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Effects of Contestation Within a Collective Agent in EU Trade Policy-Making

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The Principal Agent Model and the European Union

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

Abstract

This chapter argues that conceiving the Commission as a unitary actor is a legitimate simplification of empirical reality for most research purposes. Recently, the principal–agent literature has started examining collective-actor features of agents and suggested that internal conflict is as disadvantageous to agents as it is to principals. By contrast, I argue that intra-agent conflict occurs less frequently and with a lower intensity than is typically the case for collective principals. The Commission-as-agent can overcome conflict quickly due to its hierarchical setup and less stringent decision-making procedures. It may even harness conflict through inter-service consultations to draft better initial proposals. On the political level, open conflict among Commissioners can earn it the reputation of credibly defending controversial sectoral interests in the eyes of affected stakeholders. I develop my argument by focusing on five bilateral trade agreements negotiated from 1970–2007. Generalizing it beyond the case of EU trade policy-making, I focus on empirical, theoretical and methodological reasons justifying many scholars’ choice to model agents such as the Commission as unitary actors.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany

    Markus Gastinger

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  1. Markus Gastinger
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  1. Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE), Universite catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Tom Delreux

  2. Centre for European Research in Maastricht, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Johan Adriaensen

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Gastinger, M. (2017). Effects of Contestation Within a Collective Agent in EU Trade Policy-Making. In: Delreux, T., Adriaensen, J. (eds) The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_8

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