Abstract
Both philosophers and non-philosophers often have the impression that the concept of violence has an essence, that is, one or more properties that are characteristic of all violence and only violence. In this chapter, it is shown that characteristics of damage, morally wrong and intention cannot be the essence. The conclusion is that we need to understand our notion of violence in the same way as Wittgenstein understood the concept of play and family. That insight is not only of philosophical importance but also of non-philosophical relevance.
This is a more extensive version of a Dutch article that has been published in Karakter. Tijdschrift voor wetenschap.
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Notes
- 1.
Note that the purpose of the following paragraphs is explicitly not to define once and for all what the definition of violence should be, a definition against which the already-existing concept of violence can be measured and on the basis of which that concept can be judged on its value. When reading the following pages, one should rather keep the word ‘violence’ in mind, as it is used, for example, in the media, political discourse or everyday life. The aim is, in fact, to see whether there is a characteristic shared by everything we call ‘violence’ in these different contexts, and which only characterizes those things that we consider to be violence.
- 2.
- 3.
For a more detailed analysis, see Jason Wyckoff (2013), ‘Is the Concept of Violence Normative?’, Revue internationale de philosophie 3 (265), 337–352.
- 4.
See also Giuliano Pontara (1978), ‘The Concept of Violence’, Journal of Peace Research 1 (15), 19–32.
- 5.
Nick Haslam (2016), ‘Concept Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology’, Psychological Inquiry 27 (1), 1–17.
- 6.
See also Malin Akerström (2002), ‘Slaps, Punched, Pinches – But not Violence: Boundary-Work in Nursing Homes for the Elderly’, Symbolic Interactions 25 (4), 515–536.
Bibliography
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Pontara, G. (1978). The Concept of Violence. Journal of Peace Research, 15(1), 19–32.
Wyckoff, J. (2013). Is the Concept of Violence Normative? Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 3(265), 337–352.
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Lauwaert, L. (2019). Violence and Essentialism?. In: Lauwaert, L., Smith, L., Sternad, C. (eds) Violence and Meaning. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27173-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27173-2_2
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