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From Stateful Hardware to Resettable Hardware Using Symmetric Assumptions

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9451))

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Abstract

Universally composable multi-party computation is impossible without setup assumptions. Motivated by the ubiquitous use of secure hardware in many real world security applications, Katz (EUROCRYPT 2007) proposed a model of tamper-proof hardware as a UC-setup assumption. An important aspect of this model is whether the hardware token is allowed to hold a state or not. Real world examples of tamper-proof hardware that can hold a state are expensive hardware security modules commonly used in mainframes. Stateless, or resettable hardware tokens model cheaper devices such as smartcards, where an adversarial user can cut off the power supply, thus resetting the card’s internal state.

A natural question is how the stateful and the resettable hardware model compare in their cryptographic power, given that either the receiver or the sender of the token (and thus the token itself) might be malicious. In this work we show that any UC-functionality that can be implemented by a protocol using a single untrusted stateful hardware token can likewise be implemented using a single untrusted resettable hardware token, assuming only the existence of one-way functions.

We present two compilers that transform UC-secure protocols in the stateful hardware model into UC-secure protocols in the resettable hardware model. The first compiler can be proven secure assuming merely the existence of one-way functions. However, it (necessarily) makes use of computationally rather expensive non-black-box techniques. We provide an alternative second compiler that replaces the expensive non-black-box component of the first compiler by few additional seed OTs. While this second compiler introduces the seed OTs as additional setup assumptions, it is computationally very efficient.

N. Döttling—The authors acknowledge support from the Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61061130540) for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation, within which part of this work was performed; and also from the CFEM research center (supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council) within which part of this work was performed. Supported by European Research Commission Starting Grant no. 279447.

D. Kraschewski—Part of work done while at Technion, Israel. Supported by the European Union’s Tenth Framework Programme (FP10/2010-2016) under grant agreement no. 259426 – ERC Cryptography and Complexity.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

    Nico Döttling

  2. TNG Technology Consulting GmbH, Munich, Germany

    Daniel Kraschewski

  3. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Jörn Müller-Quade & Tobias Nilges

Authors
  1. Nico Döttling
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  2. Daniel Kraschewski
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  3. Jörn Müller-Quade
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  4. Tobias Nilges
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nico Döttling .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China

    Man-Ho Au

  2. Japan Advanced Inst. of Science and Tech, Ishikawa, Japan

    Atsuko Miyaji

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Döttling, N., Kraschewski, D., Müller-Quade, J., Nilges, T. (2015). From Stateful Hardware to Resettable Hardware Using Symmetric Assumptions. In: Au, MH., Miyaji, A. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9451. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26059-4_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26059-4_2

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