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Joint Signature and Encryption in the Presence of Continual Leakage

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Information Security Applications (WISA 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8909))

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Abstract

The goal of leakage-resilient cryptography is to build schemes secure even if the secrets are partially leaked to the adversary. As far as we know, most existing leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes are studied in the setting of single secret, e.g., signing key of signature scheme, decryption key of encryption scheme. In this paper, we study the case of double secrets, i.e., the notion of a joint signature and encryption in the presence of continual leakage, for the first time. Following the terminology of [2], we refer to this primitive as leakage-resilient signcryption. In particular, we give two instantiations of such signcryption scheme based on existing leakage resilient signature and encryption schemes.

This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 60970139) and the Strategic Priority Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences (Grant No. XDA06010702).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In our definition, each user has a single key pair \((\mathsf {sk}, \mathsf {pk})\) which can be used for both signing and decryption, in some other definitions, e.g., [2], the signing and decryption keys may be generated by different key-generation algorithms.

  2. 2.

    Here, we need a public hash or encoding function to map \(Y_T^{r}\) to a bit string whose length is same as the bit representation of \((m||\varSigma ||X_T)\). Then, the same function will be used in the decryption algorithm.

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Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Fei Tang & Hongda Li

  2. Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Fei Tang & Hongda Li

  3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Fei Tang

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  1. Fei Tang
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  2. Hongda Li
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Correspondence to Fei Tang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Pukyong National University, Busan, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Kyung-Hyune Rhee

  2. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Soongsil University, Seoul, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Jeong Hyun Yi

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Tang, F., Li, H. (2015). Joint Signature and Encryption in the Presence of Continual Leakage. In: Rhee, KH., Yi, J. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8909. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15087-1_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15087-1_21

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15086-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15087-1

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