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Corporate Criminal Liability from a Comparative Perspective

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Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability

Abstract

The recognition of legal entities has been an important step in the development of many countries and has often gone hand in hand with their industrialization. Necessary investments for projects such as railways required states to allow private entities to act legally on their own and restrict liability to the money invested, in order to attract investors. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, when economic markets and the emergence of companies had gained momentum as a result of the industrial revolution, legal systems have dealt with the problem of how these entities, with companies being the most important ones, should be treated when its members infringe legal regulations. This question becomes particularly significant for society when members commit crimes.

The effect of such “corporate wrongdoing” can be tremendous. An early example is the collapse of the South Sea Company from 1719 to 1721 and the financial ruin left in its wake due to widespread insider trading and corruption. The accounting scandals within Enron and Worldcom in the US, the case of financial fraud within Parmalat in Italy, or the corruption cases within Siemens in Germany are vivid examples during the last decade of the scope and severe consequences corporate wrongdoing can have on direct stakeholders and the overall market. In a liberal society, and especially in a free market economy, the freedom of conducting business without state interference is a critical element of the system. Yet the mere scope of the aforementioned cases calls for an adequate response by society and its legal systems. This chapter takes a comparative view of existing national and international solutions to corporate criminal liability (1) from prevailing models (2) over new approaches (3) to new perspectives in regulation (4).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (88) 18 concerning liability of enterprises having legal personality for offences committed in the exercise of their activities, adopted on 20 October 1988.

  2. 2.

    Council Act of 19 June 1997 drawing up the Second Protocol of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, OJ C 221 of 19.7.1997, p. 11 (Art. 3).

  3. 3.

    Joint Action 97/154/JHA of 24.2.1997 on trafficking in human beings and the sexual exploitation of children, OJ L 63 of 4.3.1997, p. 2 (under II.A.c.); 98/742/JHA of 21 December 1998 on making it a criminal offense to participate in a criminal organization in the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 351 of 29.12.1998, p. 1 (Art. 3); 98/742/JHA of 22 December 1998 on corruption in the private sector, OJ L 358 of 31.12.1998, p. 2 (Art. 5).

  4. 4.

    Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29.5.2000 on counterfeiting of the euro, OJ L 140 of 14.6.2000, p. 1 (Art. 8); 2001/413/JHA of 28.5.2001 on fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, OJ L 149 of 2.6.2001, p. 1 (Art. 7); 2002/475/JHA of 13.6.2002 on terrorism, OJ L 164 of 22.6.2002, p. 3 (Art. 7); 2002/629/JHA of 19.7.2002 on trafficking in human beings, OJ L 203 of 1.8.2002, p. 1 (Art. 4; replaced by directive 2011/36/EU); 2002/946/JHA of 28.11.2002 on the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328 of 5.12.2002, p. 1. (Art. 2); 2003/568/JHA of 22.7.2003 on corruption in the private sector, OJ L 192 of 31.7.2003, p. 54 (Art. 5); 2004/68/JHA of 22.12.2003 on the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ L 13 of 20.1.2004, p. 44 (Art. 6; replaced by directive 2011/93/EU); 2004/757/JHA of 25.10.2004 on illicit drug trafficking, OJ L 335 of 11.11.2004, p. 8 (Art. 6); 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems, OJ L 69 of 24.2.2005, p. 67 (Art. 8, replaced by directive 2013/40/EU); 2008/841/JHA of 24.10.2008 on organized crime, OJ L 300 of 11.11.2008, p. 42 (Art. 5); 2008/913/JHA of 28.11.2008 on racism and xenophobia, OJ L 328 of 6.12.2008, p. 55 (Art. 5).

  5. 5.

    Directive 2003/6/EC of 28.1.2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96 of 12.4.2003, p. 16 (Art. 1 Nr. 6, Art. 2); 2005/60/EC of 26.10.2005 on money laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L 309 of 25.11.2005, p. 15 (Art. 2, 39); 2008/99/EC of 19.11.2008 on the protection of the environment, OJ L 328 of 6.12.2008, p. 28 (Art. 6); 2009/123/EC of 21.10.2009 on ship-source pollution, OJ L 280 of 27.10.2009, p. 52 (Art. 8); 2011/36/EU of 5.4.2011 on trafficking in human beings, OJ L 101 of 15.4.2011, p. 1 (Art. 5); 2011/92/EU [corrected: 2011/93/EU] of 13.12.2011 on sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ L 335 of 17.12.2011, p. 1 (Art. 12); 2013/40/EU of 12.8.2013 on attacks against information systems, OJ L 218 of 14.8.2013, p. 8 (Art. 10).

  6. 6.

    Proposal for a directive on insider dealing and market manipulation, document COM (2012) 420 final of 25.7.2012 and COM (2011) 654 final of 20.10.2011 (Art. 7); on fraud to the Union’s financial interests, document COM (2012) 363 of 11.7.2012 (Art. 6); on the protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting by criminal law, council document 14085/1/13 of 3.8.2013 (Art. 6); on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, document COM (2013) 45 final of 5.2.2013 (Art. 55).

  7. 7.

    For details, see Engelhart (2012b), pp. 110ff.

  8. 8.

    Convention on the Protection of Environment through Criminal Law of 4.11.1998 (not yet in force), ETS No. 172 (Art. 9); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27.1.1999, ETS No. 173 (Art. 18); Convention on Cybercrime of 23.11.2001, ETS No. 185 (Art. 12); Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 16.5.2005, ETS No. 196 (Art. 10); Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 16.5.2005, ETS No. 197 (Art. 22); Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism of 16.5.2005, ETS No. 198 (Art. 10); Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 25.10.2007, ETS No. 201 (Art. 26); Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats to public health of 28.10.2011 (not yet in force), ETS No. 211 (Art. 11).

  9. 9.

    See the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9.121999 (Art. 5); United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 15.11.2000 (Art. 10); United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31.10.2003 (Art. 26).

  10. 10.

    OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 17.12.1997 (Art. 2).

  11. 11.

    E.g. Inter-American Convention against Corruption of 29.3.1996 (Art. 8 para. 1); Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol against corruption of 14.8.2001 (Art. 4 para. 2); African Union Convention on preventing and combating corruption of 11.6.2003 (Art. 11 No. 1).

  12. 12.

    E.g. the FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation. The FATF Recommendations (February 2012), p. 26, 34 (No. 7c.), 37 (No. 8).

  13. 13.

    Also often called “business crime”, “white collar crime”, or “financial crime”.

  14. 14.

    E.g. Norway (1991), Iceland (1993), France (1994), Finland (1995), Slovenia (1995), Belgium (1999), Estonia (2001), Hungary (2001), Malta (2002), Croatia (2003), Lithuania (2003), Poland (2003), Switzerland (2003), Slovakia (2004), Romania (2004), Austria (2006), Luxembourg (2010), Spain (2010), Czech Republic (2011); Sweden provides for a corporate criminal sanction but nor for corporate criminal liability since 1986 (as a kind of mixed model); Italy chose a quasi-criminal approach in 2001; Bulgaria introduced a mixed administrative-criminal liability for legal persons in 2005. See Gober and Pascal (2011); Pieth and Ivory (2011); Sieber and Cornils (2008), pp. 347ff.; Vermeulen et al. (2012).

  15. 15.

    See Engelhart (2012a), pp. 322ff., 346ff., 599ff.; Mittelsdorf (2007); Ransiek (2012), p. 45.

  16. 16.

    Second Protocol, supra note 3, Art. 3.

  17. 17.

    For an overview and further references, see Engelhart (2012a), pp. 458f., 677ff.; von Freier (1998), pp. 230ff.

  18. 18.

    For possible models, see Engelhart (2012a), pp. 350ff. See also Tiedemann (2012), pp. 9ff.

  19. 19.

    This approach is based on v. Gierke and his theory of real corporate delinquency (Theorie der realen Verbandstäterschaft), see von Gierke (1887), pp. 603ff., 613.

  20. 20.

    See e.g. Henkel (1960), pp. 91ff.

  21. 21.

    See e.g. Coffee (1980–1981), p. 386.

  22. 22.

    See e.g. von Freier (1998), pp. 55ff. who shows that no common philosophical basis for corporate and individual liability can be found. See also Paul (2011), pp. 49ff. for the important case in the 18th century of the South sea company.

  23. 23.

    See e.g. Art. 102 of the Swiss Criminal Codes mentions “Unternehmen”.

  24. 24.

    See e.g. the Austrian Verbandsverantwortlichkeitsgesetz mentions “Verband”.

  25. 25.

    On preventive effects, see in detail infra Sect. 4.1.

  26. 26.

    On compliance, see e.g. Kaplan and Murphy (2013); Hauschka (2010); Moosmayer (2012); Kuhlen (2013), pp. 1ff.; Rotsch (2010), pp. 141ff.; Sieber (2008), pp. 460ff.

  27. 27.

    See Engelhart (2012a), pp. 285ff.; Eufinger (2012), p. 21; Walsh and Pyrich (1995), pp. 649ff.

  28. 28.

    Berle and Means (1932), pp. 44ff., 69.

  29. 29.

    On the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see infra at Sect. 3.3.2.

  30. 30.

    See Arroyo Zapatero (2013).

  31. 31.

    Tiedemann (1988), p. 1173 and Tiedemann (1989), pp. 174ff.

  32. 32.

    See the final report for the European Commission by Delmas-Marty (1993), pp. 59, 60, 83.

  33. 33.

    Bundesgesetz über die Verantwortlichkeit von Verbänden für Straftaten (Verbandsverantwortlichkeitsgesetz – VbVG), BGBl. I Nr. 151/2005, Revision: BGBl. I Nr. 112/2007.

  34. 34.

    Art. 102 Swiss Criminal Code; for details, see Forster (2006); Geiger (2006); Perrin (2011), p. 197.

  35. 35.

    D.Lgs. 8 guigno 2001, n. 231.

  36. 36.

    See Castaldo (2006), p. 361, de Maglie (2011), p. 255; Javers (2008), p. 408.

  37. 37.

    See Almond (2013), Matthews (2008), and Pinto and Evans (2013).

  38. 38.

    The current guidelines (effective 1 November 2013) are available online: http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/index.cfm (12.2.2014). For details on the system, see Engelhart (2012a), pp. 149ff.; Gruner (2013), §§ 8–11; see also Laufer (2006), pp. 99ff.

  39. 39.

    § 8 B 2.1 USSG.

  40. 40.

    § 8C 2.5 (f) USSG: The program reduces the so-called culpability score, which determines the minimum and maximum multiplier necessary to calculate the fine range.

  41. 41.

    § 8C 2.8 (a) (11) USSG: The lack of a compliance program is a circumstance that should be considered by the court when determining the fine within the calculated fine range.

  42. 42.

    § 8 D 1.4 (b) (1) USSG.

  43. 43.

    See the high numbers of guilty pleas in federal court proceedings that are regularly based on a deal and that reached an all-time high in 2010 at 96 %, see United States Sentencing Commission, 2010 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Table 53, Engelhart (2012a), pp. 276, 746.

  44. 44.

    See Markoff (2012–2013), McConnell et al. (2010–2011), and Ramirez (2009–2010) as well as Engelhart (2012a), pp. 739ff.

  45. 45.

    Title 9, Chapter 28 USAM.

  46. 46.

    See e.g. Hefendehl (2007), pp. 826ff., more positively Roxin (2006), § 3 para. 25; see also Engelhart (2012a), pp. 277ff., 661f.

  47. 47.

    See Breland (1975); Tiedemann (1976), p. 249, see also Tiedemann, in this volume, pp. 11ff.

  48. 48.

    See Sieber and Engelhart (2014).

  49. 49.

    See for more details Engelhart (2012a), pp. 515ff., 768ff.; Kölbel (2008), pp. 22ff.; Krause (2011), p. 439; Pape (2011), pp. 154ff.; Theile (2008), p. 406.

  50. 50.

    See Luhmann (1994), pp. 43ff. and Luhmann (1995), pp. 38ff.

  51. 51.

    See Boers (2001), p. 353; Gómez-Jara Díez (2007), pp. 302ff.; Heine (1995), pp. 79ff.; Sieber (2008), p. 475.

  52. 52.

    See e.g. von Rosenstiel (2007), pp. 387ff.; Spieß and Winterstein (1999), pp. 121ff.

  53. 53.

    See supra footnote 50.

  54. 54.

    See supra footnote 51 and surrounding text.

  55. 55.

    See e.g. Alting (1994–1995).

  56. 56.

    Ayres and Braithwaite (1995), pp. 101ff.

  57. 57.

    Sigler and Murphy (1988), pp. 169ff.

  58. 58.

    Eifert (2012), pp. 1345ff.; Hoffmann-Riem (2006), pp. 447ff.; Voßkuhle (2001), p. 213.

  59. 59.

    See Engelhart (2012a), pp. 645ff.; Sieber (2000), p. 326.

  60. 60.

    The advantages and disadvantages of such a legislative choice have rarely been discussed, as the main focus is on the distinction between public and private law and on the (constitutional) limits of such measures and therefore only addresses a small aspect of the subject, especially in regard to criminal law. For a basic analysis of the different legal regimes, see Burgi (2012); Hoffmann-Riem (2007); Waldhoff (2009), pp. 381ff.

  61. 61.

    For the emergence of global corporate norms from the interplay of public and private actors, see Dilling (2012), pp. 388ff.

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Bundesverband deutscher Banken, Best-Practice-Leitlinien für Wertpapier-Compliance (June 2011); see also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Compliance and the Compliance Function in Banks (April 2005).

  63. 63.

    See e.g. NYSE, NASDAQ, or AmEx.

  64. 64.

    See the Website of the EPA: http://www.epa.gov/compliance/assistance/index.html (12.2.2014).

  65. 65.

    See supra Sect. 3.3.3.

  66. 66.

    See supra Sect. 3.3.2.

  67. 67.

    See supra Sects. 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.

  68. 68.

    See Sec. 33 para. 1s. 2 No. 2, Sec. 39 para. 2 Nr. 17b securities trading act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz—WpHG).

  69. 69.

    See Engelhart (2012a), pp. 720ff. with a preformulated proposal for a Corporate Sanctions Act (“Unternehmenssanktionsgesetz”) comprising criminal and quasi-criminal (“ordnungswidrigkeitenrechtliche”) regulations for substantive and procedural law.

  70. 70.

    Systems such as the German one have the great advantage of differentiating between different levels of protection for legal goods: The most important legal goods are protected by criminal law, less important ones by quasi-criminal law regulations. This differentiation fosters legal clarity and legal certainty and should also be used in a corporate sanction system.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg i. Br., Germany

    Marc Engelhart

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  1. Marc Engelhart
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Correspondence to Marc Engelhart .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany

    Dominik Brodowski

  2. ROXIN Rechtsanwälte LLP, München, Germany

    Manuel Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra

  3. University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Germany

    Klaus Tiedemann

  4. Faculty of Law, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany

    Joachim Vogel

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Engelhart, M. (2014). Corporate Criminal Liability from a Comparative Perspective. In: Brodowski, D., Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra, M., Tiedemann, K., Vogel, J. (eds) Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05993-8_6

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