Abstract
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only, which is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation. Specifically, we consider the setting of a joint computation where different agents have inputs of different quality and each agent is interested in learning as much as possible while maintaining exclusivity for information. Our high level question is how to design mechanisms that motivate all the agents (even those with high-quality inputs) to participate in the computation; we formally study problems such as set union, intersection, and average.
The second author received support from: the Danish Independent Research Council under Grant-ID DFF-6108-00169 (FoCC); the European Union’s under grant agreement No 731583 (SODA) and No 803096 (SPEC). Part of the work of the third author was done when working at Aarhus University. The third author was also supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China Grants No. 61433014, 61602440, 61872334 and Shanghai Key Laboratory of Intelligent Information Processing, China. Grant No. IIPL-2016-006.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In the secure multiparty computation setting this trusted party is usually replaced by a cryptographic protocol. For the sake of simplicity, we do not further consider cryptographic protocols in this work.
- 2.
Pareto effiency ensures no agent can be better off without making anyone worse off.
- 3.
Welfare maximization is achieved by maximizing over all Pareto efficient outcomes.
- 4.
[14] considers other facets, such as privacy, but still in lexicographic ordering.
References
Archer, D.W., et al.: From keys to databases - real-world applications of secure multi-party computation. Comput. J. 61(12), 1749–1771 (2018)
Aumann, R.J.: Game theory. In: Game Theory, pp. 1–53. Springer (1989)
Azar, P.D., Goldwasser, S., Park, S.: How to incentivize data-driven collaboration among competing parties. In: ITCS, pp. 213–225 (2016)
Ben-Efraim, A., Lindell, Y., Omri, E.: Efficient scalable constant-round MPC via garbled circuits. In: Takagi, T., Peyrin, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2017. LNCS, vol. 10625, pp. 471–498. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_17
Chen, Y., Nissim, K., Waggoner, B.: Fair information sharing for treasure hunting. In: AAAI, pp. 851–857 (2015)
Chen, Y., Waggoner, B.: Informational substitutes. In: FOCS, pp. 239–247 (2016)
Damgård, I., Pastro, V., Smart, N., Zakarias, S.: Multiparty computation from somewhat homomorphic encryption. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 643–662. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_38
Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In: STOC, pp. 623–632. ACM (2004)
Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., Lepinski, M.: Rational secure computation and ideal mechanism design. In: FOCS, pp. 585–594 (2005)
Keller, M., Orsini, E., Scholl, P.: MASCOT: faster malicious arithmetic secure computation with oblivious transfer. In: ACM SIGSAC, pp. 830–842 (2016)
Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320–339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_18
Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B., Smart, N.P., Yanai, A.: Efficient constant round multi-party computation combining BMR and SPDZ. In: Gennaro, R., Robshaw, M. (eds.) CRYPTO 2015. LNCS, vol. 9216, pp. 319–338. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_16
Mantena, R., Sankaranarayanan, R., Viswanathan, S.: Platform-based information goods: the economics of exclusivity. Decis. Support Syst. 50(1), 79–92 (2010)
McGrew, R., Porter, R., Shoham, Y.: Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation. In: TARK, pp. 59–71. ACM (2003)
Miltersen, P.B., Nielsen, J.B., Triandopoulos, N.: Privacy-enhancing auctions using rational cryptography. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 541–558. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_32
Nielsen, J.B., Nordholt, P.S., Orlandi, C., Burra, S.S.: A new approach to practical active-secure two-party computation. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 681–700. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_40
Nissim, K., Orlandi, C., Smorodinsky, R.: Privacy-aware mechanism design. In: ACM EC, pp. 774–789. ACM (2012)
Pinkas, B., Schneider, T., Zohner, M.: Scalable private set intersection based on OT extension. ACM Trans. Priv. Secur. 21(2), 7:1–7:35 (2018)
Roth, A.: The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1988)
Segal, I., Whinston, M.: Exclusive contracts and protection of investments. RAND J. Econ. 31(4), 603–633 (2000)
Shapley, L.S.: A value for n-person games. The Shapley value, pp. 31–40 (1988)
Shoham, Y., Tennenholtz, M.: Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity. Theor. Comput. Sci. 343(1), 97–113 (2005)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding authors
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Brânzei, S., Orlandi, C., Yang, G. (2019). Sharing Information with Competitors. In: Fotakis, D., Markakis, E. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11801. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-30472-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-30473-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)