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Fault Analysis on SIMON Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers

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Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2014 (ICISC 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8949))

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Abstract

This paper proposes applying differential fault analysis (DFA) to the Simon family of lightweight block ciphers. We perform DFA by examining the characteristics of the AND operation which is a non-linear function of Simon. Then, we evaluate in detail the number of fault injections required to obtain a secret key. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show how to extract the entire secret key for all parameters in the Simon family using a practical fault model based on random faults. As an example, for Simon with a \(128\)-bit block size and a \(128\)-bit secret key, we can extract the entire secret key using \(7.82\) fault injections on average. The results of simulations performed on a PC show that the average number of fault injections required to retrieve a round key agrees with that based on theoretical results. We believe that this study gives new insight into the field of fault analysis because Simon has a property specific to non-linear functions in that it uses the AND operation while not using a substitution box which most block ciphers employ.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In fact, the input differences and the output difference can be known from the correct and faulty ciphertexts when we try to obtain the input of the non-linear function at the penultimate round. A detailed description is given in Sect. 5.2.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, NTT Corporation, 3-9-11, Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585, Japan

    Junko Takahashi

  2. NTT Technology Planning Department, NTT Corporation, 1-5-1, Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8116, Japan

    Toshinori Fukunaga

Authors
  1. Junko Takahashi
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  2. Toshinori Fukunaga
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Correspondence to Junko Takahashi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Sejong University, Seoul, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Jooyoung Lee

  2. Kookmin University, Seoul, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Jongsung Kim

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Takahashi, J., Fukunaga, T. (2015). Fault Analysis on SIMON Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers. In: Lee, J., Kim, J. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2014. ICISC 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8949. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15943-0_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15943-0_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15942-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15943-0

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