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Automated Cryptographic Analysis of the Pedersen Commitment Scheme

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Computer Network Security (MMM-ACNS 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 10446))

Abstract

Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol, proving its security properties of correctness, perfect hiding, and computational binding. To formally verify the protocol, we extended the theory of EasyCrypt, a framework which allows for reasoning in the computational model, to support the discrete logarithm and an abstraction of commitment protocols. Commitments are building blocks of many cryptographic constructions, for example, verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting. Our work paves the way for the verification of those more complex constructions.

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Acknowledgments

This work was partly supported by the EPSRC under grant EP/M013561/2.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

    Roberto Metere & Changyu Dong

Authors
  1. Roberto Metere
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  2. Changyu Dong
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Roberto Metere .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Gdansk University of Technology , Gdansk, Poland

    Jacek Rak

  2. Binghamton University , Binghamton, New York, USA

    John Bay

  3. St. Petersburg Institute for Informatics and Automation, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Igor Kotenko

  4. Utica College , Utica, New York, USA

    Leonard Popyack

  5. Binghamton University , Binghamton, New York, USA

    Victor Skormin

  6. Warsaw University of Technology , Warsaw, Poland

    Krzysztof Szczypiorski

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Metere, R., Dong, C. (2017). Automated Cryptographic Analysis of the Pedersen Commitment Scheme. In: Rak, J., Bay, J., Kotenko, I., Popyack, L., Skormin, V., Szczypiorski, K. (eds) Computer Network Security. MMM-ACNS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10446. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65127-9_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65127-9_22

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-65126-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-65127-9

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