Abstract
Recently, there has been an increased research interest in telecommunication network pricing, which leads to many proposals for new pricing schemes motivated by different objectives namely: to maximize service provider’s revenue, to guarantee fairness among users and to satisfy QoS requirements for differentiated network services.
In present paper, we consider a Bertrand model with N rational Service Providers (SPs) that offer homogeneous telecommunication services to customers. We assume that all SPs offer the same services and seek to persuade more customers in the same market, we model this conflict as a non-cooperative game. On the one hand, each SP decide his policies of price and Quality of Service (QoS) in order to maximize his profit. On the other hand, we assume that the customers are boundedly rational and make their subscription decisions probabilistically, according to Luce choice probabilities. Furthermore, they decide to which SP to subscribe, each one may migrate to another SP or alternatively switch to “no subscription state” depending on the observed price/QoS. In this work, we have shown that the SPs have an interest in confusing customers i.e. more than the customers are irrational, the SPs earn more.
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Ait Omar, D., Outanoute, M., Baslam, M., Fakir, M., Bouikhalne, B. (2017). Joint Price and QoS Competition with Bounded Rational Customers. In: El Abbadi, A., Garbinato, B. (eds) Networked Systems. NETYS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10299. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59647-1_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59647-1_33
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