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Taking Care of Commons to Tackle the Financial Crisis

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Abstract

The economic crisis triggered several restrictive policies aimed at reducing public expenses. One of the options pursued in this respect concerns public goods and implies an increased efficiency in the management of such goods through the involvement of private players and the sale of public assets to reduce costs. This intervention line is, however, reductive, limited to a “quantitative” approach, which could weaken public administration’s responsiveness towards public needs. It is thus mandatory to get over the traditional approach aimed at correcting the drawbacks of the past models, largely inspired by the combination of reducing costs and increasing market influence.

Researching solutions to tackle the financial crisis requires new explanations and innovative paradigms that are able to deliver innovation and economic growth, on the one side, and social cohesion, on the other side. In this respect, the correct approach should start from the essential needs of citizens, rather than from the best possible allocation of goods and resources, focusing not only on the individual’s fruition, but on a collective utilization of public goods aimed at reaching an inclusive redistribution of the advantages and values connected to such goods.

In light of the previous explanations, it is possible to observe that commons can be useful to get over the financial crisis not only as resources useful to overcome the crisis in times of hardship. They cannot be considered just as goods feasible to increase production and economic growth and neither as public resources granted to public institutions to deliver services. Moreover, the effectiveness of commons as anti-crisis tools stems from their potential to generate welfare, encouraging a cooperative and collaborative approach, which may in its turn be useful to tackle the crisis. If duly protected, commons allow the development of new social and economic relations between public institution and citizens, triggering beneficial dynamics aimed at satisfying the needs of people thorough “social added value”.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Napolitano (2006), pp. 141 ff.

  2. 2.

    See, on this point, the issues explained by Nonini (2013), pp. 2666 ff.; Hardt (2013), pp. 4492 ff.

  3. 3.

    On the relationship between the economic crisis and the heavy debts of the banks, see for instance: Ricoveri (2013), pp. 269 ff.

  4. 4.

    For an overview of the different paths of reflections on commons, see Nespor (2013), pp. 665 ff.

  5. 5.

    Studies on this point are numerous and we hereby make reference to the bibliography of Bombardelli (2016).

  6. 6.

    The description considers different essential features of the commons, but it cannot cover for all their different characteristics, given the undeniable difficulties, at least in legal theory, of finding a thorough definition of commons. On this point, see Cortese (2016), pp. 37 ff.

  7. 7.

    It is very important, in this respect, the distinction devised by Ostrom (1990), pp. 30 ff.

  8. 8.

    The different types of commons are not described with univocal conclusions. On this point, see Bravo (2001), pp. 505 ff.; Marella (2012), pp. 17 ff.; Nespor (2013), pp. 680 ff.; Nonini (2013), pp. 2604 ff.; Cerulli Irelli and De Lucia (2014), pp. 6 ff.; Pellizzari (2016), pp. 249 ff.

  9. 9.

    See, Marella (2012), pp. 12 ff.; Lucarelli (2013), pp. 1198 ff.

  10. 10.

    The necessity of having an essential set of rules to rely on in order to protect the commons is widely shared. That is confirmed even when the protection of commons can be carried out through self-governing and self-organizing solutions developed by the users. On this point, see Ostrom (1990), pp. 90 ff. On the relationship between commons and law, Lessig (2013), pp. 1279 ff.

  11. 11.

    For an overview concerning the globalization of law, see Ferrarese (2000), Allegretti (2002), and Cassese (2003).

  12. 12.

    On the transformation of commons during history, see Grossi (2000), pp. 103 ff.; Grossi (2012), pp. 1059 ff.; Ciervo (2012), pp. 45 ff.; Dani (2014), pp. 10 ff.

  13. 13.

    See Nespor (2013), p. 665; Shiva (2013), pp. 81 ff.

  14. 14.

    On the constitutional developments concerning commons in Southern America Countries, see Ciervo (2012), pp. 134 ff.; for a wider international perspective, see Lindsay (2014). On the regulation of cities, considered as commons at the international level, see Foster and Iaione (2016), pp. 281 ff.

  15. 15.

    Some examples are proposed by Nespor (2013), pp. 665 ff. In more general terms on digital commons, see Pradi and Rossaro (2014).

  16. 16.

    For the full text, see www.vialiberamc.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Carta-europea-dei-beni-comuni.pdf [last accessed on 30th march 2016].

  17. 17.

    For the full text, see www.europeanwater.org/it/notizie/notizie-locali/397-manifesto-per-i-beni-comuni-nell-unione-europea [last accessed on 2th august 2017].

  18. 18.

    For the text, see www.ong.it/per-uneuropa-dei-diritti-e-dei-beni-comuni [last accessed on 2th august 2017].

  19. 19.

    See www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/intergroupes/VIII_LEG_06_Common_goods.pdf [last accessed on 2th august 2017]. The unit that took part in this research had the opportunity to expose the results of its scientific activity to the intergroup on September 15th, 2015 in Brussels.

  20. 20.

    Giglioni (2016), pp. 151 ff.; Cornella (2016), pp. 219 ff.

  21. 21.

    See, Lucarelli (2013), pp. 1513 ff.; Giglioni (2016), pp. 155 ff.

  22. 22.

    On the relevance of social cohesion as the legal ground to grant a full protection of commons, see the arguments of Lucarelli (2013), pp. 1513 ff.

  23. 23.

    Giglioni (2016), pp. 155 ff.

  24. 24.

    See, Cornella (2016), pp. 225 ff. See also, Mone (2012), pp. 63 ff.

  25. 25.

    See Maddalena (2011); Rodotà (2012), pp. 311 ff.

  26. 26.

    See, Arena (2010); Lucarelli (2015), par. 2 ff.

  27. 27.

    Rodotà (2012), pp. 313 ff.; Rodotà (2013), pp. 273 ff. and 459 ff.

  28. 28.

    See, Arena (2010).

  29. 29.

    Rodotà Commission—For the amendment of the provisions of the Civil Code relating to public goods, Law proposal, 14 June 2007, in www.giustizia.it.

  30. 30.

    On the usi civici issue in the Italian legal system, see Grossi (2012), pp. 1077 ff.; Maddalena (2013), pp. 142 ff.; Cerulli Irelli and De Lucia (2014), pp. 3 ff.

  31. 31.

    See, for instance, Algostino (2013), par. 6; Mone (2014), pp. 63 ff.

  32. 32.

    As it has been demonstrated by the referendum concerning water in 2011; on this issue, see Ciervo (2012), pp. 159 ff.

  33. 33.

    On the specific relevant statutes, see Cortese (2016), p. 46.

  34. 34.

    Arena (2014a, b). For an overview of the different experiences at the local level, see Labsus (2015).

  35. 35.

    Arena (1997), pp. 29 ff.

  36. 36.

    Arena (2010).

  37. 37.

    Coccoli (2013), pp. 255 ff.

  38. 38.

    As it will be pointed out in the following pages, it seems that rivalry problems may arise not only with regard to “first generation material commons”, but also with reference to “immaterial commons” produced by a collective action, that are usually considered non-rival (see, supra, footnote 2). That is due to the mutual liability among different people that is usually necessary to develop such immaterial commons.

  39. 39.

    For the demonstration that commons satisfy primary and fundamental needs not artificially developed by consumerism, see Pennacchi (2012), pp. 259 ff. and 375 ff.; Maddalena (2013), pp. 142 ff. On the importance of the participation of citizens in singling out the relevant needs, see Mattei (2011); Algostino (2013), par. 3; Lucarelli (2015), par. 6 ff.

  40. 40.

    See, for instance, Rodotà (2012), pp. 324 ff.; Ricoveri (2013), pp. 649 ff.

  41. 41.

    Assuming that, in satisfying needs, individuals can act not only moved by self-interest but also by embracing civil responsibility with a cooperative aim, it becomes possible to find utilization tools that do not harm nor reduce resources through extra utilization, allowing an efficient distribution. See, Ostrom (1990), pp. 38 ff.

  42. 42.

    This makes it difficult to place tout court commons within collective properties, as it has been pointed out by Giannini (1985), pp. 92 ff., which considers commons as “a modern form of collective property”, distinguishing them from the public goods owned by the State. On this specific topic see, with different perspectives, Lucarelli (2015), par. 5 ff.; Caliceti (2016), pp. 74 ff.

  43. 43.

    Donolo (2012), pp. 16 ff.

  44. 44.

    See, for instance, Giannini (1985), pp. 92 ff., which considers fruition by the collectivity as a distinctive feature of the commons, while public powers would be relevant in order “to establish, preserve and manage the connected collective advantages”.

  45. 45.

    See the definitions put forward by the Rodotà Commission (details in footnote 29).

  46. 46.

    See Lessig (2013), pp. 1205 ff.; Lucarelli (2015), par. 2 ff.

  47. 47.

    See Rodotà (2012), pp. 315 ff.

  48. 48.

    The unlimited access to commons may actually generate the negative dynamics described by Hardin (1968), pp. 1243 ff.

  49. 49.

    On the necessity to regulate the access to commons, see Lessig (2013), pp. 1205 ff.

  50. 50.

    The remarks by Giannini (1985), p. 93, do not seem in line with the latest developments. The author, indeed (30 years ago), considered commons to be “so abundant” that it was not necessary to speculate about their ownership and management.

  51. 51.

    On the risk of collectivity taking over the expectations of singles, harming their fundamental rights, see a Vitale (2013), pp. 283 s., p. 689 e p. 1423.

  52. 52.

    Pennacchi (2012), pp. 556 ff.

  53. 53.

    The risk is particularly underlined by Esposito (2006), p. IX. The community, in this respect, is not a common subject or the sum of individuals, but the being of the relationship between individuals in itself, which is something more of the single individualities and can be added to them.

  54. 54.

    On the difficult measurement of the scope of the different kinds of community and on the relevance of the scale of the phenomena related to the common needs to be satisfied, see the critical remarks by Vitale (2013), pp. 283 ff. and 689 ff.

  55. 55.

    Esposito (2006), pp. XIII ff.

  56. 56.

    On the “mutually constructive relationship” between commons and communities, see Marella (2012), pp. 21 ff.

  57. 57.

    On the exclusion of the “communal dimension” as a category in modern legal systems, completely replaced by the dichotomy between public and private, see Marella (2012), pp. 11 ff. and Ciervo (2012), pp. 62 ff.

  58. 58.

    See Lucarelli (2013), pp. 208 ff.; Marella (2012), pp. 12 ff.

  59. 59.

    On the value of the munus, as a gift to individuals implying the beneficiary’s duty to give back to the community as a basic rule, see Esposito (2006), pp. X ff.

  60. 60.

    On the risks connected with the privatization of commons, including their possible destruction, see Napolitano (2006), pp. 141 ff.; Nespor (2013), pp. 672 ff.

  61. 61.

    See Rodotà (2012), pp. 326 ff.

  62. 62.

    The distinction between the nature of the goods and their ownership has been proposed, inter alia, by the Rodotà Commission (see footnote 2).

  63. 63.

    See Grossi (2012), pp. 1061 ff.

  64. 64.

    In case law, in particular, Court of Cassation, ruling of February 14th, 2011, no. 3665; see also the comment by Cortese (2011), pp. 1170 ff.

  65. 65.

    Caliceti (2016), p. 69.

  66. 66.

    For a careful analysis, see Lucarelli (2015), par. 2 ff.

  67. 67.

    See Boscolo (2015), pp. 69 ff. and 81 ff.

  68. 68.

    On the need to distinguish between the right of property and the fruition of the goods, see Rodotà (2012), pp. 317 ff.; Lucarelli (2015), par. 6 ff.

  69. 69.

    On the importance of granting rights to users as a crucial step in the management of the commons, see Ostrom (1990), pp. 90 ff.

  70. 70.

    See Simonati (2016), pp. 143 ff.

  71. 71.

    The relationship between commons and market dynamics is one of the most important topics considered by the studies on such matter. See, for example, Marella (2012), pp. 20 ff.; Rodotà (2012), pp. 331 ff.; Pennacchi (2012), pp. 316 ff.; Lucarelli (2013), pp. 1596 ff.; Coccoli (2013), p. 302.

  72. 72.

    On commons as complex and adaptive systems, see Levin, (1999), pp. 39 ff. and 195 ff.

  73. 73.

    On the “immunization” that the traditional right of private property grants to the owner, see Esposito (2004), pp. 61 ff.

  74. 74.

    On the possibility, for communities, to limit the rights of the owner (especially when the owner is a public subject), see Lucarelli (2015), par. 7.

  75. 75.

    On the different roles of individuals towards commons, see Pennacchi (2012), pp. 391 ff. On the importance of the citizens’ responsibility to protect the public interest in connection with public administrations, see Berti (1994), pp. 357 ff.; Arena (2011).

  76. 76.

    On the value of various social actions as commons in itself, see for instance Marella (2012), pp. 26 ff.; Nonini (2013), pp. 2636 ff.; Nespor (2013), p. 676.

  77. 77.

    On the new proceedings concerning commons, see Simonati (2016), pp. 103 ff.

  78. 78.

    On art. 43 of the Italian Constitution as a possible legal ground to allow self-management of commons, see Rodotà (2012), p. 313; Lucarelli (2015), par. 9.

  79. 79.

    See Franzini (2012), p. 65.

  80. 80.

    See the criticisms of Vitale (2013), pp. 283 ff.

  81. 81.

    Mattei (2013), pp. 332 ff.

  82. 82.

    Arena (1997), pp. 29 ff.

  83. 83.

    For this purpose, public administrations should coordinate the activities pursued by citizens under art. 118 of the Italian Constitution, on the one side, and ensure social and economic cohesion, on the other side, avoiding an excessive localism in the management of commons. Although with different views, see Arena (2011), pp. 101 ff.; Lucarelli (2015), par. 7.

  84. 84.

    On the role of the so called “third sector” in protecting commons, see Pellizzari (2016), pp. 259 ff.

  85. 85.

    Pennacchi (2012), pp. 1262 ff.

  86. 86.

    See Bollier (2013), pp. 3139 ff.; Nespor (2013), pp. 677 ff.

  87. 87.

    On the role of commons as a factor to produce added value, generating dynamics opposite to those originated by the financial economy, see Ricoveri (2013), pp. 1604 ff.; Maddalena (2013), pp. 142 ff.

  88. 88.

    Once again, Pennacchi (2012), pp. 1262 ff.

  89. 89.

    See also Bollier (2013), pp. 3199 ff.

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  1. University of Trento, Department of Law, Trento, Italy

    Marco Bombardelli

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Bombardelli, M. (2018). Taking Care of Commons to Tackle the Financial Crisis. In: Merloni, F., Pioggia, A. (eds) European Democratic Institutions and Administrations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72493-5_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72493-5_13

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-72493-5

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