Conclusion

Abstract

The contrasting perspectives between Brazilian domestic courts on WTO agreements — as a representative of an emerging economy in Latin America — in a comparative perspective with European Union courts, one of the major economies of the world, provides an illustrative scenario that suggests that relations of power are an important factor in the adoption, or not, of direct effect of WTO agreements. When traditionalism is chosen without consideration of powerful WTO member states’ interpretation, then the question becomes whether the judicial enforcement of the GATT would attain the raison d’être of traditionalism which is to bring power under law. This study puts into question the core assumptions of traditionalism and indicates that, instead of bringing power under law, judicial enforcement of trade rules in Latin America provokes more asymmetry in the world balance of power. In fact, the traditionalist perspective constrains weaker countries more in their domestic policies over international trade agreements, as rich WTO member states do not provide rights of action on trade rules at their domestic level. In the current description of the world, the impact of traditionalism in developing countries enhances the disequilibrium and inequality among nations with the benefit of powerful economies. As a result, traditionalism in the context of international trade agreements seems to sparks the very imbalance of power that it seeks to avoid through the enforcement of international trade agreements by domestic courts.