Abstract
The call to re-envision theoretical psychology comes after more than a half century of theorists’ efforts to re-envision psychological science. Especially prominent is persistent critique of mainstream psychology’s deployment of the ontological and epistemic templates of the natural sciences, in theorists’ multifaceted mission to replace that metatheoretical grounding with one deemed properly suited (or indigenous) to a thoroughgoing psychological science of lived experience. Despite anticipated objection, I call for consideration of boundary-pushing trends and challenges in the natural sciences, especially in theory and philosophy of physics, with an eye toward inspiring theoretical psychologists and mainstream psychologists anew. I also draw attention to the use of relevant findings of mainstream psychological scientists by philosophers of psychology who ask traditional philosophical questions nonetheless. This use mirrors the use of relevant findings of biological scientists by philosophers of biology within the burgeoning field of biophilosophy, in which I find an apt analogue to what I herein call “psycphilosophy.” By adopting a more mutual, relational attitude toward disciplines that have heretofore been dismissed, theoretical psychologists may attain a better position from which to make more constructive and productive contact with mainstream psychological scientists—contact that may facilitate the impact on the mainstream that has to date eluded theorists.
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Notes
- 1.
The term “theoretical psychology” encompasses theoretical and philosophical psychology, as stipulated in the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology (www.theoreticalpsychology.org/history). Teo (2018) states that “the terms theoretical and philosophical psychology are often used interchangeably, but professional philosophers prefer the term philosophical psychology when reflecting on psychological topics” (p. vi).
- 2.
Teo (2018) also uses a therapy analogy: “It may be the case that critical-theoretical psychology has advanced arrogant analyses of psychology, combined with self-righteousness, which have made it difficult to accept critique … Perhaps a forced therapy is less effective than the process of asking basic questions that need to be discussed” (p. 15).
- 3.
The “Psychology and the Other” conference and book series is one formalized example (see www.psychologyandtheother.com).
- 4.
Teo (2017b, 2018) convincingly advocates expanding psychology’s disciplinary boundaries by way of the “psychological humanities.” Whether my turn to boundary challenges in the natural science are viewed as the self-limiting, if not outright regressive, emulation of the natural sciences decried by many theorists remains to be seen.
- 5.
My thanks to philosopher of physics Peter Lewis for this example.
- 6.
There abounds fierce debate about whether string theory can in principle be tested empirically, and if not, whether it should or should not be considered a bona-fide scientific theory in physics. See, for example, Dawid (2013) and Woit (2006), who hold opposing views about this. The implications of this debate for theoretical psychology exceed the limits of this chapter.
- 7.
See Lassiter and Ballantyne (2017, note 1, p. 94), for citation of other such work.
- 8.
- 9.
Existential social psychology is another candidate for consideration by theoretical psychologists who emphasize moral concerns. For example, Rothschild and Keefer (2017) demonstrated how and when moral outrage at social injustice “alleviates guilt and buffers threats to one’s moral identity” (title, p. 209) rather than serving to combat injustice. This mainstream work has important implications for psychology’s participation in advancing social justice.
- 10.
In experimental philosophy the nature of “folk” concepts is empirically tested rather than presumed (see, e. g., Phillips, De Freitas, Mott, Gruber, & Knobe, 2017; Phillips, Misenheimer, & Knobe, 2011), and there is much debate about whether its findings significantly challenge “armchair philosophical methods” (Ichikawa, 2014, p. 207). Stich and Tobia (2016) review diverse research programs in experimental philosophy.
- 11.
“Biophilosophy is neither a metaphilosophical position nor a philosophical subdiscipline [but rather] a way of doing philosophy that uses tools drawn from the biological sciences to address non-biological (or non-paradigmatically biological) questions” (Smith, 2017b, p. 4).
- 12.
My thanks to David Livingstone Smith for pointing this out.
- 13.
Stam (2012) critiques the functionalism he finds dominant in psychology on the grounds that it spawns an infinite number of meaningless variables: “Functional descriptions … can be multiplied indefinitely [without] limit to the kind and degree of number of entities that can be imagined” (p. 231).
- 14.
Just what it means for philosophy of science to be “continuous” with science has been debated. In the concluding section I touch on this question briefly.
- 15.
The term “indigenous” is polysemous. I distinguish indigenous psychologies as culturally contextualized, which Teo (2013) says all psychologies are, from “indigenous psychology” as a unique approach to a disciplinary psychology that rejects the naturalism of natural sciences, regardless of its geographical origins. I find the latter meaning in Wertz (2016), who seeks an expressly psychological science free from its naturalistic underpinnings, in its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.
- 16.
Stam (2012) rightly challenged the view that science proceeds and should proceed from first principles: “The idea that knowledge can be created from a grand theory or from first principles looks ever more remote and archaic” (p. 236). “Genuine scientific inquiries will always follow problems, not dictates or disciplines” (p. 229).
- 17.
See Thomasson (2015) for explication of Quinian and neo-Quinian (scientistic) positions.
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Held, B.S. (2019). Testing the Limits: Theoretical Psychology Re-envisioned in Light of Boundary-Pushing Trends in Theoretical Physics, Philosophy of Biology, and Philosophy of Psychology. In: Teo, T. (eds) Re-envisioning Theoretical Psychology. Palgrave Studies in the Theory and History of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16762-2_7
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