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The Myth of Performativity: From Aristotle to Arendt and Taminiaux

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Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 89))

Abstract

What I want to call the “Myth of Performativity” is a theoretical conception, mistakenly attributed to Aristotle, about what distinguishes praxis in the strict sense (i.e., morally and politically relevant actions) from other kinds of human activities. According to the Myth, actions constitute pure performances—i.e., a sheer display of ethical virtue—and do not leave behind themselves concrete traces in the world—i.e., any traces significant for appraising their goodness. If that is what performativity would amount to, it can only be mythical. So how can the Myth be a pitfall? The reason is that the Myth takes inspiration from a correct understanding of actions: to differentiate actions from other kinds of human activities—for instance, from productions (poiêsis)—it is useful to ascribe a sort of performativity to the former. The Myth becomes, however, a real risk once one distorts the performativity proper to actions and, instead, celebrates pure performativity. And the Myth of Performativity in this latter form becomes an irresistible temptation for those who hold inappropriate views about the political realm and the role assumed therein by certain Promethean activities which are supposed to be performative in a paradigmatic way. In this paper I mean to show that, throughout his work, Taminiaux’s concern remains one and the same: to alert us to the dangerous attractions of the Myth of Performativity. I will expound the above claims in two steps; first, by showing—pace Arendt and Taminiaux—that Aristotle himself had militated against the Myth and, second, by demonstrating that the phenomenology of action casts doubt on the legitimacy of the Myth.

An exclusively performative conception of action is sometimes attributed to Hannah Arendt and, as a consequence, her reflection on the constitutive traits of the political is accused of grecomania. […] Because of the need to distinguish action properly said from any form of production […], she allegedly reduced action to pure spontaneism […] A grecomania would follow such that it would make Arendt seem to be—malgré elle—akin to Heidegger […]. But on closer inspection we rapidly see that, in Arendt, the analysis of action is not at all reduced to the celebration of pure performativity […]. On the contrary, performativity is the defect as much as the grace of action.(Taminiaux (2002a), 91–92. Τranslations of Taminiaux’s works are mine)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Taminiaux is also in dialogue with Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and the whole phenomenological tradition from Husserl to Derrida. Within the confines of this paper, however, it would be frivolous to present all the ramifications of his work.

  2. 2.

    I follow Reeve’s translations of both the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and the Politics (Pol.) : respectively, Reeve (2014) and (2017).

  3. 3.

    Heidegger (1992), 49–50.

  4. 4.

    Heidegger (1992), 56.

  5. 5.

    Arendt (1958), 206; my italics.

  6. 6.

    Arendt (1968a), 151.

  7. 7.

    Arendt (1968a), 152.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    See, for instance: Taminiaux (2002a), 83, 89, 91–96; (1992), 54–55, 90–91, 110–114, 120–124, 162–163; (2009), 118, 160; (2014), 128–135.

  10. 10.

    See: Arendt (1958), 136–144.

  11. 11.

    In The Human Condition, these include, among others, the lapsus of treating pure activities as ateleis and an incorrect interpretation of beneficence; see: Arent (1958), 206, 196. The analysis of Aristotelian prohairesis in Arendt (1978), II 55–63, gives a much more reliable picture of Aristotle’s concepts.

  12. 12.

    Arendt (1958), 194–195. The same criticism of Aristotle is also developed in: Arendt (1993), 109–112; (1963), 178–180, 192–195; (1990), 82–83.

  13. 13.

    For a defense of Aristotle’s legislation and “rule of law” as political practices—against Arendt’s objections, although with no reference to Arendt—see Yack (1993), 175–208.

  14. 14.

    Pol. III 1, 1274b36–37; V 9, 1309b35–36; VII 2, 1324b26; VII 4, 1326a4.

  15. 15.

    Respectively: NE I 13, 1102a8; Pol. IV 1, 1288b27.

  16. 16.

    See: Keyt (1999), 76; Kraut (1997), 66, 77; Miller (1991); Newman (1887), II 398; Bodéüs (1993), 66; Schütrumpf (1991–96), I 82–83 and III 207–216, IV 84–85, 142–143, 255. I use the terms ‘legislator’ and ‘lawgiver’ as equivalent.

  17. 17.

    Its productive aspect is indisputably confirmed by the nouns denoting the activity of the legislator: he is a producer or maker, that is, a “dêmiourgos” and “kataskeuastês.” The Politics abounds with similar formulations: Pol. II 8, 1267b30; II 9, 1271a14–15; IV 12, 1273b32–33; VII 13, 1332a29.

  18. 18.

    By contrast, in Arendt (1978), II 14, she nicely translates prakta as “what is brought into being by action.”

  19. 19.

    For further discussion of prakton and the solidity and visibility Aristotle confers on it, see: Kontos (2011), 9–53.

  20. 20.

    Notably, the 448 B.C. decree I have in mind (IGI2 24) was in reality much more detailed and even included a reference to the priestess to be appointed or the very materials (bronze, etc.) to be used.

  21. 21.

    Arendt (1968a), 128.

  22. 22.

    This is the most common attitude of commentators; see, for instance, Villa (1996), 37–49. The previous section has shown why that view is untenable.

  23. 23.

    See, for instance, Beiner (2014), 1–24, according to whom Arendt’s notion of performativity “is a radical view, and it seems hard to square with our common experience of politics” (12), “[it] falls well short of being a plausible view” (14), and “seems of questionable coherence” (18). For reasons that will be analysed below, Beiner’s reading conflicts with Arendt’s argument.

  24. 24.

    See, respectively: Arendt (1978), I 75 and 199.

  25. 25.

    See, respectively: Arendt (1990), 98, and (1978), I 204–206.

  26. 26.

    It is beyond the scope of this paper to appraise Taminiaux’s reading of Heidegger.

  27. 27.

    Taminiaux exploits an idea present in Arendt (1958), 152, 167, 204.

  28. 28.

    Taminiaux (2002a), 87, 93 (respectively). See also: (1992), 110–114; (2014), 26–29.

  29. 29.

    Arendt (1958), 52.

  30. 30.

    This stage, both in its pre-political and its strictly political form, can “find its proper location almost any time and anywhere” (Arendt (1958), 198).

  31. 31.

    Arendt (1958), 144.

  32. 32.

    Taminiaux (2009), 134–135; (2002b), 442–443.

  33. 33.

    Arendt (1968b), 465.

  34. 34.

    Arendt (1968b), 475.

  35. 35.

    Taminiaux (2005), 75–100.

  36. 36.

    Arendt (1968a), 163, 151.

  37. 37.

    See: Taminiaux (2002a), 83–89; (1992), 124–125, 162–163; (2014), 126–135.

  38. 38.

    Arendt (1968a), 162–163.

  39. 39.

    See: Tamianiaux’s reading of Ricoeur’s Soi-même comme un autre in Taminiaux (2009), 303–325.

  40. 40.

    “Preservation” of the polis also represents a prominent political end in Aristotle’s Politics IV-V. It is based on the assumption that even the worst constitution is better than no constitution at all.

  41. 41.

    See, for instance: Taminiaux (1992), 115–153; (2009), 19–26.

  42. 42.

    Arendt (1958), 204–205; my italics.

  43. 43.

    Arendt (1958), 191; my italics.

  44. 44.

    Arendt (1968a), 145.

  45. 45.

    It is this same power that Arendt ascribes to promises as elements constituting the foundation of the body politic: “Binding and promising, combining and covenanting are the means by which power is kept in existence” (Arendt (1963), 166). Accordingly, political performances should also entail the sources of its being augmented and increased. The very model of a political performance, namely the establishment of Rome, witnesses that “the act of foundation inevitably develops its own stability and permanence” (Arendt (1963), 194).

  46. 46.

    See: Arendt (1958), 167–174, 197–198, 205–206; (1968a), 44, 94, 206; (1963), 193–206; (1968b), 419–437.

  47. 47.

    See: Arendt (1958), 186, 192.

  48. 48.

    Arendt (1978), 93.

  49. 49.

    See, for instance, Beiner (1992), 193, and Bernstein (1986), 237.

  50. 50.

    Taminiaux (1992), 240; my italics. I follow here the translation by M. Gender in Taminiaux (1997), 193.

  51. 51.

    Arendt (1992), 63.

  52. 52.

    As to political actors who harbor in themselves a spectator, see my analysis of promisors in: Kontos (2011), 145–154.

  53. 53.

    Arendt (1978), I 167, 169.

  54. 54.

    Arendt (1978), I 178.

  55. 55.

    Arendt (1990), 91.

  56. 56.

    Husserl (1954), 366 (D. Carr’s translation).

  57. 57.

    Arendt (1968a), 44.

  58. 58.

    See: Taminiaux (2002a), 108–130; the English version of this text has been included in Taminiaux (1997).

  59. 59.

    See: Arendt (1978), I 85, 206 and II 12–13.

  60. 60.

    See: Arendt (1978), II 174, 184–185.

  61. 61.

    Tamianiaux (2002a), 130.

  62. 62.

    See: Arendt (1968a), 91–141, and her analysis of foundation in (1963), 132–206.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Fabio Ciaramelli, Véronique Fóti, and Vassiliki Vergouli for their insightful comments on a penultimate version of the paper.

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Correspondence to Pavlos Kontos .

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Kontos, P. (2017). The Myth of Performativity: From Aristotle to Arendt and Taminiaux. In: Fóti, V., Kontos, P. (eds) Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 89. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56160-8_14

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