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On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions

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Operations Research Proceedings 2014

Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings ((ORP))

Abstract

Tournament solutions constitute an important class of social choice functions that only depend on the pairwise majority comparisons between alternatives. Recent analytical results have shown that several concepts with appealing axiomatic properties tend to not discriminate at all when the tournaments are chosen from the uniform distribution. This is in sharp contrast to empirical studies which have found that real-world preference profiles often exhibit Condorcet winners, i.e., alternatives that all tournament solutions select as the unique winner. In this work, we aim to fill the gap between these extremes by examining the distribution of the number of alternatives returned by common tournament solutions for empirical data as well as data generated according to stochastic preference models.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g., [2], Chap. 6, Sect. 2.2.2.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, München, Germany

    Felix Brandt & Hans Georg Seedig

Authors
  1. Felix Brandt
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  2. Hans Georg Seedig
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Felix Brandt or Hans Georg Seedig .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Operations Research, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Marco Lübbecke

  2. Lehrstuhl II für Mathematik, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Arie Koster

  3. RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Peter Letmathe

  4. E.ON Energy Research Center, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Reinhard Madlener

  5. Management Science, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Britta Peis

  6. Chair of Operations Management, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Grit Walther

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Brandt, F., Seedig, H.G. (2016). On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions. In: Lübbecke, M., Koster, A., Letmathe, P., Madlener, R., Peis, B., Walther, G. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2014. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8

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