Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Dynamics of Strategic Protection Against Virus Propagation in Heterogeneous Complex Networks

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10575))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 2057 Accesses

Abstract

With an increasing number of wide-spreading cyber-attacks on networks such as the recent WannaCry and Petya Ransomware, protection against malware and virus spreading in large scale networks is essential to provide security to network systems. In this paper, we consider a network protection game in which heterogeneous agents decide their individual protection levels against virus propagation over complex networks. Each agent has his own private type which characterizes his recovery rate, transmission capabilities, and perceived cost. We propose an evolutionary Poisson game framework to model the heterogeneous interactions of the agents over a complex network and analyze the equilibrium strategies for decentralized protection. We show the structural results of the equilibrium strategies and their connections with replicator dynamics. Numerical results are used to corroborate the analytical results.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Barrat, A., Barthelemy, M., Vespignani, A.: Dynamical Processes on Complex Networks. Cambridge university Press, Cambridge (2008)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Chen, J., Zhu, Q.: Optimal control of interdependent epidemics in complex networks. In: SIAM Conference on Network Science, Boston, Massachusetts, 15–16 July 2016

    Google Scholar 

  3. Chen, J., Zhu, Q.: Interdependent network formation games with an application to critical infrastructures. In: Proceedings of 2016 American Control Conference, Boston, USA, 6-8 July 2016

    Google Scholar 

  4. Gubar, E., Zhu, Q.: Optimal control of multi-strain epidemic processes in complex networks. In: Proceedings of the 7th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets), Knoxville, TN, 9-10 MAY 2017

    Google Scholar 

  5. Taynitskiy, V., Gubar, E., Zhu, Q.: Optimal impulsive control of epidemic spreading of heterogeneous malware. In: Proceedings of 20th IFAC World Congress, Toulouse, France, 9-14 July 2017

    Google Scholar 

  6. Taynitskiy, V., Gubar, E., Zhu, Q.: Optimal security policy for protection against heterogeneous malware. In: International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and Optimization (NETGCOOP), Avignon, France (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Gubar, E., Zhu, Q.: Optimal control of Influenza epidemic model with virus mutations. In: Proceedings of European Control Conference (ECC), Zurich, Switzerland (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Hethcote, H.W.: Qualitative analyses of communicable disease models. Math. Biosci. 28(3–4), 335–356 (1976)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Pastor-Satorras, R., Vespignani, A.: Epidemic spreading in scale-free networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 86(14), 3200 (2001)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. O’Gorman, G., McDonald, G.: Ransomware: A growing menace. Symantec Corporation (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Gourdin, E., Omic, J., Van Mieghem, P.: Optimization of network protection against virus spread. In: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on the Design of Reliable Communication Networks (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Theodorakopoulos, G., Le Boudec, J.Y., Baras, J.: Selfish response to epidemic propagation. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 58(2), 363–376 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Preciado, V.M., Zargham, M., Enyioha, C., Jadbabaie, A., Pappas, G.: Optimal resource allocation for network protection against spreading processes. IEEE Trans. Control Netw. Syst. 1(1), 99–108 (2014)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Myerson, R.: Large Poisson games. J. Econ. Theor. 94(1), 7–45 (2000)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Van Mieghem, P., Omic, J.: In-homogeneous virus spread in networks (2013). arXiv:1306.2588

  16. Hayel, Y., Zhu, Q.: Epidemic protection over heterogeneous networks using evolutionary Poisson games. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 12(8), 1786–1800 (2017)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Hayel, Y., Zhu, Q.: Evolutionary Poisson games for controlling large population behaviors. In: Proceedings of 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Osaka, pp. 300–305 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Taylor, P., Jonker, L.: Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosci. 40, 145–156 (1978)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K.: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1998)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  20. Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K.: Evolutionary game dynamics. Am. Math. Soc. 40, 479–519 (2003)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Filio-Rodriguez, O., Primak, S., Kontorovich, V., Shami, A.: A game theory interpretation for multiple access. In: Cognitive Radio Networks with Random Number of Secondary Users in CoRR (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Simhon, E., Starobinski, D.: Advance reservation games and the price of conservatism. ACM SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev. 42(3), 33 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LIA/CERI, University of Avignon, Avignon, France

    Yezekael Hayel

  2. Tandon School of Engineering, NYU, New York, USA

    Quanyan Zhu

Authors
  1. Yezekael Hayel
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Quanyan Zhu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yezekael Hayel .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Stefan Rass

  2. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Bo An

  3. University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas, USA

    Christopher Kiekintveld

  4. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA

    Fei Fang

  5. AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Stefan Schauer

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this paper

Cite this paper

Hayel, Y., Zhu, Q. (2017). Dynamics of Strategic Protection Against Virus Propagation in Heterogeneous Complex Networks. In: Rass, S., An, B., Kiekintveld, C., Fang, F., Schauer, S. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10575. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_27

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_27

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68710-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-68711-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation