Abstract
In the year 2007, China enforced a new policy stipulating that industrial land must be granted through tender, auction, and/or listing (TAL) and the transaction price of the granted land should be higher than a minimum price standard. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the reform based on interrupted time series quasi-experimental design. The effects of the reform on industrial land conveyance and on overall land granting are evaluated. The results indicate that this reform has successfully reduced the proportion of industrial land granted through negotiation; however, it has not promoted price growth but has reduced the TAL granted industrial land price. This reform has also significantly reduced the total negotiation granted land and the proportion of land granted through negotiation in the overall land granting market.
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Notes
- 1.
The statistical criteria changed in year 2011. Since there are no other substitute data, this study assumes that the measurement error of this systematic change would not undermine the statistical validity of our analysis.
- 2.
The statistical criteria changed in year 2004. Before the change, it means the investment on capital construction; after 2005, it is the investment of fixed assets in urban area.
- 3.
This index is only available during the years 2003 to 2008. To compare the results with those generated from time series 2003–2011, this index is both included and excluded in the 2003–2008 period. In the model without this variable, the effect of urban-rural income disparity becomes more pronounced and significant, which means that the regions with higher urban-rural income inequality and higher impetus of rural resident immigration are more likely to grant land through negotiation to attract investment.
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Du, J. (2020). China’s Land Granting Reform for Industrial Land: A Quasi-experimental Evaluation. In: Levine-Schnur, R. (eds) Measuring the Effectiveness of Real Estate Regulation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35622-4_6
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