Abstract
This chapter traces the nature and impact of the anti-Allied advocacy of the culture wars upon the radical identity shift of the Hawthornian majority. Crucially, it demonstrates how and why the increasingly bitter tone of those cultural contestations resulted in the virtual abandonment, on the part of the English-descended majority, of its former (and tenaciously held) attitude of political anglophobia. Not only, for this majority of the American population, would political anglophobia cease to fulfill an essential ontological function; henceforth it became possible for them to conceive of “true Americanism” as being not just consistent with an Anglo-American alliance, but as even requiring such a strategic union. Political anglophobia certainly did not entirely disappear from American society after the war, but henceforth it would be more exclusively the preserve of non-English ethnic minorities, including and especially the German- and Irish-Americans, rather than what it had previously been: the indispensable identity prop of the English-descended majority themselves.
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Notes
- 1.
The best single biography is Leon Edel, Henry James: A Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985).
- 2.
Quoted in Michael Lind, The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 63.
- 3.
Quoted in George S. Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930), p. 172. Not everyone was so magnanimous regarding a fellow American’s decision to renounce citizenship. One anti-interventionist champion of “cultural pluralism” in the United States observed, more than a bit ruefully, that “[n]o one resented the action of the late Mr. Henry James when he found himself in such disagreement with the attitude of the government of his country toward the European phase of the Great War that he could in conscience no longer retain his citizenship in it and gave it up. On the contrary, excuses and justifications were added to those he gave himself.” Horace M. Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples (New York: Arno Press, 1970; orig. pub. 1924), pp. 59–60.
- 4.
See Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Denna F. Fleming, “Woodrow Wilson and Collective Security Today,” Journal of Politics 18 (November 1956): 611–24; and Arthur Walworth, America’s Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).
- 5.
Intermestic being taken to represent both a domestic ethnic component of national identity, and a budding sense of newfound transatlantic collective identity in a political sense; see Eric P. Kaufmann, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
- 6.
Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 44–45. Michael Lind puts this same thought into more colorful language when he writes of the country’s Anglo-American foundation that “we have inherited a culture which, in its deepest structure, remains ‘Anglomorph.’…. America has a way of turning Greeks, Mexicans, Swedes, Chinese, and Polish Jews into reincarnations of seventeenth-century Englishmen.” Next American Nation, p. 261.
- 7.
Illustratively, even such an American as Walter Hines Page, who would eventually become totally committed to the British cause while serving as his country’s ambassador to wartime Britain, could exult in August 1914, “Again and ever I thank God for the Atlantic Ocean”; quoted in Margaret MacMillan, “1914 and 2014: Should We Be Worried?” International Affairs 90, 1 (2014): 59–70, quote at p. 59.
- 8.
Quoted in Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (Toronto: Lester and Orpens, 1989), p. 209.
- 9.
For this assumption, see Michael S. Neiberg, Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).
- 10.
For his own central involvement in the culture wars of the neutrality years, see Neal M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972).
- 11.
This would be an inversion of a more familiar notion in IR, the “gradient-of-power” hypothesis, by which a state’s ability to project power diminishes in direct proportion to the distance over which it needs to move its military force.
- 12.
Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate, p. 27 (emphasis added). Remarkably, the foreword to this book was admiringly written by none other than “Colonel” Edward House, who has been widely (if not totally accurately) depicted as President Wilson’s alter-ego and principal wartime advisor. By 1930, House was able to lavish praise on Viereck, a nemesis back during the neutrality period, for the equable manner in which the quondam German propagandist analyzed the culture wars of that period, “remind[ing] us how foolish and partisan we can be in times of high emotional tension…. Now that the world has become calm and reason once more rules, we can read with pleasure and interest such a book as Mr. Viereck has written, and wonder how we nearly lost our balance during the trying days of the Great War” (pp. v–vi). Two years after the publication of Germs of Hate, Viereck would return the compliment in a reasonably sympathetic (to House) book, The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York: Liveright, 1932). Skeptical views of the actual degree of “influence” House had upon the president are found in David M. Esposito, “Imagined Power: The Secret Life of Colonel House,” Historian 60 (Summer 1968): 741–55; Robert Higgs, “Who Was Edward M. House?” Independent Review 13 (Winter 2009): 455–62; and especially Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007). More supportive of the case for an influential House are Nicholas Ferns, “Loyal Advisor? Colonel Edward House’s Confidential Trips to Europe, 1913–1917,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 24 (September 2013): 365–82; Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); and Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1956). As for Viereck, he would later, during the Second World War, re-embrace the cause of the “Fatherland” at a time when most other German-Americans refrained from doing so. Even after his son, George S. Viereck, Jr., died fighting as an American solider at Anzio, the elder Viereck refused to repudiate Nazism, leading his wife, Gretchen, to divorce him. On this later aspect of Viereck’s political activism, see Phyllis Keller, States of Belonging: German-American Intellectuals and the First World War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 181–89. On German-Americans’ general antipathy to Hitlerism, see Timothy J. Holian, The German-Americans and World War II: An Ethnic Experience (New York: Peter Lang, 1996).
- 13.
See especially Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979).
- 14.
For a contemporary account of such incidents, see John Price Jones and Paul M. Hollister, The German Secret Service in America, 1914–1918 (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1918). For the most authoritative recent scholarship on this issue, see Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff and German-American Relations, 1908–1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); and Idem, “The Politics of Irresponsibility: Imperial Germany’s Defiance of United States Neutrality during World War I,” in Germany and America: Essays on Problems of International Relations and Immigration, ed. Hans Trefousse (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1980), pp. 3–20.
- 15.
Munitions stored at the Jersey City terminal awaiting shipment to Europe exploded in the early morning hours of 30 July, creating a shock wave that led many people far from the scene of the blast to think it must have been generated by an earthquake. Skyscrapers and other structures in nearby Manhattan had their windows shattered by the detonation, which also caused so much structural damage to the recently remodeled torch of the Statue of Liberty that it led to the torch’s being permanently closed to visitors, and eventually removed from the statue altogether. See Jules Witcover, Sabotage at Black Tom: Imperial Germany’s Secret War in America, 1914–1917 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1989); and Chad Millman, The Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America and an Epic Hunt for Justice (New York: Little, Brown, 2006). On the damage to the original torch, see Helene Stapinski, “The Passing of the Torch,” New York Times, 18 November 2018, p. 28.
- 16.
See Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000); and Charles Thomas Johnson, Culture at Twilight: The National German-American Alliance, 1901–1918 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 24–26.
- 17.
Carl F. Wittke, We Who Built America: The Saga of the Immigrant (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939).
- 18.
On the contemporaneous interstate consequences of status anxiety, see Reinhard Wolf, “Rising Powers, Status Ambitions, and the Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn from Imperial Germany’s Failures,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (Summer 2014): 185–219; and Idem, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition,” International Theory 3 (February 2011): 105–42. More generally, see Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
- 19.
Although framed for a radically different temporal period, an analysis that seems more than apt for the culture wars of the neutrality years is Paul Saurette, “You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics,” Review of International Studies 32 (July 2006): 495–522.
- 20.
In the judgment of one student of American society during the interwar years, the legacy of political anglophobia continued to weigh on American opinion, even after the outbreak of the war, when it was easier to find strong pro-German sentiments being candidly expressed than comparable pro-British ones. “Pro-British patterns were harder to isolate than those pro-German, for what blood sympathy might have induced among those of British origin was checked by the experience of the United States that was anti-English. Mark Sullivan’s second volume, America Finding Herself (1927), has unique chapters on the ingredients of the education of mature Americans of 1914. Their history books had taught them to distrust England. Americans were slower to believe that England could be right than that Germany was wrong.” Frederic L. Paxson, American Democracy and the World War: Pre-War Years, 1914–1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1936), pp. 164–65.
- 21.
Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States, p. 99.
- 22.
See, in particular, the first-hand accounts written by two American diplomats to Belgium until April 1917, Brand Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, 2 vols. (Toronto: McClelland, 1919); and Hugh Gibson, A Journal from Our Legation in Belgium (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1917).
- 23.
Paul H. Avrich, The Haymarket Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 58–59. Spies was one of the four anarchists hanged in November 1887, in connection with the Haymarket affair of the previous year.
- 24.
As commented by the British ambassador to the United States, Cecil Spring Rice, at a time in 1916 when London was worried that the beverages were beginning to mix a little too well; quoted in Stephen Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914–18 (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 114.
- 25.
One feverish imagination, possessed by a German rather than a German-American essayist, even fantasized that America would derive enormous benefit if, with Britain occupied on the Western front and Canada’s army overseas aiding it, the large numbers of German-American “reservists”—some 500,000 or so according to this author—could be allowed to do the United States the great service of marching northward and seizing Canada for it! See for this fantastic claim, Karl Jünger, Deutsch-Amerika mobil! (Berlin: B. Behr, 1915), pp. 140–42.
- 26.
Richard Bartholdt, From Steerage to Congress: Reminiscences and Reflections (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1930), pp. 366–67 (emphasis added).
- 27.
See note 12.
- 28.
See Michael Pearlman, To Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the Progressive Era (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984). Also see John Patrick Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1974).
- 29.
Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties: The United States from Armistice to Normalcy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 91–92.
- 30.
See Charles Paul Vincent, Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915–1919 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985); Eric W. Osborne, Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–19 (London: Frank Cass, 2004); and A. C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1937).
- 31.
Quoted in Clifton James Child, “German-American Attempts to Prevent Exportation of Munitions of War, 1914–1915,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 25 (December 1938): 351–68, quote at pp. 356–57.
- 32.
In the autumn of 1914 the Literary Digest published the results of its sampling of the editorial leanings of America’s press; of the 367 editors who responded to the review’s questionnaire, 105 leaned toward the Allies, 20 toward the Central Powers, and the remaining 242 professed to be neutral in thought; Dean R. Esslinger, “American German and Irish Attitudes toward Neutrality, 1914–1917: A Study of Catholic Minorities,” Catholic Historical Review 53 (July 1967): 194–216, citing from pp. 194–95.
- 33.
“The Germanisation of the United States,” National Review 65 (March 1915): 41–51, quote at pp. 50–51. For similar worries about the Germanic impress upon American identity, see “Are Americans More German than British?” World’s Work 21 (December 1915): 141–47.
- 34.
Earl R. Beck, Germany Rediscovers America (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1968), p. 2. Berlin’s ambassador to the United States reflected on the unwisdom of relying so much on the ability of the German-Americans’ ability to keep America out of the war, writing two years after the armistice that “[o]ur greatest mistake was to expect too much from them.” Johann Bernstorff, My Three Years in America (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), pp. 22–23.
- 35.
The Weber article was helpfully summarized in English by the editors of a leading Hawthornian journal, under the title, “Do the German-Americans Dictate Our Foreign Policy?” American Review of Reviews, no. 41 (March 1910), pp. 349–50.
- 36.
Nor was the perception limited to those in positions of authority in the German capital; it was fairly widely assumed throughout the country that the US diaspora would be an incredible asset for the Fatherland. As a result, once America entered the war, many Germans felt not only confused, but betrayed, by their kinfolks’ inability to have kept America on the sidelines. One German artillery officer who thought he knew America well because of his family’s close business and personal connections in the country, Karl Friedrich Rudolf Nagel, later recalled that “[m]any German people who had lifelong dealing with Americans felt vaguely that they simply would not fight us, even if their government told them so…. That we now had to face all these American soldiers was proof to me that our diplomats must have been the worst in the world. It was unbelievable.” Quoted in Joseph E. Persico, Eleventh Month, Eleventh Day, Eleventh Hour: Armistice Day, 1918—World War I and Its Violent Climax (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 255–56.
- 37.
Terry Golway, Irish Rebel: John Devoy and America’s Fight for Ireland’s Freedom (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Terence Dooley, The Greatest of the Fenians: John Devoy and Ireland (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 2003); and Desmond Ryan, The Phoenix Flame: A Study of Fenianism and John Devoy (London: Arthur Barker, 1937).
- 38.
See John P. Buckley, The New York Irish: Their View of American Foreign Policy, 1914–1921 (New York: Arno Press, 1976).
- 39.
Quoted in Michael Doorley, Irish-American Diaspora Nationalism: The Friends of Irish Freedom, 1916–1935 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005), pp. 37–38.
- 40.
Cohalan was here referring to the fate of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty of 1897, which would have submitted to arbitration future disputes between the United States and United Kingdom, such as the one that had arisen two years earlier over Venezuela. It failed by three votes to get the necessary two-thirds majority when up for ratification before the senate on 5 May 1897, and while Irish-American hostility was indeed one element in its defeat, far more important was opposition coming from pro-silver senators in western states, who saw the treaty as the handiwork of a devilish conspiracy fomented by British “gold monometallism.” See Nelson Manfred Blake, “The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897,” American Historical Review 50 (January 1945): 228–43, quote at p. 238.
- 41.
Hartley, Irish Question, p. 30, quoting the Washington correspondent of London’s Morning Post; and Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate, pp. 97–98.
- 42.
Clifton James Child, The German-Americans in Politics, 1914–1917 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1939), pp. 73–78.
- 43.
See Benjamin O. Fordham, “Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I,” International Organization 61 (April 2007): 277–310; and Kathleen Burk, Britain, America, and the Sinews of War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). As one scholar explains, “[a]ccording to article 7 of the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, the United States was well within its rights to continue or end munitions sales to the belligerents—as long as both sides were treated equally.” M. Ryan Floyd, Abandoning Neutrality: Woodrow Wilson and the Beginning of the Great War, August, 1914-December, 1915 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 79–80.
- 44.
Quoted in Child, “German-American Attempts,” p. 361.
- 45.
See Donald C. Watt, “The British Reactions to the Assassination at Sarajevo,” European Studies Review 1 (July 1971): 233–47; and Keith M. Wilson, “The British Cabinet’s Decision for War, 2 August 1914,” British Journal of International Studies 1 (July 1975): 148–59. More generally, see F. H. Hinsley, ed., British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1977).
- 46.
The words in single quotations represent Theodore Roosevelt’s recollections of what the Kaiser had told him in 1910, as recorded in a letter the former president wrote to George Otto Trevelyan in October 1911; cited in J. Lee Thompson, Never Call Retreat: Theodore Roosevelt and the Great War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 5 (emphasis in original).
- 47.
Oswald Garrison Villard, Germany Embattled: An American Interpretation (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1915), pp. 6–7.
- 48.
Jacob Peter Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah: The Teaching of Germany’s Poets, Prophets, Professors, and Preachers—A Documentation, trans. Jessie Bröchner (New York: George H. Doran, 1917), pp. 48–49. Bang, who taught theology at the University of Copenhagen, produced the Danish version of this book in 1915.
- 49.
See Stuart Wallace, War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914–1918 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988).
- 50.
On the rise of German-American cultural chauvinism, see Guido A. Dobbert, “German-Americans between New and Old Fatherland, 1870–1914,” American Quarterly 19 (Winter 1967): 663–80; and Jörg Nagler, “From Culture to Kultur: Changing American Perceptions of Imperial Germany, 1870–1914,” in Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America Since 1776, ed. David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 131–54.
- 51.
John A. Hawgood, The Tragedy of German-America: The Germans in the United States of America during the Nineteenth Century—and After (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940), pp. 265–66.
- 52.
Ibid., p. 53.
- 53.
A young theologian who later become one of America’s most prominent foreign policy analysts even went so far as to blame what he took to be the clannishness of his fellow German-Americans for the degradation of Germany’s image in American eyes during the era of the culture wars; see Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Failure of German-Americanism,” Atlantic Monthly 118 (January 1916): 13–18; reprinted under the same title in World War I at Home: Readings on American Life, 1914–1920, ed. David F. Trask (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 145–49.
- 54.
Dorothy Ross, “Historical Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century America,” American Historical Review 89 (October 1984): 909–28, quote at 919.
- 55.
See Howard B. Woolston, “Rating the Nations: A Study in the Statistics of Opinion,” American Journal of Sociology 22 (November 1916): 381–90.
- 56.
Yet even this incident, with 124 Americans among the 1198 dead, did little to stimulate interventionist fervor in the United States. Notes one author, of some 1000 editorials appearing in American newspapers within three days of the sinking, only half a dozen featured a clear advocacy for the United States to enter the war, suggesting that “[p]erhaps about one-half of 1 percent of the entire population wanted to enter the clash.” Justus Drew Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War: A New History of American Entry into World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. 73.
- 57.
For pan-Germanism’s lack of influence upon German-American cultural nationalism, see Mildred S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, 1890–1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924). For pan-German expansionist ideology—before, during, and following the existence of the Pan-German League (or, as it was called officially in German, the Alldeutscher Verband)—see Michel Korinman, Quand l’Allemagne pensait le monde: Grandeur et decadence d’une géopolitique (Paris: Fayard, 1990).
- 58.
Translated roughly as “once again, the German nature will heal the world.” Quoted in Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, p. 35.
- 59.
Child, German-Americans in Politics, pp. 175–76.
- 60.
The imagery is from Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: A “Special Relationship”? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 104.
- 61.
Quoted in Russell A. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 169.
- 62.
The respective cables, O’Leary’s and Wilson’s, are quoted in Buckley, New York Irish, pp. 90–91, 95–96.
- 63.
Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).
- 64.
Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 176.
- 65.
See S. D. Lovell, The Presidential Election of 1916 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980). The only states west of the Mississippi to go for Hughes were Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota, and Oregon.
- 66.
See Armin Rappaport, The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951); and Sterling J. Kernek, “Distractions of Peace during War: The Lloyd George Government’s Reactions to Woodrow Wilson, December 1916–November 1918,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. 65, 2 (1975): 1–117.
- 67.
See Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); and Ralph B. Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–1978 (New York: William Morrow, 1978).
- 68.
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” American Political Science Review 99 (February 2005): 107–23, quote at pp. 118–19 (emphasis added).
- 69.
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the United States (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952).
- 70.
Gabriel Almond, “Public Opinion and National Security Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (Summer 1956): 371–78, quote at p. 372.
- 71.
Huntington, Who Are We?, 9–10.
- 72.
For a forceful and cogent articulation of this theme, see Arthur Gleason, Our Part in the Great War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1917). Gleason complained that cultural pluralists were conducting a dangerous campaign to strip the country’s national identity of its essential qualities, derivative as these latter were of an English civilizational milieu. Responding to a German-American named Kirchberger who took to the pages of the Chicago Evening American on 10 August 1916 to question the national-identity bona fides of the “Choates, the Roosevelts, the Eliots, and the foreign-born Haven Putnams” [i.e., EDAs all, even if in the case of Roosevelt only tangentially so], Gleason retorted that “[o]ur ancestry, literature, sentiment and language do produce such men as Joseph Choate, Theodore Roosevelt, Charles William Eliot and George Haven Putnam. Those names do go straight back in our national history to the original stock, which shaped our national policy and ideals. It was their ancestry, English and American literature, their racial sentiment, and the English language, which made the historic America. Mr. Kirchberger believes them to be disloyal to the New America” (pp. 118–19).
- 73.
Bernard C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 1, 6–7.
- 74.
Quoted in A. Scott Berg, Wilson (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2013), pp. 577–78.
- 75.
Notes one of the leading experts on American participation in the war, “for a while [it] came to be repudiated even more thoroughly than either Vietnam or Iraq. That should not come as a surprise. From the outset, this war had a large number of opponents and a much bigger cohort of uneasy supporters. Those numbers guaranteed that the war would have its naysayers even before the guns fell silent in November 1918.” John Milton Cooper, Jr., “The World War and American Memory,” Diplomatic History 38 (September 2014): 727–36, quote at p. 731.
- 76.
Michael Kazin, “The Great Mistake in the Great War,” New York Times, 6 April 2017, p. A28 (emphasis added).
- 77.
For the impact of Stunde Null on subsequent German attitudes toward the use of force, see Thomas F. Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
- 78.
On the interwar return of Anglo-American tension, see John E. Moser, Twisting the Lion’s Tail: American Anglophobia between the World Wars (New York: New York University Press, 1999); and George H. Knoles, The Jazz Age Revisited: British Criticism of American Civilization during the 1920s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955). Useful contemporary assessments of this tension include “The Source of Anti-Britishism,” New Republic 52 (16 November 1927): 325–26; “Anti-British Hysteria,” Nation, 143 (11 September 1937): 253–54; and Margaret Halsey, With Malice Toward Some (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1938).
- 79.
David R. Woodward, Trial By Friendship: Anglo-American Relations 1917–1918 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993), p. 220.
- 80.
Quoted in Child, German-Americans in Politics, pp. 163–64.
- 81.
Henry Seidel Canby, “Anglomania,” Harper’s 143 (November 1921): 709–14, quote at p. 709.
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Haglund, D.G. (2019). Getting Their English Up: The Culture Wars and the Ending of American Neutrality, 1914–1917. In: The US "Culture Wars" and the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18549-7_6
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