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Political Islam as an Ordering Factor? The Reconfiguration of the Regional Order in the Middle East Since the “Arab Spring”

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The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East

Abstract

In this chapter, Political Islam is presented as a major factor in the reconfiguration of the regional order since the first Arab Spring movement through its critical role in regional conflicts. In national as well as regional contexts, Political Islam’s most notable actors—especially the Muslim Brotherhood and their ideological associates—play a conflict-generating role, both as subject and object. On the one hand, they are closely involved in the restructuring of the region. On the other hand, certain regional powers, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Qatar, have an interest in making a political issue out of their existence. Political Islam’s growing influence throughout the region polarizes the societies of the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East. It provides an integrative element or enemy image, which serves to facilitate the consolidation of new regional alliances by means of threat perceptions and power options. Against this background, this chapter offers a comparative analysis of the formation of new regional axes and the strategies deployed by the four mentioned states for coping with Political Islam.

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Notes

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Dihstelhoff, J., Lohse, A. (2020). Political Islam as an Ordering Factor? The Reconfiguration of the Regional Order in the Middle East Since the “Arab Spring”. In: Amour, P. (eds) The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_2

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