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Leakage-Resilient IND-CCA KEM from the Extractable Hash Proofs with Indistinguishability Obfuscation

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Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10143))

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Abstract

Leakage-resilient cryptography requires that a crypto-system remain provably secure even if the attacker gets additional information about the internal states, which is usually the secret key in the scenario of public key encryption.

In this paper, we propose a solution to achieve leakage resilience CCA for key encapsulation mechanisms firstly based on the all-but-one extractable hash proof system in the bounded leakage model, where to the best of our knowledge, previous leakage resilient public key encryption schemes are mostly based on the Cramer-Shoup’s universal hash proof system and its variations. The main technique we employ is the indistinguishability obfuscation. Specifically, we use the obfuscated decryption program as the secret key to deal with the leakage.

Although our schemes can tolerate a considerately good amount of leakage, the tolerated rate of leakage (defined as the ratio of leakage-amount to key size) is quite unsatisfactory because we use the whole obfuscated program as the secret key.

This work is supported the by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61572495, No. 61272534, and No. 61379137) and the National Basic Research Program of China (973 project) (No.2013CB338002).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that there is \((c,\omega )\in \mathsf {R}_{pp}\) if and only if \(\pi =\mathsf {H}_{pk}(tag,c)\). However, if the \(\omega \) output by \(\mathsf {Ext}\) satisfies the one-way relation \(\mathsf {R}_{pp}\) might not be easily and publicly verified in a general way. Actually, the verification algorithm has to be designed according to concrete relations and assumptions. The same thing happens with the function G which extracts the hardcore bits from \(\omega \). Although one can always use some general hardcore bits such as Goldreich-Levin hardcore, there might be other functions that extracts the hardcore bits more efficiently under concrete assumptions. The output length of function G directly affects the design of a concrete scheme under this general framework since the overall length of the encapsulated keys has to be sufficient for the DEM.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Wenpan Jing, Xianhui Lu & Bao Li

  2. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Wenpan Jing, Xianhui Lu & Bao Li

  3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Xianhui Lu & Bao Li

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  1. Wenpan Jing
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  2. Xianhui Lu
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  3. Bao Li
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Correspondence to Wenpan Jing .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Science, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China

    Kefei Chen

  2. Institute of Information Engineering, SKLOIS, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

  3. Snapchat Inc., Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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Jing, W., Lu, X., Li, B. (2017). Leakage-Resilient IND-CCA KEM from the Extractable Hash Proofs with Indistinguishability Obfuscation. In: Chen, K., Lin, D., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10143. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_18

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