afghanistan in 2017, as opposed to 1337 in 2016 and 947 in 2015 (Lamothe, 2018, February 10).
- 16.
A question which got reflected by Craig Nelson, Kabul Bureau Chief, The Wall Street Journal, in an e-mail interview with the author, on 5 March 2018.
- 17.
For example, India opened consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar.
- 18.
Actually, rather due to the successful US led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) based on the cooperation with the Northern Alliance.
- 19.
For example, India pledged in 2011 two billion US dollars in development aid to Afghanistan until the period 2014 at the International Conference on Afghanistan (Timmons, 2012, June 7).
- 20.
To include security as an issue in bilateral relations is a process which started already in April 2008, as India agreed to share its experience in counter-insurgency with Afghanistan, offered training for pilots, and help to maintain Afghanistan’s fleet of helicopters (Sikri, 2009, p. 53).
- 21.
For example, in the form of supplying Afghanistan with defensive military equipment, such as armoured check posts and watch towers (Pant, 2010, p. 8).
- 22.
Namely, thee Zaranj-Delaram Road was a project carried out by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO). Another important road project links the Kandahar with Spin Boldak, an important city close to the Pakistan border (D’Souza, 2007, p. 837)
- 23.
The project demonstrates a landmark cooperation among the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, including for major components: a 500 kV AC transmission line from Datka, in Kyrgyzstan, to Sughd, in Tajikistan; a 1300 megawatt AC-DC Convertor Station at Sangtuda, Tajikistan; a 750 kilometer High Voltage DC line from Sangtuda to Nowshera in Pakistan, via Afghanistan, and a 1300 megawatt DC-AC Convertor Station at Nowshera. Two Indian companies were selected by the government in Kabul to build the transmission lines in Afghanistan (Putz, 2017, December 12).
- 24.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi cited in Xinhua (2017a, December 27).
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Wolf, S.O. (2020). Afghanistan Within the BRI Vision and the Feasibility of Enlarging the CPEC. In: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. Contemporary South Asian Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16198-9_8
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