Abstract
We are increasingly surrounded by numerous embedded systems which collect, exchange, and process sensitive and safety-critical information. The Internet of Things (IoT) allows a large number of interconnected devices to be accessed and controlled remotely, across existing network infrastructure. Consequently, a remote attacker can exploit security vulnerabilities and compromise these systems. In this context, remote attestation is a very useful security service that allows to remotely and securely verify the integrity of devices’ software state, thus allowing the detection of potential malware on the device. However, current attestation schemes focus on detecting whether a device is infected by malware but not on disinfecting it and restoring its software to a benign state.
In this paper we present HEALED – the first remote attestation scheme for embedded devices that allows both detection of software compromise and disinfection of compromised devices. HEALED uses Merkle Hash Trees (MHTs) for measurement of software state, which allows restoring a device to a benign state in a secure and efficient manner.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In the case of networks of embedded devices, we rely on the initialization protocol of existing collective attestation schemes for sharing software configurations and symmetric keys between devices [8].
- 2.
It is not possible to provide accurate measurements of the energy consumption of HEALED since our FPGA implementations of SMART and TrustLite tend to consume considerably more energy than manufactured chips.
References
Target attack shows danger of remotely accessible HVAC systems (2014). http://www.computerworld.com/article/2487452/cybercrime-hacking/target-attack-shows-danger-of-remotely-accessible-hvac-systems.html
Jeep Hacking 101 (2015). http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/systems/jeep-hacking-101
Abera, T., et al.: C-FLAT: control-flow attestation for embedded systems software. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2016, pp. 743–754. ACM, New York (2016), https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978358
Abera, T., et al.: Invited - things, trouble, trust: On building trust in iot systems. In: Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC 2016, pp. 121:1–121:6. ACM, New York (2016). https://doi.org/10.1145/2897937.2905020
Ambrosin, M., Conti, M., Ibrahim, A., Neven, G., Sadeghi, A.R., Schunter, M.: SANA: secure and scalable aggregate network attestation. In: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer & Communications Security, CCS 2016 (2016)
ARM Limited: SSL library mbed TLS/polarssl (2016). https://tls.mbed.org/
Armknecht, F., Sadeghi, A.R., Schulz, S., Wachsmann, C.: A security framework for the analysis and design of software attestation. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (2013)
Asokan, N., et al.: SEDA: scalable embedded device attestation. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Computer & Communications Security, CCS 2015, pp. 964–975 (2015)
Asokan, N., Nyman, T., Rattanavipanon, N., Sadeghi, A., Tsudik, G.: Assured: architecture for secure software update of realistic embedded devices. IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. 37(11), 2290–2300 (2018)
Botnet, M.: Website (2016). https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html
Dessouky, G., et al.: LO-FAT: low-overhead control flow attestation in hardware. In: 54th Design Automation Conference (DAC 2017), June 2017
Eldefrawy, K., Tsudik, G., Francillon, A., Perito, D.: SMART: secure and minimal architecture for (establishing a dynamic) root of trust. In: Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (2012)
Francillon, A., Nguyen, Q., Rasmussen, K.B., Tsudik, G.: A minimalist approach to remote attestation. In: Design, Automation & Test in Europe (2014)
Gardner, R., Garera, S., Rubin, A.: Detecting code alteration by creating a temporary memory bottleneck. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 4(4), 638–650 (2009)
Ibrahim, A., Sadeghi, A.R., Tsudik, G.: DARPA: device attestation resilient against physical attacks. In: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. WiSec 2016 (2016)
Ibrahim, A., Sadeghi, A.R., Tsudik, G.: US-AID: unattended scalable attestation of IOT devices. In: Proceedings of the 37th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, SRDS 2018 (2018)
Kennell, R., Jamieson, L.H.: Establishing the genuinity of remote computer systems. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2003)
Koeberl, P., Schulz, S., Sadeghi, A.R., Varadharajan, V.: TrustLite: a security architecture for tiny embedded devices. In: European Conference on Computer Systems (2014)
Kovah, X., Kallenberg, C., Weathers, C., Herzog, A., Albin, M., Butterworth, J.: New results for timing-based attestation. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 239–253 (2012)
Li, Y., McCune, J.M., Perrig, A.: VIPER: verifying the integrity of peripherals’ firmware. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (2011)
McCune, J.M., et al.: TrustVisor: efficient TCB reduction and attestation. In: Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, S&P 2010, pp. 143–158 (2010)
McCune, J.M., Parno, B.J., Perrig, A., Reiter, M.K., Isozaki, H.: Flicker: an execution infrastructure for TCB minimization. SIGOPS Operating Syst. Rev. 42(4), 315–328 (2008)
Merkle, R.C.: Protocols for public key cryptosystems. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 122–134. IEEE Computer Society (1980). http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/sp/sp1980.html#Merkle80
de Meulenaer, G., Gosset, F., Standaert, O.X., Pereira, O.: On the energy cost of communication and cryptography in wireless sensor networks. In: IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing (2008)
OpenSim Ltd.: OMNeT++ discrete event simulator. http://omnetpp.org/ (2015)
Perito, D., Tsudik, G.: Secure code update for embedded devices via proofs of secure erasure. In: Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6345, pp. 643–662. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_39
Petroni, Jr., N.L., Fraser, T., Molina, J., Arbaugh, W.A.: Copilot – a coprocessor-based Kernel runtime integrity monitor. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 13–13. USENIX Association (2004)
Pietro, R.D., Ma, D., Soriente, C., Tsudik, G.: POSH: proactive co-operative self-healing in unattended wireless sensor networks. In: 2008 Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, October 2008, pp. 185–194 (2008)
Sailer, R., Zhang, X., Jaeger, T., Van Doorn, L.: Design and implementation of a TCG-based integrity measurement architecture. In: Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 223–238 (2004)
Samuel, J., Mathewson, N., Cappos, J., Dingledine, R.: Survivable key compromise in software update systems. In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 61–72. CCS 2010. ACM, New York (2010). https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866315
Schellekens, D., Wyseur, B., Preneel, B.: Remote attestation on legacy operating systems with trusted platform modules. Sci. Comput. Program. 74(1), 13–22 (2008)
Seshadri, A., Perrig, A., van Doorn, L., Khosla, P.: SWATT: software-based attestation for embedded devices. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2004)
Seshadri, A., Luk, M., Perrig, A., van Doorn, L., Khosla, P.: SCUBA: secure code update by attestation in sensor networks. In: ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (2006)
Seshadri, A., Luk, M., Shi, E., Perrig, A., van Doorn, L., Khosla, P.: Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems. In: ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (2005)
Trusted Computing Group (TCG): Website. http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org (2015)
Vijayan, J.: Stuxnet renews power grid security concerns, June 2010. http://www.computerworld.com/article/2519574/security0/stuxnet-renews-power-grid-security-concerns.html
Zeitouni, S., et al.: ATRIUM: runtime attestation resilient under memory attacks. In: 2017 International Conference on Computer Aided Design, ICCAD 2017, November 2017
Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous reviewers and, in particular, Alvaro Cardenas for his constructive feedback. This research was co-funded by the German Science Foundation, as part of project S2 within CRC 1119 CROSSING, HWSec, and Intel Collaborative Research Institute for Collaborative Autonomous & Resilient Systems (ICRI-CARS). Gene Tsudik was supported in part by: (1) DHS under subcontract from HRL Laboratories, (2) ARO under contract W911NF-16-1-0536, and (3) NSF WiFiUS Program Award 1702911.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 International Financial Cryptography Association
About this paper
Cite this paper
Ibrahim, A., Sadeghi, AR., Tsudik, G. (2019). HEALED: HEaling & Attestation for Low-End Embedded Devices. In: Goldberg, I., Moore, T. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11598. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32101-7_36
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32101-7_36
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-32100-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-32101-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)