Abstract
Brizzi analyses the progressive personalisation and presidentalisation of the French political system that came into being in 1962 with the introduction of the direct election of the Head of State. The opposition to this reform from all political parties focused on the democratic risks that resulted from forging a close connection between the personalisation of the institution of the presidency and the intensive use that the Head of State made of television. The opposition openly accused the General of creating an authoritarian regime based on “telecracy”. However, as Brizzi notes, these accusations came precisely at the moment in which de Gaulle, for the first time in his political career, began to withdraw from appearing on television.
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Notes
- 1.
During the first cabinet meeting following the referendum, de Gaulle told members of the government: “I did not come back to power solely to solve the Algerian problem […]. Now other problems have arisen that the Head of State has to solve. He has responsibilities towards himself and Parliament . Today I will not reveal to you the answer I am going to give to myself”. J. Daniel , De Gaulle et l’Algérie, Paris, Seuil, 1986, p. 281.
- 2.
R. Brizzi and M. Marchi, Charles de Gaulle, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008, pp. 163–165.
- 3.
A letter sent some weeks after Debré’s resignations to François Goguel and kept in the latter’s archive provides proof that personal and political disagreements with the President of the Republic were the reasons for the Prime Minister’s resignations: “My departure was inevitable, and in any case it is normal in politics. The problem was both personal and about the Constitution […]”. AFG, FG28, Michel Debré letter to François Goguel , 4 May 1962.
- 4.
Berstein , Histoire du gaullisme, op. cit., p. 259.
- 5.
In L’Express Pierre Mendès France gave voice to a rather widespread feeling in Parliament : “No we definitely haven’t got the right to know the reason why the grand vizir has been replaced and what the consequences will be.” P. Mendès France, Le changement de grand vizir, L’Express, 19 April 1962, pp. 10–11.
- 6.
Pompidou addressed the National Assembly as follows: “Appointed by the Head of State, who represents its source of power, the government is and remains responsible before Parliament .”. L’Année politique 1962, Paris, Puf, 1963, pp. 655–659.
- 7.
Roussel, Charles de Gaulle, op. cit., p. 713.
- 8.
Michel Debré’s archive contains the correspondence between the General and Michel Debré. This shows that as early as the spring of 1960 the two started to have discussions on the presidentalisation of the system that revolved around the direct election of the Head of State with universal suffrage. AMD, 2DE29-30.
- 9.
J-N. Jeanneney, Un attentat. Petit-Clamart, 22 août 1962, Paris, Seuil, 2016.
- 10.
“I am aware of the fact that it is common opinion that the election of the President of the Republic by an electoral college—as foreseen by the actual Constitution—could not be sufficient for my successor […]. I agree that this arrangement for the Head of State could be somewhat inadequate. To solve this problem and at the same time to reinforce what can be defined as ‘the personal equation’ of the future President it could be necessary that the President is elected through a universal suffrage system.” De Gaulle, Discours et Messages, III, op. cit., pp. 301–302.
- 11.
The only significant repercussion in the executive was the resignation of the Minister of Education, Pierre Sudreau, who, in a letter dated 24 September 1962, explained the reasons for his decision: “This reform, which has no consequences while you remain, will paradoxically become dangerous when you go and I refuse to give carte blanche to whoever will succeed you.” Viansson-Ponté, Histoire de la république gualliene, op. cit., p. 325.
- 12.
In this battle, Debré stood firm with the General. His letter to de Gaulle dated 7 September 1962—the week before the President officially announced his intention to call the referendum before cabinet—provides clear proof of the fact that Debré, far from remaining a silent figure, continued to be the most faithful keeper of Gaullism even after he left Matignon : “I think time has come for an important change, similar in a way to what happened at the end of 1958, when, after the referendum and the elections the new regime started. […]. It is essential now that we make sure our opponents are defeated: political parties, trade unions, so-called élites […]. The question of unity and stability of power is not resolved yet. We solved this problem in 1958 when de Gaulle became Head of State. Through his letigimisation and authority he has provided a solution to all the major problems. […]. What about tomorrow? […] We must remain in line with the 1958 Constitution, but we have to push for some changes […]. The establishment of a figure whose authority is totally independent from political parties and Parliament is the only way to curb the latter’s omnipotent power […]. It is for this reason that it is necessary, that the universal suffrage system is adopted for the appointment of the President of the Republic, in place of the electoral college system created in 1958 […]. France needs a monarch; monarchy in the present context is not viable, therefore we have to give France a ‘Republican monarch’.” AMD, 2DE30, Michel Debré letter to General de Gaulle, 7 September 1962.
- 13.
M. Faure , in Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats Parlementaires, Séance du jeudi 4 octobre 1962, p. 3.218.
- 14.
In 1940 when he was Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud aided the political career of the then almost unknown Colonel de Gaulle who was first appointed Under Secretary of State for National Defence and War in the Reynaud administration and then promoted to General. For a reconstruction of this, see J-P. Guichard, Paul Reynaud, un homme d’état dans la tourmente, septembre 1939-juin 1940, Paris, l’Harmattan, 2008. For a biography of Paul Reynaud, see T. Tellier, Paul Reynaud, Un indépendant en politique, Paris, Fayard, 2005.
- 15.
P. Reynaud, in Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats Parlementaires, Séance du jeudi 4 octobre 1962, p. 3.210.
- 16.
Tournoux, La Tragédie du général, op. cit., pp. 433–436.
- 17.
P. Reynaud, in Journal Officiel de la République Française, Séance du jeudi 4 octobre 1962, pp. 3.209–10.
- 18.
“The referendum necessitates that means of propaganda are balanced. The referendum requires that the referendum question is previously discussed by Parliament , and that the public debate is instrumental to dispel any public doubts about its meaning.” M. Faure, in Journal Officiel de la République Française, Séance du jeudi 4 octobre 1962, p. 3.219.
- 19.
A. Diligen t, in Journal Officiel de la République Française, Séance du mercredi 21 novembre 1962, p. 2.930.
- 20.
INA , Télésoir, 4- October 1962, 29′48″.
- 21.
J-J. Servan-Schreiber , Technique du coup d’Etat, L’Express , 27 September 1962, p. 50.
- 22.
Ibidem.
- 23.
G. Montaron, Quitte ou double, Témoignage chrétien, 5 October 1962, p. 3.
- 24.
Bourdon, Histoire de la télévision sous de Gaulle, op. cit., pp. 94–95.
- 25.
INA , Télésoir, 17 October 1962, 0′21″.
- 26.
This rebalance led television news to reduce the amount of time dedicated to the electoral campaign and the candidates. During the 8 April 1962 referendum, the 8 p.m. news dedicated 35.8% of its total time to the electoral campaign (22% of time was taken up by the Algerian situation, which was connected to the referendum). In the autumn of 1962 the referendum campaign occupied 20.8% of the news. See M. Charlot, “La télévision”, in F. Goguel (ed), Le référendum d’octobre et les élections de novembre 1962, Paris, Colin, 1965, pp. 159–165.
- 27.
C. Estier, Les remous à la télévision, France-Observateur, 25 October 1962, p. 8.
- 28.
Exemplary in this regard is the 18 October television speech, when de Gaulle remarked what he had already stated, that if the referendum had failed he was going to disappear from the political scene. He also pointed out that he would also have retired in the case of “a weak majority of ‘yes’ votes […]. What could I do without a heart-felt trust from the nation?”. INA, de Gaulle collection, 18 October 1962, 6′ 28″.
- 29.
The six parties were allowed to campaign and went on air on the evenings of 22 and 23 October. In each of these two nights three representatives of political parties could address the electoral public for ten minutes each. The 60 minutes of electoral campaign allocated to political parties was further limited by the absence of any technical support during the programme (the studio was empty save for a table; the recording was done with a fixed camera). This political mini-marathon was followed first by Georges Pompidou’s long speech (who used the more attractive formula of the “fireside chat”) recorded in the elegant Palace Matignon and then by the inevitable presidential speech on 26 October that closed the electoral campaign . See. M. Charlot, “La télévision”, op. cit., pp. 143–68.
- 30.
S. Tchakhotine , Le Viol des foules par la propagande politique, Paris, Gallimard, 1939.
- 31.
Y. Le Vaillant , Oui…c’est. un viol!, France-Observateur, 19 October 1962, p. 17.
- 32.
J-J. Servan-Schreiber , Le Sacre manqué, L’Express , 1 November 1962, p. 48.
- 33.
INA , de Gaulle collection, 7 November 1962, 11′02″.
- 34.
Charlot, “La télévision”, op. cit., pp. 160–161.
- 35.
M. Lebesque , La France devant son miroir, L’Express, 22 November 1962, p. 52.
- 36.
M. Faure , in Journal Officiel de la République Française, Séance du jeudi 10 janvier 1963, p. 542.
- 37.
G. Vedel , La leçon de 1962, L’Express, 27 December 1962, p. 12.
- 38.
This term became popular from 1963 on and was used both in the daily press and in specialised periodicals. See R. Rémond and C. Neuschwander, “Télévision et comportement politique”, in Revue française de science politique , 13, 2, 1963, p. 327; “La France vit-elle en ‘télécratie’?”, in Preuves, 11, 1963; D. Cordelier, “La télécratie ou l’art de téléviser pour régner”, in Le Monde et la Vie, 2, 1965. This expression also appeared some years later in the title of a study on the control of television in France in the first years of the Fifth Republic: C. Durieux, La Télécratie, Paris, Tema, 1976.
- 39.
Rémond , Neuschwander, Télévision et comportement politique, op. cit., pp. 325–347.
- 40.
Ibidem, p. 327.
- 41.
During the first four years of the de Gaulle’s presidency he appeared on television 1506 times as compared to 4 appearances by Maurice Thorez and 8 by Jacques Duclos. Montaldo, Dossier O.R.T.F. 1944–1974, op. cit., p. 141.
- 42.
Vassallo, La télévision sous de Gaulle, op. cit., p. 100.
- 43.
E. Sablier , personal communication, 10 November 2004. For more details, see Sablier, La télé du Général, Paris, op. cit., pp. 111–116.
- 44.
J. Leprette, Le Service de liaison interministérielle pour l’information (SLII) de 1964 à 1966, in Aa.Vv., De Gaulle et les médias, op. cit., p. 130.
- 45.
“There, the journalists receive recommendations, directives, ‘advice’. There, the news and other information programmes are reviewed”. J-P. Manel and A. Planel, La crise de l’Ortf, Paris, Pauvert, 1968, p. 33.
- 46.
M. Faure , in Journal Officiel de la République Française, Séance du jeudi 10 janvier 1963, p. 542.
- 47.
M. Harrison, “Government and Press in France during the Algerian War”, in The American Political Science Review, 58, 2, 1964, p. 273.
- 48.
Quoted in A. Morice, “Où en est. l’information en France?”, in Revue politique des idées et des institutions, 1,1964, p. 19.
- 49.
The political expert Maurice Duverger in the spring of 1963 noted that France—ever since the Fourth Republic—had faced an abnormal situation in comparison to other European countries: “It is one of the few countries in which the Statute of radio and television does not equate to the economic and political structures of the State. From a sociological point of view, radiotelevision should be free and public like in Great Britain , Belgium, Holland, the German Federal Republic, Italy etc. Instead, television remains a State monopoly directly managed by the government, like in the USSR […]. It is telling that Parliament had never wanted to vote a new RTF statute during the Fourth Republic. And yet, the need for a statute is more and more urgent.” M. Duverger, “Sociologie du statut de la Télévision”, in Les cahiers de la Télévision, 3, 1963, p. 5.
- 50.
Vedel , La leçon de 1962, op. cit., p. 12.
- 51.
For a detailed account on the statute and its development, see Bourdon, Histoire de la télévision sous de Gaulle, op. cit., pp. 35–47 and Vassallo, La télévision sous de Gaulle, op. cit., pp. 78–83.
- 52.
Bourdon , Haute fidélité. Pouvoir et télévision 1935–1994, op. cit., p. 79.
- 53.
Quoted in Viansson-Ponté, Histoire de la république gaullienne, op. cit., p. 372.
- 54.
J. Lacouture , De Gaulle, III, op. cit., p. 170.
- 55.
INA, de Gaulle collection, 31 January 1964, 1h31′15″.
- 56.
Roussel , Charles de Gaulle, op. cit., p. 371.
- 57.
Sirius, Le Pouvoir absolu, Le Monde, 2 February 1964, p. 1.
- 58.
Berstein , Histoire du gaullisme, op. cit., p. 271.
- 59.
Mendès’s position was distinct both from Gaullism and from communism; he believed in a liberal and parliamentary Republic. In his view democracy and the Republic were incompatible with personalisation of power: “To choose one man for his talents, merits, prestige and political capacities, implies that the people have given up their right to command, to determine their own destiny. It is the equivalent of people’s abdication, or regression.” R. de Lacharrière, “Mendès France et le général de Gaulle: l’impossible rapprochement”, in Pouvoirs, 27, 1983, p. 27.
- 60.
J. Lacouture , Pierre Mendès France, Paris, Seuil, 1981 and Aa.Vv., Pierre Mendès France et l’esprit républicain, Paris, Le Cherche-Midi, 1996.
- 61.
For an insightful account of the “domestication” of the French left to the system of the Fifth Republic see O. Duhamel, La gauche et la V e République, Paris, Puf, 1993.
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Brizzi, R. (2018). Gaullist “Telecracy” (1962–65). In: Charles De Gaulle and the Media. French Politics, Society and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65642-7_8
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