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Natural Conditions of Spatial Cognition

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Historical Epistemology of Space

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in History of Science and Technology ((BRIEFSHIST))

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Abstract

The similar biological constitution of all humans and the fundamental similarities in their physical environments make it plausible to assume that there are structures of spatial cognition that do not vary between different cultures or over history, but constitute the foundation for all cultural manifestations of spatial knowledge. In order to understand the dependence of spatial thinking on culture it is important first to identify these structures. The chapter discusses the sensorimotor schemata that are formed in humans regardless of society and historical age in similar ways as with nonhuman primates. The examples presented are (1) the schema of permanent objects, which allows for successful handling of objects on a mesocosmic scale, and (2) the landmark model of larger-scale space underlying cognitive mapping skills and allowing for successful navigation through various types of environment.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a critical discussion of ‘nativist’ approaches , see, e.g., Tomasello (1999, 48–51).

  2. 2.

    For an explanation of cultural habitus, see Tomasello (1999, 78–81); for that of cultural learning, see Tomasello (1999, 61–70), who relates these human modes of learning to the conception of others as intentional beings and argues that its development begins around the ninth month.

  3. 3.

    For a more critical discussion of comparisons between animal and human spatial cognition, see Hazen (1983).

  4. 4.

    For a definition of the concept of schema , see, for instance, Piaget (1983, 180–185). A different definition is given in Neisser (1976, 51–57). Below we will introduce the concept of mental model to describe relevant cognitive structures.

  5. 5.

    See Piaget (1959, in particular 97–101) .

  6. 6.

    Various empirical studies have been devoted to testing Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, complementing and correcting it in many respects. But while some of the interpretations have been at great variance with Piaget’s views, the evidence does not seem to refute Piaget’s overall scheme as outlined here. For a review of much of the literature and a critical discussion of post-Piagetian work on spatial cognition, see Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2003).

  7. 7.

    For example Piaget (1981, 110–111) .

  8. 8.

    This behavior is often referred to in the psychological literature as the A-not-B error, ‘A’ denoting the location where the object was previously found and ‘B’ the one at which it vanished; see, e.g., Piaget (1981, 109–110) and Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2003, 53–71).

  9. 9.

    For a detailed discussion of this stage , see Piaget (1959, 44–66).

  10. 10.

    See the discussion in Dasen and Heron (1981, 303–307).

  11. 11.

    For a survey of the spatial abilities of nonhuman primates , see Tomasello and Call (1997).

  12. 12.

    Tomasello and Call (1997, 41–42).

  13. 13.

    According to Tomasello and Call (1997, 46), many studies which suggest stage six skills have not employed appropriate control procedures. One may speculate that the occurrence of stage six abilities depends on the specific needs of an animal species, e.g., when following prey or when avoiding predators (Tomasello and Call 1997, 55).

  14. 14.

    Siegel and White (1975); Kitchin and Blades (2002, 89–90).

  15. 15.

    See Kitchin and Blades (2002) for a recent account on cognitive maps which surveys a large part of this literature.

  16. 16.

    See, e.g., Hazen (1983).

  17. 17.

    See, e.g., Kitchin and Blades (2002, 85–96).

  18. 18.

    See various contributions in Pick and Acredolo (1983).

  19. 19.

    Tolman (1948).

  20. 20.

    See, for instance, Fabrigoule 1987).

  21. 21.

    See Tomasello and Call (1997, 28–39) for a survey of the evidence for different primate species.

  22. 22.

    See Menzel (1973). Menzel (1987) discusses the interpretation of these findings in terms of cognitive mapping.

  23. 23.

    Sigg and Stolba (1981).

  24. 24.

    Tomasello and Call (1997, 55–56). There are further studies pointing to similarities in animal and human spatial cognition. Thus, Foreman et al. (1984), who carried out experiments with pre-school children in a so-called radial maze, an arrangement previously used in experiments on spatial abilities of animals, have pointed to remarkable similarities between pre-school children and well-trained nonhumans in the performance of certain spatial tasks. This fact was interpreted to suggest a similarity of the role of visuospatial cues in the development and use of cognitive representations of space and the underlying processes across species.

  25. 25.

    See Piaget (1981, 107–116) ; Piaget (1959, 86–96); Piaget and Inhelder (1956, 5–13) .

  26. 26.

    See, e.g., Piaget (1981 ) . See also Damerow (1998, 248).

  27. 27.

    They rely on what Piaget has called perceptional space in distinction to representational space , which is built up only at the preoperational and operational stages (Piaget and Inhelder 1956, 3–43 ). See, however, Boesch and Boesch (1984, 168–169) who interpret some of their findings as evidence for concrete operational thinking in the spatial reasoning of nonhuman primates and suggest the existence of ‘Euclidean’ cognitive maps , relating to Piaget’s distinction between topological , projective, and Euclidean space; see also Normand and Boesch (2009).

  28. 28.

    It remains an open question to what extent the transfer of spatial abilities to novel and artificial contexts of action presupposes that the actor’s understanding of the novel situation is one involving a representation of real space. For example, it may be doubted whether the fact that rhesus macaques, using a joystick, are able to anticipate the path through a computer-simulated maze (see Tomasello and Call 1997, 51–54) necessarily implies that they conceive of the maze as a representation.

  29. 29.

    Piaget (1960, 3–26).

  30. 30.

    See the classical experiment by Piaget and Inhelder (1956, 209–246) . For a critical discussion integrating recent empirical results, see Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2003, 118–125).

  31. 31.

    A possible counter example of symbol use in spatial communication among bonobos is discussed in Savage-Rumbaugh (1998, 161–165), but does not seem conclusive.

  32. 32.

    We reserve the notion of concept to describe elements of knowledge structures that are somehow related to linguistic or otherwise symbolic representations, without implying, of course, that there was a one-to-one relation between concepts and words.

  33. 33.

    For an introduction to the concept of accommodation (the adaption of mental structures to environmental inputs) and the complementary concept of assimilation (the adaption of environmental inputs to mental structures; see below) , see Piaget (1981, 7–9 and passim) .

  34. 34.

    On the concept of mental model as understood here, see in particular Renn and Damerow (2007); see also various contributions in Gentner and Stevens (1983). The concept is akin to Marvin Minsky’s frames (Minsky 1975).

  35. 35.

    It is the functioning of the model—for instance the way different perspectives are coordinated to make an object remain constant in size and shape under different views—that implies the three dimensionality . For a suggestion of how a three-dimensional cube and its transformations under different perspectives may be realized mentally without invoking a three-dimensional mental image, see Minsky (1975, 216–221) , who uses coordinated frames. A more comprehensive discussion of three-dimensional vision is found in Marr (1982).

  36. 36.

    Objections against imputations of the use of cognitive maps , in particular when simpler explanations of the spatial abilities are available, are raised, for instance, by Tuan (1975) and Bennett (1996). Recently, Wang and Spelke (2002) argued against the concept of cognitive map , emphasizing the human use of navigation techniques such as path integration , which are also found in insects and spiders and imply no more than the mental representation of one vector. It seems, however, that the presence of more ‘momentary’ and ‘egocentric’ representations does not at all preclude the build-up of more enduring and comprehensive mental representations. On the relation of these two types of representations, see, for instance, Cornell and Heth (2004).

  37. 37.

    See Gärling et al (1985) for a detailed description of the possible components cognitive maps are made of.

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  1. Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin, Germany

    Matthias Schemmel

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Schemmel, M. (2016). Natural Conditions of Spatial Cognition. In: Historical Epistemology of Space. SpringerBriefs in History of Science and Technology. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25241-4_2

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