Abstract
The “divide and conquer” approach to scientific realism requires a compelling criterion for specifying theory-parts worthy of realist commitment – components deemed very probably true. Articulating such a criterion has proved difficult, however. Long-term retention across theory-change provides a poor basis at best (judging by examples like the ether of light); the same can be said about such features as empirical success and current freedom from specific doubts. This paper argues for a seemingly better choice, drawn from scientific practice and focused on five overlapping strategies: hostile probing of a theory’s central tenets by its opponents, revision of auxiliary assumptions (mainly by supporters of the theory), external grounding of theoretical assumptions, efforts to identify adequacy conditions for successor theories, and explanations of a theory’s success after becoming superseded.
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Notes
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See, for example, Sulloway (1992) on relevant works by Sigmund Freud, Franz Alexander, Sigfried Bernfeld & Sergei Feitelberg, Heinz Lichtenstein, and Leon Saul.
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Typically, these parts correspond to applications of T grounded in models subjected to abstraction, domain-restriction, and coarse-graining (partial-models of T). See Cordero (2013).
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In Whewell (1847, pp. 67–68) he says: “No example can be pointed out, in the whole history of science, so far as I am aware, in which this Consilience of Inductions has given testimony in favour of an hypothesis afterwards discovered to be false. … [W]hen the hypothesis, of itself and without adjustment for the purpose, gives us the rule and reason of a class of facts not contemplated in its construction, we have a criterion of reality, which has never yet been produced in favour of falsehood”.
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I wish to thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments.
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Cordero, A. (2013). Theory-Parts for Scientific Realists. In: Karakostas, V., Dieks, D. (eds) EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_13
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