Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Romania’s Accession to the European Union: The Rule of Law Dilemma

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Common European Legal Thinking

  • 834 Accesses

Abstract

How can the EU ensure respect for the Rule of Law, enshrined in Art. 2 TEU, by its Member States and by Accession Candidates? How far do the monitoring and supervisory competences of the EU reach in this regard? How effective could such a monitoring be? These questions moved more and more into focus after the 2004/2007 enlargement of the EU. As Romania shifted from the collapse of the Ceausescu régime in December 1989 to EU membership in January 2007, the question of how respect for the Rule of Law could be effectively ensured was an issue of permanent debate, and so it continues to be. The numerous Regular and Monitoring Reports of the Commission on the accession negotiations 1998–2006, its Strategy Papers during this period and its frequent Regular Reports in the framework of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) after 2007 provide a rich source of information about this unique debate, at least from the perspective of the EU.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Wennerström 2007, p. 197 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Wennerström 2007, p. 205. A discussion of these basic concepts in EU law, German law and the ECHR is beyond the scope of this paper. See Schmidt‐Aßmann 2004; Kuijer 2004; Ullerich 2011.

  3. 3.

    Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, O.J. L 354/56 (2006).

  4. 4.

    Progress Report of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37.

  5. 5.

    Roos 2011, p. 7 et seq.

  6. 6.

    Constitution of Romania of 21 November 1991; English version www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=256&idl=2. For the genesis of the Constitution of 1991 see Slavu 2008, p. 156; Hein 2013, p. 285 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Kerek 2010, p. 479, observes that according to the Constitutional Court practice, the Rule of Law is a structural principle which does not have the quality of a legal norm.

  8. 8.

    Hein 2013, p. 309.

  9. 9.

    Kerek 2010, p. 481.

  10. 10.

    Detailed rules for the judicial system were adopted by Law no. 92/1992, Monitorul Oficial no. 197/1992.

  11. 11.

    The SCM was already foreseen in the Constitution of 1909 and existed until 1949; Hein 2013, p. 300.

  12. 12.

    See Ionescu 2008, p. II/75 et seq. For a critical assessment of the provisions on the judiciary see Hein 2013, p. 309 et seq., a survey of the development of Romanian constitutional law is given by Blokker 2012a, p. 187 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Ionescu 2008, p II/71.

  14. 14.

    On the role of the prosecutors in Romania between the executive and the judiciary see Carausan 2009, p. 112.

  15. 15.

    Since 2003: Art. 22–53. See Ionescu 2008, p. II/28 et seq. For an overview of the jurisprudence of the Romanian (and the Hungarian) Constitutional Court on fundamental rights see Kerek 2010, p. 279–498.

  16. 16.

    Law no. 47/1992 on the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court, Monitorul Oficial no. 643/2004; a comprehensive account is given by Kerek 2010, p. 148. In the following: RCC.

  17. 17.

    Kerek 2010, p. 186 et seq.

  18. 18.

    Kerek 2010, p. 209; Ionescu 2008, p. II/82.

  19. 19.

    See Ionescu 2008, p. II/30 et seq. and II/88 et seq.; Gionea and Tontsch 2007, p. 117 et seq.; Kerek 2010, p. 209 et seq. The Constitution provides for the possibility of a direct action of the Ombudsman, but does not provide for a constitutional complaint (“Verfassungsbeschwerde”) by individuals.

  20. 20.

    Hein 2013, p. 313; Regular Report of 13 November 2001, SEC(2001) 1753, p. 20.

  21. 21.

    Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 835; Hein 2013, p. 311; OSI Report 2002, p. 171 et seq. See also the critical observations by Rothacher 2002, p. 423 et seq., 438, and by Gallagher 2005, p. 285.

  22. 22.

    Rengeling and Szczekalla 2004, § 44 para 1155–1188; Kuijer 2004, p. 9 et seq., 79 et seq.; Müller 2009, p. 461 et seq.; Tschirky 2011, p. 87 et seq.; Meyer‐Ladewig 2011, para 90–100; Grabenwarter and Pabel, in Dörr et al. (2013), p. 742–838; Grabenwarter 2014, para 66 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Agenda 2000, p. 41; Regular Report of 5 November 2003, SEC(2003) 1211, p. 22.

  24. 24.

    As to the approach of the CoE to the Rule of Law see Kuijer 2004, p. 79 et seq.; Trechsel 2005, p. 81 et seq.; Grabenwarter and Pabel, in Dörr et al. (2013), p. 742–838; Seibert‐Fohr 2012, p. 1334.

  25. 25.

    Cremona 2003, p. 229; Sticht 2006, p. 360 et seq.; Sannerholm 2012, p. 63.

  26. 26.

    Tschirky 2011, p. 327; De Witte 2003, p. 229; Sannerholm 2012, p. 62 et seq.

  27. 27.

    Tschirky 2011, p. 30; Sannerholm 2012, p. 63. See also the Recommendation no. CM/REC (2010) on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. The ECtHR issued numerous judgments against Romania for violation of Art. 6.1 ECHR due to excessive judicial delays; see Tschirky 2011, p. 30; Progress Report of 18 July 2012, COM(2012) 410, p. 8, footnote 23; Regular Report of 5 November 2003, SEC(2003) 1211, p. 27 et seq.

  28. 28.

    Sticht 2006, p. 362.

  29. 29.

    From 1993 until 2007, Romania was also a member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).

  30. 30.

    O.J. L 357 (1994).

  31. 31.

    Commission Communication, The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for accession, COM(94) 320; Maresceau 1997, p. 16 et seq.

  32. 32.

    Art. O TEU‐Maastricht took over the wording of the accession clause of Art. 237 EC.

  33. 33.

    Doc. SN 180/1/93 REV 1; Bull. EC 6‐1993, p. 12; Tatham 2009, p. 206 et seq.; Fierro 2003, p. 138 et seq.; Hillion 2004, p. 13 et seq.; Inglis 2010, p. 36 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Doc. SN 00400/95EN.

  35. 35.

    And not as a legal norm: Hilf and Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 2 TEU, para 46; Ohler, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 49 TEU, para 15–17.

  36. 36.

    Schorkopf 2000, p. 69 et seq. and 234 with regard to the values “recognised” by Art. 2 TEU; Scheuing 2005, p. 162 et seq.; Nusser 2011, p. 147 et seq.; Yowell 2012, p. 107 et seq.

  37. 37.

    Hilf and Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 2 TEU, para 34; Ohler, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 49 para 17; Ullerich 2011, calls the Rule of Law concept in Art. 2 TEU a “Strukturprinzip” (p. 118) and “Argumentationsfigur” (p. 174).

  38. 38.

    Schmidt‐Aßmann 2004, para 7; Hilf and Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 2 TEU, para 46.

  39. 39.

    For the meaning of this concept see Kochenov 2008, p. 100; Ullerich 2011, p. 144 et seq., 184; Hilf and Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 2 TEU, para 34 et seq.

  40. 40.

    For the scope of their application see inter alia Große Wentrup 2003, p. 49 and 64 et seq.; Brosius‐Gersdorf 2005, p. 17; Scheuing 2005, p. 162–164; Kokott and Sobotta 2010, p. 2 et seq.; Nusser 2011, p. 9, 40, 119 et seq. and 126 (to the right to a fair trial); Ullerich 2011, p. 117; Yowell 2012, p. 107 et seq.; Azoulai 2012, p. 207 et seq.; Blanke 2012, p. 161 et seq. See also Case C‐617/10, Aklagaren v. Fransson (ECJ 26 February 2013) para 17–19.

  41. 41.

    Meyer‐Ladewig 2012, p. 233 et seq.

  42. 42.

    Rengeling and Szczekalla 2004, § 44 para 1158–1188 (wirksamer Rechtsbehelf, unparteiisches Gericht); Grabenwarter and Pabel, in Dörr et al. (2013), p. 742–838 (in particular para 48 et seq. on the independence of the courts); Meyer‐Ladewig 2011, para 67 et seq.

  43. 43.

    Rengeling and Szczekalla 2004, § 4 para 327 et seq., underlining the difficulty of delimiting clearly the two “spheres” of competences. A special case of a supervisory EU competence in the area of Member State’s competences is the procedure provided by Art. 7 TEU (see below Sect. 5.2).

  44. 44.

    Bobek 2012, p. 315 et seq.; Adinolfi 2012, p. 299.

  45. 45.

    Agenda 2000 for a stronger and wider Union, Bull. EU Supplement 5/97. In the section “Political criteria – Human Rights”, the Agenda 2000 briefly referred to the ECHR without going into details.

  46. 46.

    Bull. EU Supplement 8/97; Regular Report of 15 July 1997, COM (97) 2003.

  47. 47.

    Point 1.3. of the “General Evaluation”.

  48. 48.

    See de Witte 2003, p. 230; Kochenov 2008, p. 65.

  49. 49.

    and with Bulgaria. They actually started on 15 February 2000 and ended on 14 December 2004.

  50. 50.

    Gabanyi 1999/2000, p. 421.

  51. 51.

    Doc. SN 00300/94EN.

  52. 52.

    Doc. SN 400/97; Maresceau 2003, p. 9 et seq.

  53. 53.

    Maresceau 1997, p. 52; Inglis 2010, p. 119 et seq.

  54. 54.

    Maresceau 1997, p 30; see www.infoeuropa.ro/insidePage.php?webPageld=77&id=18146

  55. 55.

    O.J. L 85/1 (1998), based on former Art. 238 EC.

  56. 56.

    Maresceau 1997, p. 3; Kochenov 2008, p. 34 et seq.

  57. 57.

    Council Decision (EC) No. 98/261/EC, O.J. L 121/11 (1998).

  58. 58.

    Council Decisions (EC) No. 1999/852/EC, O.J. L 335/15 (1999); (EC) No. 2002/92/EC, O.J. L 44/82 (2002); and (EC) No. 2003/397/EC, O.J. L 145/21 (2003).

  59. 59.

    Regular Report of 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1409, p. 133; Tatham 2009, p. 362 et seq.

  60. 60.

    Regular Report of 5 June 2002, COM(2002) 256.

  61. 61.

    Maresceau 1997, p. 75; O’Brennan 2006, p. 74–94; Kochenov 2008, p. 59; Coman 2007, p. 184.

  62. 62.

    Kochenov 2008, p 59; Tatham 2009, p. 247 et seq.; Hillion 2004, p. 13.

  63. 63.

    Maresceau 1997, p. 3 and 59.

  64. 64.

    Wennerström 2007, p. 197, 212 and 296, maintains that the Reports “reveal the conception of the Commission on the Rule of Law”. According to Seibert‐Fohr 2009, p. 419, the Commission was “influenced” in the negotiations by “the essential parameters of the ECHR”.

  65. 65.

    Conclusions of the European Council, Doc. SN 400/97, para 10 and 29; Hillion 2004, p. 14.

  66. 66.

    “an incredible amount of documents”: Kochenov 2008, p. 7 and 67–78.

  67. 67.

    Wennerström 2007, p. 197 et seq., 212 et seq.; Maresceau 2003, p. 32 et seq. The Progress Reports 1998–2006 have been closely analysed, inter alia, by Kochenov 2008.

  68. 68.

    Kochenov 2008, p. 86 et seq.

  69. 69.

    Regular Report of 8 November 2000, COM(2000) 710, p. 25 and 87, of 13 November 2001, SEC(2001) 1753, p. 30, and of 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1409, p. 129.

  70. 70.

    Emmert 2003, p. 306.

  71. 71.

    Emmert 2003, p. 306; Coman 2007, p. 184.

  72. 72.

    They actually started on 15 February 2000 and ended on 14 December 2004.

  73. 73.

    Doc. 15917/02 of 29 January 2003.

  74. 74.

    The Commission further discusses in section (1) (“political criteria”) several other points such as fundamental freedoms and Human Rights, the fight against corruption (outside the judiciary), combating organised crime, and money laundering; this paper concentrates on the issue of the independence of the judiciary.

  75. 75.

    Regular Report of 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1409, p. 25.

  76. 76.

    In 1999/2000: 70 out of 70 appointments, in 2000/2001: 45 out of 53 appointments: OSI Report 2002, p. 176.

  77. 77.

    Regular Report of 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1409, p. 11.

  78. 78.

    Regular Report of 5 November 2003, SEC(2003) 1211.

  79. 79.

    Also designated as “High Judicial Council”.

  80. 80.

    Ionescu 2008, p. II/78; Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 838; Kochenov 2008, p. 261; Seibert‐Fohr 2009, p. 425; Hein 2013, p. 300.

  81. 81.

    Regular Report of 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1409, p. 25.

  82. 82.

    Tatham 2009, p. 491; Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 837; Hein 2013, p. 359; Blokker 2012a, p. 6 and footnote 18.

  83. 83.

    Monitorul Oficial no. 643/2004; Text in English: www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site/page?id=371. See Carp 2007, p. 200; Bormann 2004, p. 207–267; Hein 2013, p. 359 et seq., p. 375 et seq. The draft revision had been checked by the Venice Commission 2002; see its Opinion CDL‐AD(2002) 17 of 9 July 2002.

  84. 84.

    Ionescu 2008, p. II/78; Kerek 2010, p. 481.

  85. 85.

    Ionescu 2008, p. II/79; Carp 2007, p. 878.

  86. 86.

    Decision of the RCC no. 148/2003 of 16 April 2003 on the Draft Constitution, Monitorul Oficial no. 317/2003 www.ccr.ro/decisions/pdf/en/2003/D148_03.pdf; Hein 2013, p. 367 and 371. The RCC made numerous reservations to the draft.

  87. 87.

    Decision of the RCC no. 375/2005 of 6 July 2005, Monitorul Oficial no. 591/2005, p. 19.

  88. 88.

    See Valea 2010, p. 95 et seq.; Kerek 2010, p. 239–241; Roth 2006, p. 141; Hein 2013, p. 369.

  89. 89.

    Decision of the RCC no 356/2003 of 22 September 2003, Monitorul Oficial no. 686/2003.

  90. 90.

    Regular Report of 5 November 2003, SEC(2003) 1211, p. 20; Hein 2013, p. 378.

  91. 91.

    Resolution 2004 P5_A(2004)0103.

  92. 92.

    Hein 2013, p. 404.

  93. 93.

    Between 2000 and 2005, this law had been amended no less than nineteen times; Coman 2007, p. 195.

  94. 94.

    Carp 2007, p. 202; Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 844.

  95. 95.

    Decision of the RCC no. 375/2005 of 6 July 2005, Monitorul Oficial no. 591/2005; Coman 2007, p. 212 et seq.; Carp 2007, p. 204 et seq.; Hein 2013, p. 396 et seq.

  96. 96.

    Carp 2007, p. 224 et seq.

  97. 97.

    With regard to public prosecutors upon a proposal by the Minister of Justice: Hein 2013, p. 392 et seq.; for details on the status, independence and impartiality of the public prosecutors see Carausan 2009, p. 104–128. In the decision no. 375/2005 the RCC emphasised the functional independence of the prosecutors from the Ministry of Justice (see footnote 85).

  98. 98.

    Decision of the RCC no. 419/2005 of 18 July 2005, Monitorul Oficial no. 653/2005.

  99. 99.

    Other constitutional conflicts occurred between 2006 and 2009 concerning the prosecution of high‐level corruption, a subject which is outside the scope of this paper. See Smilov and Toplek 2007.

  100. 100.

    An overview of the modified provisions on the Judicial Power is given by Ionescu 2008, p. II/75 et seq.; for an evaluation see Hein 2013, p. 403 et seq.

  101. 101.

    Hein 2013, p. 378.

  102. 102.

    Ionescu 2008, p. II/78 et seq.

  103. 103.

    Carp 2007, p. 203; Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 845.

  104. 104.

    Ionescu 2008, p. II/78.

  105. 105.

    “recurs in anulare”. Hein 2013, p. 381; see Regular Reports 2000/2002/2003 and Monitoring Report 2006.

  106. 106.

    Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 863; see also Geissler and Rebegea 2011, p. 2–4.

  107. 107.

    Comprehensive Monitoring Report of 25 October 2005, COM(2005) 534, p. 10; Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 840.

  108. 108.

    Hein 2013, p. 469 with reference to the period 2003 to 2009 (“ein wesentlicher Teil der rechtsstaatlich prekären Probleme ist im Verlauf des Untersuchungszeitraumes gelöst worden”). This was accomplished with the assistance of the German IRZ‐Foundation which was between 2000 and 2010 the most important “Twinning”‐partner of the Romanian Ministry of Justice; see Trappe 2012, p. 345; Olaru 2012, p. 435 et seq.; critical to the EC method applied in the Romanian Justice Sector: Rem and Gasper 2008, p. 15 et seq.

  109. 109.

    Monitoring Reports of 2005 and 2006.

  110. 110.

    Monitoring Report of 26 September 2006, COM(2006) 549, p. 6.

  111. 111.

    Monitoring Report of 26 September 2006, COM(2006) 549, p. 10.

  112. 112.

    Denis‐Smith 2009, p. 65 et seq.

  113. 113.

    Ionescu 2008, p. II/80.

  114. 114.

    Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 876.

  115. 115.

    Seibert‐Fohr 2012, p. 1342 et seq.; Parau 2012, p. 643.

  116. 116.

    Parau 2012, p. 619 et seq.

  117. 117.

    Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 879 et seq.; Mendelski 2011a, p. 155 et seq.; Hein 2013, p. 403, footnote 1; Tanasescu and Popescu 2012, 166 et seq.; see also Garoupa and Ginsburg 2009, p. 201–232.

  118. 118.

    Geissler and Rebegea 2011, p. 5.

  119. 119.

    Coman 2007, p. 186; Seibert‐Fohr 2009, p. 425; Seibert‐Fohr 2012, p. 1342.

  120. 120.

    Comprehensive Monitoring Report of 25 October 2005, COM(2005) 534, p. 4; a critical view is also taken by Rem and Gasper 2008, p. 16–23 who analyse the Twinning Projects at the SCM.

  121. 121.

    See for example Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 880; Seibert‐Fohr 2012, p. 1295.

  122. 122.

    See for examples Weber 2010, p. 314–317.

  123. 123.

    For the “Pro” and “Contra” see Hein 2013, p. 439 et seq.; Tanasescu and Popescu 2013, p. 306 et seq. Wittreck 2006, p. 617, 641 et seq. and 660 et seq., calls self‐administration of the judiciary “a wrong track” (“Irrweg”); critical also Bobek 2007, p. 110, regarding judicial councils in the new East European Member States, and Parau 2012, p. 619–665. Conversely, see Rieger 2011, p. 126 et seq. on the reform discussion in Germany which seems to favour a stronger role of judicial self‐administration.

  124. 124.

    Conclusions of 13 December 2002, of 13 December 2003 and of 17 December 2004. See O’Brennan 2006, p. 55–73.

  125. 125.

    Conclusions of 13 December 2002, Doc. 15917/02 of 29 January 2003, para 3 and 14.

  126. 126.

    OJ L 157/9 of 21 June 2005.

  127. 127.

    In particular Resolutions P5_TA(2002)0317 and P5_TA(2002)0536. See O’Brennan 2006, p. 95–112.

  128. 128.

    O.J. L 157/7 (2005).

  129. 129.

    Resolution P6‐TA(2005)0531 of 15 December 2005 points 5 and 6; see further Resolution P6_TA(2006)0512 of 30 November 2006 commenting on the Monitoring Report of 26 September 2006, COM(2006) 549.

  130. 130.

    COM(2004) 657.

  131. 131.

    O.J. L 157/3 (2005), point 5. With reference to the Opinion of the Commission, the Council formally accepted Romania’s application for admission: Decision of 25 April 2005, O.J. L 157/9 (2005).

  132. 132.

    O.J. L 157/4 (2005), recital 9.

  133. 133.

    Signed on 25 April 2005 in Luxembourg.

  134. 134.

    Tatham 2009, p. 114.

  135. 135.

    Slavu 2008, p. 144.

  136. 136.

    Germany ratified the Accession Treaty just one week before it entered into force (on 24 November 2006).

  137. 137.

    Slavu 2008, p. 149.

  138. 138.

    Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 10.

  139. 139.

    Thus political considerations had priority according to external observers; see e. g. Smith 2003, p. 130, and Slavu 2008, p. 236 and 257.

  140. 140.

    Carey 2011, p. 333.

  141. 141.

    Inglis 2010, p. 210.

  142. 142.

    O.J. L 157/174 and L 157/374 (2005).

  143. 143.

    See footnote 83, part 3.3.

  144. 144.

    Originally it was only conceived for a period of “up to three years”: Monitoring Report of 16 May 2006, COM(2006) 214, p. 9; Monitoring Report of 26 September 2006, COM(2006) 549, p. 9.

  145. 145.

    Decision 2006/928/EC, O.J. L 354 (2006), p. 56; see Alegre 2009, p. 5–7; Inglis 2010, p. 204 et seq.; Szarek‐Mason 2010, p. 227–233; Carrera, Guild and Hernanz 2013a, p. 15–17; Carp 2014, p. 1–16.

  146. 146.

    Inglis 2010, p. 7.

  147. 147.

    Objections by the Romanian Government against the extended duration of the monitoring are not known.

  148. 148.

    The issue of corruption in the justice system is beyond the scope of this paper in spite of its high relevance for the independence of the judiciary; see the Progress Reports 2009–2014 and the Commission Communication on Fighting Corruption of 3 February 2014, COM(2014) 38, Annex 23 on Romania; Smilov and Toplek 2007; Roos and Rebegea 2009; Bormann 2009, p. 125 et seq.; Szarek‐Mason 2010, p. 182, 221–238 (on Romania and Bulgaria).

  149. 149.

    Progress Report of 18 July 2012, COM(2012) 410.

  150. 150.

    Progress Report of 30 January 2013, COM(2013) 47.

  151. 151.

    Progress Report of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37.

  152. 152.

    Technical Report of 22 January 2014, SWD(2014) 37.

  153. 153.

    www.just.ro/Portals/0/Right_Panel/Plan de actiune/plan_actiune_en-21122007(1).pdf

  154. 154.

    Hein 2013, p. 463.

  155. 155.

    Also a new framework for judicial inspections was adopted; Progress Report of 30 January 2013, COM(2013) 47, p. 8.

  156. 156.

    Progress Report of 18 July 2012, COM(2012) 410, p. 6.

  157. 157.

    Progress Report of 18 July 2012, COM(2012) 410, p. 3 and 19; Technical Report of 22 January 2014, SWD(2014) 37, p. 5.

  158. 158.

    Urgent Communication of the Romanian Constitutional Court of 3 July 2012; see Venice Commission 2012, p. 14 et seq.

  159. 159.

    Progress Report of 18 July 2012, COM(2012) 410, p. 19.

  160. 160.

    The Council and the European Parliament regularly endorsed the Commission’s evaluation of the functioning of the SCM.

  161. 161.

    For details on the ANI see Progress Report of 18 July 2012, COM(2012) 410, p. 14–16.

  162. 162.

    Law no. 144/2007 regarding the setting up, organisation and functioning of the National Integrity Agency.

  163. 163.

    Technical Report of 20 July 2010, SEC(2010) 949, p. 8 et seq., and of 20 July 2011, SEC(2011) 968, p. 8 et seq.

  164. 164.

    Progress Report of 20 July 2010, COM(2010) 949, p. 9. For details on the constitutional conflict over the parliamentary immunity see Hipper 2014, p. 15.

  165. 165.

    Progress Report of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37, p. 6; Technical Report of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37, p. 14.

  166. 166.

    Technical Report of 30 January 2013, COM(2013) 47, p. 7/8, and of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37, p. 7–10. The new Civil Procedure Code entered into force on 15 February 2013.

  167. 167.

    In 2011, no less than 140 Emergency Ordinances had been issued by the Government (see Venice Commission 2012, p. 5 et seq.), in 2013 the Government issued no less than 96.

  168. 168.

    Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 840; Carey 2011, p. 351.

  169. 169.

    Progress Report of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37.

  170. 170.

    Progress Report of 30 January 2013, COM(2013) 47, p. 2 et seq.; Progress Report of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37, p. 3–5; see the chronology of the events in the Opinion of the Venice Commission 2012, p. 3 and Blokker 2012b, p. 8 et seq.

  171. 171.

    Therefore they are largely outside the scope of this paper and cannot be discussed here in detail.

  172. 172.

    Technical Report of 28 January 2014, SWD(2014) 37, p. 4. See the detailed survey on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in Kerek 2010, p. 279–498.

  173. 173.

    See Venice Commission 2012, p. 18.

  174. 174.

    Progress Report of 18 July 2012, COM(2012) 410, p. 18; Carp 2014, p 8 et seq.

  175. 175.

    Decision no. 732/2012 of 9 July 2012, Monitorul Oficial no. 477/2012.

  176. 176.

    Emergency Ordinance no. 38/2012; see Carp 2014, p. 8 and 11.

  177. 177.

    Decision No. 727/2012 of 9 July 2012, Monitorul Oficial no. 477/2012; Decision no. 738/2012 of 19 September 2012. See Venice Commission 2012, p. 8; Carp 2014, p. 8–10.

  178. 178.

    Technical Report of 22 January 2014, SWD(2014) 37.

  179. 179.

    Emergency Ordinance No. 41/2012; see Venice Commission 2012, p. 9; Carp 2014, p. 9 and 11.

  180. 180.

    Decision no. 6 of 21 August 2012; Progress Report of 30 January 2013, COM(2013) 47, p. 3, footnote 4.

  181. 181.

    Venice Commission 2012, p. 12 point 47.

  182. 182.

    Venice Commission 2012, p. 10 point 33.

  183. 183.

    Progress Report of 30 January 2013, COM(2013) 47, p. 6; Gabanyi 2013, p. 442.

  184. 184.

    Progress Report of 22 January 2014, COM(2014) 37.

  185. 185.

    See Venice Commission 2014, passim; Technical Report of 22 January 2014, SWD(2014) 37, p. 5–6. A first proposal had been published in 2011 by the (then) Prime Minister Emil Boc (available under www.rcis.ro).

  186. 186.

    Venice Commission 2014, p. 5 point 23. For a detailed survey of the proposed provisions see Venice Commission 2014, passim; Blokker 2012a, p. 7 et seq.; Carp 2014, p. 8–13. See also www.gov.ro/programme-for-government-2013-2016_12a105576.html

  187. 187.

    Venice Commission 2014, p. 33 and 28.

  188. 188.

    Venice Commission 2014, p. 29.

  189. 189.

    The Venice Commission also recommended a special clause for the transfer of competences to the EU.

  190. 190.

    Venice Commission 2014, p. 4.

  191. 191.

    Progress Report of 30 January 2013, COM(2013) 47, p. 6; Progress Report of 22 January 2014, COM(20143) 37, p. 3.

  192. 192.

    Roos 2011.

  193. 193.

    Resolution P7_TA(2013) 0315 16 February 2013 (with reference to the Resolution of 12 December 2012); see also the Fundamental Rights Reports of the EP 2012, 2013 and 2014.

  194. 194.

    Council Conclusions of 11 March 2013, referring to Doc. 6269/13 of 12 February 2013 and to the resolution of the European Parliament of 3 July 2013.

  195. 195.

    Speech 12/596 by President Barroso: www.europa.eu/rapid/press_release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm; Speech 13/677 of 4 September 2013 by Vice‐President Reding (with reference to the Romanian rule of law crisis in 2012).

  196. 196.

    Commission Communication of 11 March 2014, COM(2014) 158; Press release of the Commission of 11 March 2014 IP/14/237. See also Carrera, Guild and Hernanz 2013a, p. 50.

  197. 197.

    About this procedure see the Commission Communication, Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606; Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 7 TEU para 62; Carrera, Guild and Hernanz 2013a, p. 50 (for a new “Copenhagen mechanism”). An earlier proposal had already been made by the EP in its Draft Treaty establishing the European Union of 19 March 1984, O.J. C 77/33 (1984), Art. 4.4 and 44.

  198. 198.

    For a critical appraisal of the Commission’s proposals see Bieber and Maiani 2013, p. 1085 et seq.

  199. 199.

    See Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), Art. 7 para 29 et seq.; on the Communication of the Commission see para 62. On former Art. 6.1 see Alegre 2009, p. 18 et seq.; Carrera, Guild and Hernanz 2013a, p. 38.

  200. 200.

    Council Regulation (EC) No. 168/2007, O.J. L 53/1 (2007).

  201. 201.

    Carrera, Guild and Hernanz 2013a, p. 5.

  202. 202.

    For the scope of Art. 7 TEU see Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), para 22 and 29; Grote 1999, p. 284 et seq.; Ullerich 2011, p. 74 et seq.; Mangiameli 2012, p. 37–39.

  203. 203.

    Carrera, Guild and Hernanz 2013a, p. 1, voice doubts whether the Communication had added anything new.

  204. 204.

    De Witte 2003, p. 234.

  205. 205.

    In case of a lack of an EU competence such a mechanism could possibly be created by an agreement between the Member States outside the framework of the TEU; see Case C‐370/12, Pringle (ECJ 27 November 2012); see the comments to the case by Bieber and Maiani 2013, p. 1081 et seq.

  206. 206.

    Opinion of the Legal Service, Doc. 10296 of 27 May 2014 (partly confidential). Sceptical Hipper 2014, p. 3. An overview of possible Rule of Law “supervision mechanisms” is given by Alegre 2009, p. 4 et seq.

  207. 207.

    See the annual Communications from the Commission on “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges”, in particular the most recent Communications of 16 October 2013, COM(2013) 700, and of 8 October 2014, COM(2014) 700; on the negotiations with Turkey see Fierro 2003, p. 148 et seq.

  208. 208.

    Communication of 16 October 2013, COM(2013) 700, p. 2, 6 and 14.

  209. 209.

    Wennerström 2007, p. 35; Ullerich 2011, p. 165; Hilf and Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2013), p. 26–28.

  210. 210.

    Hatje 2005, p. 149, sees the danger of an overstretching of the EU in the case of further enlargements; in this sense apparently also Oppermann 2005, p. 72 et seq.

  211. 211.

    Mendelski 2011a, p. 177 et seq.

  212. 212.

    Schorkopf 2000, p. 69 et seq., 99; Ullerich 2011, p. 73 et seq.; Mangiameli 2012, p. 21–46.

  213. 213.

    Council Doc. 16238/1/04 REV 1 of 1 February 2005, para 23 “Framework for Negotiations”.

  214. 214.

    Conclusions of 13 December 2002, Doc. 15917/02 of 29 January 2003 (point 18 on Turkey, point 23 on the countries of the Western Balkan) and of 16 June 2006, Doc. 10633/1/06 REV 1 of 17 July 2006, para 56; Communication “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013–2014” of 16 October 2013, COM(2013) 700, p. 1; Wennerström 2007, p. 167.

  215. 215.

    See the view of numerous authors cited above under Sect. 5.1.2.

  216. 216.

    Communication of 16 October 2013, COM(2013) 700, p. 7; Inglis 2010, p. 411–425.

  217. 217.

    Communication of 6 November 2007, COM(2007) 663, p. 2; Communication of 16 October 2013, COM(2013) 700, p. 7.

  218. 218.

    Communication of 12 October 2011, COM(2011) 666, p. 5; also, further financial assistance will be required for improving the justice sector, the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organised crime. For the period 2007–2013, the EU put over 800 Mio. Euro pre‐accession assistance at the disposal of the new Candidate Countries for these purposes; see Communication of 16 October 2013, COM(2013) 700, p. 7.

    At the same time, the European Council concluded that Turkey fulfils the political criteria (including the Rule of Law): Conclusions of 16/17 December 2004, Doc. 16238/1/04 of 1 February 2005, p. 4 et seq.

  219. 219.

    Communication of 16 October 2013 “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013–2014”, COM(2013) 700, p. 6, and 2014–2015 of 8 October 2014, COM(2014) 700 (see in particular Annex “Summary of findings” p. 30–48).

  220. 220.

    Wagener 2011, p. 210 et seq., on the conditions of transformation and re‐integration; sceptically Hatje 2005, p. 149 (“overstretching the EU”); Hipper 2014, p. 3.

  221. 221.

    Howard 2001, p. 101–103; Slavu 2008, p. 233; Tatham 2009, p. 483; Coman and Dallara 2012, p. 880.

  222. 222.

    House of Lords Report 2013, para 24 and 46.

  223. 223.

    Rem and Gasper 2008, p. 5.

  224. 224.

    A systematic strengthening of the monitoring on the basis of Art. 7 and 17 TEU and Art. 352 TFEU is considered possible from the legal point of view by Bieber and Maiani 2013, p. 1091.

  225. 225.

    This view of Nicolaidis and Kleinfeld 2012, p. 16, appears to be a widely held opinion.

References

  • Adinolfi, A. (2012). The “Procedural Autonomy” of Member States and the Constraints Stemming from the ECJ’s Case Law: Is Judicial Activism still necessary? In H.-W. Micklitz & B. de Witte (Eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States. Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alegre, S. (2009). Safeguarding the Rule of Law in the EU: Synthesis Report. In S. Alegre, I. Ivanov, & D. Denis-Smith (Eds.), Safeguarding the Rule of Law in an Enlarged EU: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania CEPS Special Report (pp. 1–19). Sofia: Open Society Institute. www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1833.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  • Azoulai, L. (2012). The Case of Fundamental Rights: A State of Ambivalence. In H.-W. Micklitz & B. de Witte (Eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (pp. 207–217). Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bieber, R., & Maiani, F. (2013). Enhancing centralized enforcement of EU law: Pandora’s Toolbox? CMLRev., 51, 1057–1092.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blanke, H.-J. (2012). The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe. In H.-J. Blanke, & S. Mangiameli (Eds.), The European Union after Lisbon. Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and External Action (pp. 159–232). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Blokker, P. (2012a). Constitution-Making in Romania: From Reiterative Crises to Constitutional Moment? Romanian Journal of Comparative Law, 3(2), 187–204.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blokker, P. (2012b). Romanian Constitutionalism: Form without Content?www.academia.edu/1937927/Romanian_Constitutionalism_Form_Without_Content

  • Bobek, M. (2007). Iudex ex machina: Institutional and Mental Transistions of Central European Judiciaries. In R. Coman & J.-M. De Waele (Eds.), Judicial Reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries (pp. 107-134). Brugge: Vanden Broele.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bobek, M. (2012). Why there is no principle of “Procedural Autonomy” of the Member States. In H.-W. Micklitz, & B.de Witte (Eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (pp. 305–323). Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bormann, A. (2004). Die rumänische Verfassungsreform 2003. Jahrbuch für Ostrecht, 45, 207–267.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bormann, A. (2009). Rumänien: Rechtsrahmen und Institutionen. In H. Küpper (Ed.), Korruptionsbekämpfung in Osteuropa (pp. 185–242). München: forost.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brosius-Gersdorf, F. (2005). Bindung der Mitgliedstaaten an die Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carausan, M. (2009). Institutional Uncertainties of the Rule of Law – the Public Prosecutor’s Office between the Executive and the Judiciary. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 28, 104–128.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carey, H. F. (2011). European Promotion of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Romania. In R. F. King, & P. E. Sum (Eds.), Romania under Basescu. Aspirations, Achievements, and Frustrations during His First Presidential Term (pp. 313–345). Lanham, Plymouth: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carp, R. (2007). A constitutional principle under scrutiny: the immovability of judges – Romanian regulations in a comparative law perspective. In R. Coman, & J.-M.De Waele (Eds.), Judicial Reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries (pp. 199–225). Brugge: Vanden Broele.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carp, R. (2014). The Struggle for the Rule of Law in Romania as an EU Member State: The Role of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. Utrecht Law Review, 10(1), 1–16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carrera, S., Guild, E., & Hernanz, N. (2013a). Rule of law or rule of thumb? A New Copenhagen Mechanism for the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 303. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies. www.ceps.eu/book/rule-law-or-rule-thumb-new-copenhagen-mechanism-eu

    Google Scholar 

  • Carrera, S., Guild, E., & Hernanz, N. (2013b). The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU. Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism. www.europarl.europa.eu/studies

    Google Scholar 

  • Coman, R. (2007). Media, Justice and Politics or How the Independence of the Judiciary became an Issue in Romania. In R. Coman, & J.-M.De Waele (Eds.), Judicial Reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries (pp. 157–198). Brugge: Vanden Broele.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coman, R., & Dallara, C. (2012). Judicial Independence in Romania. In A. Seibert-Fohr (Ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, (vol. 233, pp. 835–881). Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Cremona, M. (2003). The enlargement of the European Union. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dallara, Cr. (2014). The Successful Laggard in Judicial Reform: Romania Before and After Accession. In Cr. Dallara (Ed.), Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-East Europe (pp. 57-80). Zurich: Springer International Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Witte, B. (2003). The Impact of Enlargement on the Construction of the European Union. In M. Cremona (Ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (pp. 209–252). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Denis-Smith, D. (2009). The case of Romania. In S. Alegre, I. Ivanova, & D. Denis-Smith (Eds.), Safeguarding the Rule of Law in an Enlarged EU. The cases of Bulgaria and Romania. CEPS Special Report. (pp. 52–84). Sofia: Open Society Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dörr, O., Grote, R., & Marauhn, T. (Eds.). (2013). EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (2nd edn.). vol. II. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Emmert, F. (2003). Administrative and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Eastern European Law Journal, 9(3), 288-315.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fierro, E. (2003). The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. London, New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gabanyi, A. U. (1999–2000). Rumänien. In W. Weidenfeld & W. Wessels (Eds.). Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration (p. 421–424). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gabanyi, A. U. (2013). Rumänien. In W. Weidenfeld, & W. Wessels (Eds.), Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration (pp. 441–444). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, Tom (2005). Modern Romania. New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garoupa, N., & Ginsburg, T. (2009). Guarding the Guardians. Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence. American Journal of Comparative Law, 57, 201–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geissler, T., & Rebegea, C. (2011). The Old and the New Romanian Superior Council of Magistracy. Country Report. Rule of Law Program, South East Europe. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gionea, V., & Tontsch, G. H. (2007). Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Rumänien. In O. Luchterhandt, Chr. Starck, & A. Weber (Eds.), Berichte Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittel- und Osteuropa, (Teilband I, pp. 105–127). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grabenwarter, C. (2014). European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary. München, Oxford, Baden-Baden, Basel, Portland: C. H. Beck, Hart Publishing, Nomos, Helbing Lichtenhahn.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., & Nettesheim, M. (Eds.). (2013). Das Recht der Europäischen Union. Kommentar vol. I. Munich: C. H. Beck. Loose leaf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Große Wentrup, A. (2003). Die Europäische Grundrechtscharta im Spannungsfeld der Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Europäischer Union und Mitgliedstaaten. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grote, R. (1999). Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “Etat de droit”. In C. Starck (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy – a comparative analysis (pp. 269–306). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hatje, A. (2005). Grenzen der Flexibilität einer erweiterten Europäischen Union. Europarecht, vol. 2, 148–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hein, M. (2013). Verfassungskonflikte zwischen Politik und Recht in Südosturopa. Bulgarien und Rumänien nach 1989 im Vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hillion, C. (2004). The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny. In C. Hillion (Ed.), EU Enlargement. A Legal Approach (pp. 1–22). Oxford, Portland: Hart Publ.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hipper, A. M. (2014). Political Judicialization – The Quest for the Romanian Constitutional Court. www.bgss.hu_berlin.de/bgssonlinepublications/workshopDocu/advocatesnotariesofdemocracyfolder/paper1

    Google Scholar 

  • House of Lords (2013). The future of EU enlargement. European Union Committee. 10th Report of Session 2012–13. London: The Stationary Office Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howard, A.E.D. (2001). Judicial Independence in Post-Communist Europe. In P.H. Russell & D.M. O’Brian (Eds.), Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy. Critical Perspectives from around the World (pp. 89–110). Charlottesville, London: University of Virginia Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Inglis, K. (2010). Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement. Studies in EU External Relations vol. 4. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ionescu, C. (2008). Romania. In C. Kortmann, J. Fleuren, & W. Voermans (Eds.), Constitutional Law of 2 EU Member States: Bulgaria and Romania. The 2007 Enlargement (pp. II/1–II/104). Deventer: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kerek, A. (2010). Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Ungarn und Rumänien. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kochenov, D. (2008). EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kokott, J. & Sobotta, Chr. (2010). The Charter of Fundamental Rights after Lisbon. AEL Working Papers 2010/6. Florence: Academy of European Law.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuijer, M. (2004). The Blindfold Lady Justice – Judicial Independence and Impartiality in Light of the Requirements of Article 6 ECHR. Leiden: Wolf Legal Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mangiameli, S. (2012). The Union’s Homogeneity and its Common Values in the Treaty on European Union. In H.-J. Blanke, & S. Mangiameli (Eds.), The Treaty on European Union. The European Union after Lisbon. Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and External Action (pp. 21–46). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maresceau, M. (1997). Enlarging the European Union – Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe. London, New York: Longman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maresceau, M. (2003). Pre-accession. In M. Cremona (Ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (pp. 9–42). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Mendelski, M. (2011a). Romanian Rule of Law Reform: A Two-Dimensional Approach. In R. F. King, & P. E. Sum (Eds.), Romania under Basescu (pp. 155–179). Lanham/New York/Toronto/Plymouth: Lexington Books. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/profiles/Romanian_Rule_of_Law_Reform_%20Mendelski_2011.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  • Mendelski, M. (2011b). Rule of Law Reform in the Shadow of Clientelism: The Limits of the EU’s Transformative Power in Romania. Polish Sociological Review, 2, 235–253.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyer-Ladewig, J. (2011). EMRK. Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. Commentary (3rd edn.). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyer-Ladewig, J. (2012). The Rule of Law in the Case Law of the Strasburg Court. In H.-J. Blanke, & S. Mangiameli (Eds.), The European Union after Lisbon: constitutional basis, economic order, and external action (pp. 233–250). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Müller, L. F. (2009). Judicial Independence as a Council of Europe Standard. German Yearbook of International Law, 52, 461–486.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nicolaidis, K., & Kleinfeld, R. (2012). Rethinking Europe’s „Rule of Law“ and Enlargement Agenda: The Fundamental Dilemma. OECD/EU. SIGMA Paper No. 49. http://dx.dol.org/10.1787/5k4c42jmn5zp-en

  • Nusser, J. (2011). Die Bindung der Mitgliedstaaten an die Unionsgrundrechte: Vorgaben für die Auslegung von Art. 51 Abs. 1 S. 1 EuGrCh. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Brennan, J. (2006). The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. New York, London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • OSI Report (2001). Monitoring the EU Accession Process. Judicial Independence. Budapest: Open Society Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • OSI Report (2002). Monitoring the EU Accession Process.Judicial Capacity in Romania. Budapest: Open Society Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olaru, A. (2012). Activities of the Ministry of Justice in Collaboration with the German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation – IRZ. In S. Hülshörster, & D. Mirow (Eds.), Deutsche Beratung bei Rechts- und Justizreformen im Ausland: 20 Jahre Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Rechtliche Zusammenarbeit (pp. 435–438). Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oppermann, T. (2005). Die Grenzen der Europäischen Union oder Das Vierte Kopenhagener Kriterium. In C. Gaitanides (Ed.), Europa und seine Verfassung. Festschrift für Manfred Zuleeg zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (pp. 72–79). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parau, C. E. (2012). The Drive for Judicial Supremacy. In A. Seibert-Fohr (Ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition (pp. 619–666). Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Reding, V. (2013). The EU and the Rule of Law – What next? Speech/13/677. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rem, D., & Gasper, D. (2008). Romania’s accession process into the European Union. ISS Working Paper, vol. 463. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rengeling, H.-W., & Szczekalla, P. (2004). Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union. Charta der Grundrechte und Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze. Köln, Berlin, München: Carl Heymanns.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rieger, A. (2011). Verfassungsrechtliche Legitimationsgrundlagen richterlicher Unabhängigkeit. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roos, S. R. (2011). Die (un)endliche Geschichte der bulgarischen und rumänischen Justizreform. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Auslandsnachrichten, 1, 7–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roos, S. R., & Rebegea, C. (2009). Anticorruption Policies in the Justice System. Debate and Book Launch. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. www.kas.de/rspsoe

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. (2006). Verfassungstext und Verfassungswirklichkeit in Rumänien. In D. Fischer (Ed.), Transformation des Rechts in Ost und West. Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Herwig Roggemann zum 70. Geburtstag (pp. 137–150). Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothacher, A. (2002). Im Wilden Osten. Hinter den Kulissen des Umbaus in Osteuropa. Hamburg: Krämer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sannerholm, R.Z. (2012). Rule of Law after war and crisis: ideologies, norms and methods. Cambridge: Intersentia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheuing, D. H. (2005). Zur Grundrechtsbindung der EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Europarecht, 162–191.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt-Aßmann, E. (2004). Der Rechtsstaat. In J. Isensee, & P. Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepubik Deutschland 3rd edn. (vol. II, pp. 541–611). Heidelberg: C.F. Müller.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schorkopf, F. (2000). Homogenität in der Europäischen Union. Ausgestaltung und Gewährleistung durch Art. 6 Abs. 1 und Art. 7 EUV. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seibert-Fohr, A. (2009). Judicial Independence in European Union Accessions: The Emergence of a European Basic Principle. German Yearbook of International Law, 52, 405–436.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seibert-Fohr, A. (2012). Judicial Independence – The Normativity of an Evolving Transnational Principle. In A. Seibert-Fohr (Ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition (pp. 1279–1360). Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Slavu, S. (2008). Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union. Eine Analyse des EU-Beitritts Rumäniens. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smilov, D., & Toplek, J. (2007). Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe: the transition period. Farnham: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, K. E. (2003). The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality. In M. Cremona (Ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (pp. 105–139). Oxford, New York: OUP.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Sticht, M. (2006). Der Beitrag des Europarats zur demokratischen Transformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa seit 1989 am Beispiel von Ungarn, Rumänien und Aserbeidschan. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szarek-Mason, P. (2010). The European Union’s Fight Against Corruption. The Evolving Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tatham, A. F. (2009). Enlargement of the European Union. Alphen/Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanasescu, S. E., & Popescu, R. D. (2012). Romanian High Judicial Council – Between Analogy of Law and Ethical Trifles. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 36, 165–176.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomescu, C., & Levai, M. C. (2012). The Principle of Equilibrium and Separation of Powers under the Romanian Constitution. The USV Annals of Economics and Public Administration, 12(1), 284–293. http://www.seap.usv.ro/annals/ojs/index.php/annals/article/viewFile/483/483

    Google Scholar 

  • Trappe, J. (2012). EU-Twinning-Projekte als Chance der internationalen rechtlichen Zusammenarbeit. In S. Hülshörster, & D. Mirow (Eds.), Deutsche Beratung bei Rechts- und Justizreformen im Ausland: 20 Jahre Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Rechtliche Zusammenarbeit (pp. 341–348). Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Trechsel, St. (2005). Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tschirky, A. (2011). The Council of Europe’s activities in the judicial field. Zürich/Basel/Genf: Schulthess Juristische Medien.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ullerich, R. (2011). Rechtsstaat und Rechtsgemeinschaft im Europarecht. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Valea, D. C. (2010). The Competence of the Constitutional Court of Romania to settle the Constitutional Conflicts between the Public Authorities. Curentul Juridic, 42, 95–102. www.ideas.repec.org/s/pmu/cjurid1.html

    Google Scholar 

  • Venice Commission (2002). Opinion of 5–6 July 2002 on the Draft Revision of the Constitution of Romania. CDL-AD, 012.

    Google Scholar 

  • Venice Commission (2003). Opinion of 14–15 July 2003 on the Draft Revision of the Constitution of Romania. CDL-AD, 004.

    Google Scholar 

  • Venice Commission (2010). Report on the Independence of the Judicial System, Part I: The Independence of Judges. CDL-AD, 004.

    Google Scholar 

  • Venice Commission (2012). Opinion no. 685/2012 of 14–15 December 2012 on the Compatibility with Constitutional Principles and the Rule of Law of Actions taken by the Government and the Parliament of Romania in respect of Other State Institutions. CDL-AD, 026.

    Google Scholar 

  • Venice Commission (2014). Opinion no. 731/2013 of 21–22 March 2014 on the Draft Law on the Review of the Constitution of Romania. CDL-AD, 010.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagener, H.-J. (2011). Wirtschaftsordnung im Wandel. Zur Transformation 1985–2010. Marburg: Metropolis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, A. (2010). Europäische Verfassungsvergleichung. Ein Studienbuch. München: C. H. Beck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wennerström, E. O. (2007). The Rule of Law and the European Union. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittreck, F. (2006). Die Verwaltung der Dritten Gewalt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yowell, P. (2012). The Justiciability of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Domestic Law of the Member States. In P. M. Huber (Ed.), The EU and National Constitutional Law (pp. 107–123). Stuttgart: Richard Boorberg.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany

    Reimer von Borries

Authors
  1. Reimer von Borries
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Sc, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Pedro Cruz Villalón

  3. University of Applied Sciences for Administration and Public Management in the State of Lower Saxony, Hannover, Germany

    Tonio Klein

  4. Università di Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Jacques Ziller

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

von Borries, R. (2015). Romania’s Accession to the European Union: The Rule of Law Dilemma. In: Blanke, HJ., Cruz Villalón, P., Klein, T., Ziller, J. (eds) Common European Legal Thinking. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19300-7_28

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation