Abstract
Various prescriptions for the design of regulatory systems have been formulated so far. They include recommendations such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises, unbundling, access price regulation, ownership separation among vertical activities, market entry, incentive regulation and access to wholesale markets. The design of regulatory systems is also assisted by techniques such as RIA and by guidelines that have been issued by international organizations such as the OECD and the EU. A re-design of regulatory systems over time is also needed due to the tendency (“regulatory obsolescence”) of regulations to become less adequate over time. This chapter terminates with a discussion of the design of regulation of telecommunications in South Africa in the 1990s.
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Asquer, A. (2018). Conclusion: The Design of Regulatory Systems. In: Regulation of Infrastructure and Utilities. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67735-4_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67735-4_12
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