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Conceptualizing Opposition in the EU Multi-Level Polity

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Opposition in the EU Multi-Level Polity

Abstract

In this chapter, we discuss the problems of considering opposition politics in the context of the EU multi-level polity. We start from the classical, typology-centered literature on political opposition and opposition strategies, concluding that opposition politics in the EU requires more imaginative approaches. Analogous to governance, the multi-level character of the EU imposes both organizational and strategic challenges and opportunities for actors engaged in opposition, privileging new actors and coordination. We argue that the concept of an issue-oriented, i.e., policy-motivated, ad hoc opposition provides a fruitful starting point for considering opposition in a polity such as the EU. This implies that a focus on extra-parliamentary actors and oppositional objectives other than obtaining government alternation.

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Thierse, S., Badanjak, S. (2021). Conceptualizing Opposition in the EU Multi-Level Polity. In: Opposition in the EU Multi-Level Polity . Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47162-0_3

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