Abstract
One of the deep roots of opposition to social constructionism is the belief that the very idea of a social construction of physical concepts is highly suspect. In this paper, I want to call attention to the fact that such “constructions” can occur in the opposite direction as well. According to responsibilism, attributions of actions are to be understood in terms of ascriptions of responsibility. Responsibilists thus take the notion of action to be a social concept. I point out how, from the responsibilist point of view, the concept of action is misconstrued as mental by the predominant intentionalist approach in philosophy of action.
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Notes
- 1.
In calling attention to such mental constructions of what is at roots a social phenomenon, I am not siding with social constructionism. In fact, the debate between social constructionism and realism frequently is really a debate between conceptualism (or antirealism) and realism (see also Hacking 2000), where the modifier “social” does not play a great role.
- 2.
This usage of the term “intentional movement” is not widespread. The term is introduced by Frankfurt 1988). In view of the dispute between minimalism (e.g. Davidson 1971) and moderationism (e.g. Thomson 1977) in the ontology of action, the claim would have to readjusted. Moderationists would insist that intentional movements are parts (possibly proper parts) of complexes with which intentional (unintentional) actions are identical.
- 3.
The most obvious exception is H.L.A. Hart (1951) who frequently speaks of the “philosophy of conduct,” intending to cover both actions and omissions (including unintentional ones) by the term.
- 4.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett 1985), 1110a1–4.
- 5.
One must remember to avoid simple-minded interpretations here. The distinction is not (as suggested by the form of words Aristotle sometimes uses) between forces outside and inside the agent, for there can be the wrong kind of forces inside the agent (spasms, e.g.), and there may be the right kind of “external” forces (e.g. when someone helps an old person through the street). See also (Frankfurt 1988).
- 6.
The use of the term “performance” is technical. It is constructed in such a way as to encompass both actions and nonactions – the winkings and the blinkings, the arm raisings and the arm risings, falling off the stairs and running down the stairs etc.
- 7.
It is not exactly clear on Hart’s account what ontological category the variable x ranges over in the expression “α is responsible for x”. Some critics (e.g. Pitcher 1960) have charged Hart with the view that the variable ranges over actions, thus rendering Hart’s account circular. But, most of the time (except for a noncommittal statement on the first page of his paper), Hart is quite careful not to talk this way. The variable could be interpreted as ranging over events or events under a description. (For details, see Paprzycka 1997, ch. 2. See also Sneddon 2006.)
- 8.
- 9.
In a remarkable paper, Baier (1970) has sketched an approach to action where the idea of a task plays a central role. The account sketched owes a lot to hers.
- 10.
The thought that some performances acquire the status of actions (indeed intentional actions) by default is present in Brandom’s account (see esp. Brandom 1994, pp. 257ff). While Brandom officially adheres to a causal account of action, this thought makes him an implicit responsibilist.
- 11.
This is an idealizing assumption. I am making it in order to sharpen the intuitions at stake.
- 12.
The notions of prima-facie (pf-) fulfillment and pf-frustration are introduced in part to prevent the circularity problem that affects responsibilist accounts. One might, for example, argue that an expectation to raise an arm is not fulfilled when the arm rises of its own accord, by accident, in a spasm, etc. An account of action that used such a concept of expectation fulfillment would be rightly charged with circularity. That is why, at this stage, I appeal to a very liberal notion of pf-fulfillment that includes not only actions but also nonactions as pf-fulfilling an expectation.
- 13.
I mark the notion of reasonableness with an asterisk to note that it is a theoretical concept, which captures but one dimension of our ordinary concept. In particular, our concept of what it would be reasonable to expect of another person also includes a normative component (it would be unreasonable of me in this sense to expect of my neighbor to mow my lawn even though it would be within his power to do so), which I am ignoring here.
- 14.
I take the condition “α is subjected to the test” to be synonymous with the expression “α is subjected to the test and α fulfills all the conditions of the test, i.e. is cooperative, at ease, under no pressure, with no other intentions or expectations in play”.
- 15.
Defeating conditions can be defeated by other conditions and those conditions can be defeated by still other conditions.
- 16.
For similar reasons, the responsibilist is open to the idea of letting in as actions cases that are notoriously problematic for the intentionalist because the requisite internal make up seems lacking: arational actions (Hursthouse 1991), habitual actions (Pollard 2003, 2006), nonintentional actions (Chan 1995), unintentional omissions (Smith 1984, 1990), mistakes and slips (Peabody 2005). At the same time, cases of antecedential wayward causal chains do not present any special problems (see also Paprzycka 1997, 2013).
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Acknowledgement
The work on the paper has been sponsored in part by an NCN grant (DEC-2012/05/B/HS1/02949).
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Paprzycka, K. (2014). The Social Re-Construction of Agency. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_22
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