The Case for A-Theism

Lataster, Raphael

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-90793-2_3

Raphael Lataster⁵

Part of the book series: Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures ((SCPT,volume 26))

411 Accesses

Abstract

Before delving into Craig’s all-important argument for his particular Christian brand of theism, it is pertinent to consider that his case for bare theism has failed for numerous reasons, even if the unsuccessful arguments were individually considered to be mostly sound and good. It is not obvious that the arguments assemble themselves into a bricolage that proclaims the existence of some god or gods, or some other phenomenon, or even of the existence of some supernatural realm. Furthermore, it is important to note that they do not necessitate theism. Missing from Craig’s case is an argument that either makes clear that theism is the only god-model that could obtain or that eliminates all alternatives as impossible, or at least relatively improbable. In fact, many of these alternative god-conceptions are here examined and judged as being more plausible than the very limited theistic conception. In effect, I argue here for a-theism. I even argue that theism is very improbable. Crucial issues to do with knowing how such a god (or gods) may have revealed itself to humankind shall also be mooted.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 54.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 69.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 99.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
To clarify, several of Craig’s arguments for ‘some god’ further attempt to associate the evidence with the ‘theistic God’. These arguments failed on both counts, and this part of the book considers the alternatives to theism, if at least the arguments established the existence of ‘some god’.
2.
Note that Pigliucci earlier raised the concern – rightly – that the state of the evidence could falsify the theistic hypothesis. See William Lane Craig and Massimo Pigliucci. “Does God Exist? The Craig-Pigliucci Debate,” accessed 03/02/2014, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-god-exist-the-craig-pigliucci-debate.
3.
This does seem to be Craig’s primary aim: “In light of the evidence, it’s more probable than not that God exists”. He further indicates that he cannot “prove” God’s existence. See Craig (RF), p. 189. On the same page, Craig indicates that the “arguments make it rational to believe that God exists”, while immediately and inadvertently (he was discussing the rationality of non-believers) diminishing the importance of this claim, stating that a “person can be rational in believing something that is false”. Craig goes on to say that it is the truth (in contrast with the rationality) of the various worldviews that is of interest. Furthermore, in his Sydney debate in 2013 with Lawrence Krauss, the latter asked, “Are you certain that God exists?” Craig responded with an emphatic, “No!” See William Lane Craig and Lawrence Maxwell Krauss. “Debate Transcript – Life, the Universe, and Nothing (II): Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?,” accessed 23/12/2015, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/life-the-universe-and-nothing-why-is-there-something-rather-than-nothing. It is no small matter that while Craig obviously does not think that the probability of God’s existence is 0% or 100%, he has not revealed what he thinks it may be.
4.
Craig (RF), pp. 54–55.
5.
Again, there is no compelling evidence for the existence of unembodied minds or bodiless persons. As such, there is no good reason to suppose that something unembodied or bodiless can do things like create, love, intervene, fight, punish, etc. These are all things associated with bodied minds/persons. Cf. Adel Daher, “The Coherence of God-Talk,” Religious Studies 12, no. 4 (1976): 445–465. As such, while the possibility of this notion can be kept in mind, it cannot form the basis for a convincing probabilistic argument.
6.
While Craig may not intend his case to be explicitly Bayesian, so that it is dissimilar to Swinburne’s case, it does make claims about the probability of God, so that Bayesian analyses are appropriate. It is also noted that Craig does claim to argue probabilistically, but without ever coming close to revealing his supposed posterior probabilities.
7.
Concerning the latter, combining several probable explicit and implicit premises could lead to an improbable conclusion. Cf. Alvin Plantinga, “Historical Arguments and Dwindling Probabilities: A Response to Timothy McGrew,” Philosophia Christi 8, no. 1 (2006): 7–22.
8.
For example, the supposed cause of the universe could be an immaterial being that is not God. Even in Craig’s theology there exist numerous immaterial non-God entities, such as angels and demons. In his debate with Christopher Hitchens, Craig did not want to “commit to the reality of demons”, but did just that several seconds later, admitting that he believed that Jesus did exorcise such beings. See Christopher Hitchens and William Lane Craig, Does God Exist? (La Mirada, CA: Biola University, 2009), DVD.
9.
Apart from benign hypotheses such as that all these conclusions, and the conclusions of other arguments deemed not of interest, are necessary in a completely deterministic universe. Cf. Swinburne’s – presuppositionalist – attempt to declare that even non-veridical personal experiences of the divine are veridical in truth, because everything ultimately stems from God. See Swinburne (EG), p. 320.
10.
The possibility of pantheism makes this discussion more complex, for in the ‘generic’ pantheisms, the universe is ‘divine’ and there is nothing apart from it. But the focus then would shift to the other elements of pantheism, such as that the universe is ‘conscious’, etc. Interestingly, many generic pantheisms are much closer to naturalism than other models such as theism.
11.
Additionally, there are not only two competing hypotheses; there are a great many naturalistic and supernaturalistic options.
12.
Concerning the later discussed case for Jesus’ resurrection, it could be argued that the need for blood magic is very surprising if the god of theism exists. This would be more expected on naturalism, especially given our knowledge about primitive cultures and religious syncretism, or alternative god-models.
13.
Compare the concept of the last few sentences with what Draper calls “the fallacy of understated evidence”. For more on this ‘fallacy’ and some additional examples, see his unpublished paper, “Partisanship and Inquiry in the Philosophy of Religion”; Paul Draper. “Collins’ Case for Cosmic Design,” accessed 17/01/2017, https://infidels.org/library/modern/paul_draper/no-design.html; Paul Draper, “Cumulative Cases,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 414–424.
14.
For the latter, consider the previous comments on the teleological and ontological arguments.
15.
Definitions and parts of definitions evolve, leading to much disagreement, even amongst theists, about what ‘God’ actually means, so that it becomes very difficult to label ‘God’ as incoherent. For example, there is no contradiction around God’s being unable to create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it, if ‘omnipotence’ does not allow for the impossible. This further reveals how arbitrary these definitions can be, and can also allude to God’s being much more limited than originally imagined. For example, Swinburne provides a very cumbersome and ad hoc definition of omnipotence, which incidentally does not appear to be biblically based. See Swinburne (CT), p. 165. A similar ‘contradiction’ involves omniscience: is God, who knows everything, able to learn something new? The apologist’s beliefs can also evolve. For example, Judges 1:19 indicates that the allegedly omnipotent God’s plans were foiled by ‘chariots of iron’, which can simply prompt Judeo-Christian theists to dismiss their beliefs about biblical inerrancy, or to find some ambiguity to take refuge behind. Another apparent contradiction might allude to the conflict between God’s mercy and her sense of justice, especially in light of the ‘problem of Hell’, which considers if an infinite punishment is acceptable for what are finite sins. Yet another conflict can arise between God’s being omnipresent and God’s being incorporeal. Perhaps God is not transcendent after all, and is omnipresent on account of his immanence. Also, can a necessary and eternal but omnipotent properly God kill herself, in that every trace of its essence/being/stuff is obliterated? Can the immutable but perfectly free God change his mind? Can an immutable being be loving and merciful? Another example concerns God’s omnipotence and/or freedom and her omnibenevolence: is God not able/free to be/do evil? This seeming contradiction is solved by simply defining evil as something that is impossible for God to be/do. A final example: can God be necessarily perfectly good, when an entity that is as good, but non-necessarily, should be considered morally superior? See J. Gregory Keller, “On perfect goodness,” Sophia 49, no. 1 (2010): 29–36. There are many other valid questions regarding the compossibility of God’s attributes. Note also that non-theists can similarly tweak their hypotheses.
16.
Craig (OG), p. 284.
17.
Craig’s Christian exclusivism is made clear throughout his work. For example, see Craig (RF), p. 24.
18.
Craig (OG), p. 272.
19.
Ibid., p. 272.
20.
Ibid., pp. 278–280. Craig supposes that these seemingly disadvantaged people would have rejected God’s message even if they heard it, confidently presuming that “God is too good to allow someone to be lost due to historical or geographical accident”. This ad hoc hypothesis does not overcome the objection in that it fails to raise the probability of theism (see earlier comments, on these ad hoc hypotheses being inherently less probable), and overlooks the fact that God could have at least made it appear that all people had a fair chance at being saved (even though many are predetermined to be damned), by making the Gospel message instantly accessible to all, so that this obstacle would not prevent educated and reasonable investigators from adopting Christian theism.
21.
This even has biblical precedent, with the Psalmist asking why God hides. See Psalms 10:1. Contrast this with Paul’s claim in Romans 1:18–22.
22.
It is unthinkable that such a powerful being, interested in revealing itself to all, would not be able to provide empirical proof of its existence, when it provides much empirical proof of ‘mere trivialities’ (as contrasted with eternal salvation) such as the existence of pussy willows, and especially – in the Judeo-Christian and other traditions – has allegedly provided such empirical proofs to earlier generations. For example, see 1 Kings 18.
23.
If the theist demands credulity regarding claims of personal experiences of the supernatural, they should certainly extend at least the same courtesy to those merely being open about their non-belief.
24.
For my part, I believe that my status as a non-resistant non-believer is evidenced by my religious history. The opposite of what such apologists claim is true, in fact, with my reluctant non-belief made obvious. Originally a fundamentalist Christian, I became a liberal Christian, and then a deist. Flirting with naturalism, I found solace in pantheism, before finally acknowledging that I was an atheist of the ‘de facto naturalist’ variety. Also, I often prayed earnestly, not for material gain, but for God to do his will, and to strengthen my faith. It is unthinkable that such a god would then allow me to lose my faith in him, along with the soteriological benefits, and further allow me to focus my career on destroying the faith of others. In accordance with Matthew 7:7–8, I have asked, and did seek God, but found nothing, and, most importantly, was given nothing. In sincere cases like this God appears to be unjust, and quite callous.
25.
Recall that part of religion’s success is that it provides things we like. Things like loving parents, meaning, and easy answers.
26.
A gender neutral pronoun, commonly used by the transgendered.
27.
Elements a-f are expected to be uncontroversial to Craig and to most (Christian) believers. Elements a, c, and e are definitive properties of God, while the other elements, including the notion that belief is important to salvation, naturally follow from these properties and/or are consistent with mainline Christian beliefs. Note that this is a case (as with claims about nuclear explosions, for example) where the absence of evidence for God’s existence can become convincing evidence against God’s existence, particularly in a probabilistic or Bayesian analysis. On non-evidence possibly constituting evidence, see Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 7th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), p. 95. Other interesting points to consider would be God’s failing to convince people that he exists while some of his followers seem able to do so, and whether any human can actually ‘save’ another. Concerning the latter, if only God can save a person in this way, it seems even more problematic that she does not make her existence more obvious.
28.
This lack of evidence would likely cause no concern to the deist or pandeist, with those models describing a specifically ‘hidden’ or ‘missing’ god.
29.
This unsuccessful tactic commits the conjunction fallacy and could be termed shifting the divine implausibility. This is akin to gerrymandering. These excuses, at best, make no difference to the resulting posterior probability, as the increased consequent probability is offset by a decreased prior probability (the refined hypothesis takes up less of the probability space as the non-refined one). At worst, the resulting posterior probability could even be decreased, if the excuse is so implausible that it entails an even smaller prior probability. Also, other evidences that seemingly disadvantage theism include seemingly poor biological design, the unnecessary grand size and age of the universe, the anthropological evidence for the evolution of mythologies and religions, and the existence of religious diversity.
30.
See Mark 11:23 and John 14:12–14. These passages also counter the similar claim that miracles should not be expected today, due to sin or for some other such reason.
31.
Swinburne (RGI), p. 172. There seems to be something counter-intuitive and ironically anti-intellectual about opting for ignorance over education. Explanations revolving around free will also suffer from the comments made about Craig’s contingency argument, that a theistic world is very probably necessary and deterministic.
32.
For example, see 1 Kings 18:38–39 and Luke 5.
33.
Cf. Sarah Adams and Jon Robson, “Does absence make atheistic belief grow stronger?,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79, no. 1 (2016): 49–68.
34.
This is similar to how I respond in public debates to the question, “What would convince you that God exists?” I have several responses, with one of them being, “‘I do not know’, is a perfectly acceptable answer; what is important is that God would know what would convince me, yet has failed to do so.” Another revolves around my witnessing a human’s missing limb being regenerated, seconds after being prayed for in the name of Jesus. If the theist scoffs and instead points to a friend who was cured of a headache, she should be reminded that such a task would be very straightforward for an omnipotent being. Another concerns what may be the most straightforward action God could take: a theophany.
35.
Perhaps the most famed example concerns ‘original sin’, the origins of painful labour, a talking snake, and ‘apples’. See Genesis 3. Apostasy is so rampant in the Pentateuchal books alone, that rejecting the God that one knows exists seems to be a major theme of the Old Testament.
36.
This is not always so obvious. It is hardly a testament to theism that the largest theistic organisation on the planet is so often accused of child sex abuse, protecting perpetrators, and punishing victims. For a succinct history of this ongoing issue, see Kathryn A. Dale and Judith L. Alpert, “Hiding Behind the Cloth: Child Sexual Abuse and the Catholic Church,” Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 16, no. 3 (2007): 59–74.
37.
Shawn Patterson et al., EVERYTHING IS AWESOME!!! (Burbank, CA: Warner Bros., 2014), Single.
38.
Craig’s argument from morality becomes especially untenable.
39.
And yet God is specifically said to not be the author of confusion. See 1 Corinthians 14:33. That title seems more apt for Satan. This passage seems to conflict not only the discussed evidence, but also the Tower of Babel incident. See Genesis 11:1–9.
40.
Cf. James A. Keller, “A Moral Argument Against Miracles,” Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995): 54–78. Also note that the joyous festival of football that was the 2014 FIFA World Cup, watched by billions, would have been a particularly opportune event to appear at.
41.
These arguments could be combined, which Wielenberg seems to have done with his argument from apparently gratuitous suffering and abandonment. See Erik J. Wielenberg, “The parent–child analogy and the limits of skeptical theism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78, no. 3 (2015): 301–314.
42.
Craig does unsportingly imply that accepting that this ‘evil’ exists is akin to accepting an objective standard of morality, so that God’s existence is actually confirmed. See Craig (OG), pp. 161–162. Also, not only does the a-theist have no need to concede that objective morality exists in order to make this argument, they could temporarily do so to discover a contradiction or how the evidence of this evil probabilistically leads to alternatives to theism.
43.
Ironically, the perception of gratuitous suffering may have played a role in the early development of ideas about deities. See Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, “Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, no. 1 (2010): 7–16.
44.
Atheists can also appeal to emotion. Another, less emotive, example: the incredible – and unnecessary – pain many animals deal with, on a daily basis. Cf. William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 337.
45.
Robert Bass convincingly argues that even if we do not know gratuitous evils when we see them, the sheer number of seemingly gratuitous but actually inscrutable evils suggests that there are indeed gratuitous evils. See Robert Bass, “Many Inscrutable Evils,” Ars Disputandi 11, no. 1 (2011): 118–132; Robert Bass, “Inscrutable evils: still numerous, still relevant,” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75, no. 4 (2014): 379–384.
46.
Keep in mind that it is theism that is being discussed. The concept of karma in certain Indian polytheisms might offer a more probable option.
47.
Swinburne (EG), pp. 328–329, 338–339. Note also that Swinburne here realises that concocting excuses to salvage one’s hypothesis does indeed result in a lower probability.
48.
Challenges still present themselves. For example, sceptics may wonder why it should be good that a loving God would grant one person the free will to torture another, relatively innocent person. It may also be that God is completely responsible for such things, given that people can arguably only act in accordance with how the all-knowing and all-powerful God created them. This is even more likely if the world is deterministic. Also, God could have created a world in which all people freely do good. If he simply cannot – though claiming this challenges his omnipotence – then, again, it may have been better for God not to create anything at all.
49.
Craig (OG), pp. 158–161.
50.
As before, if the speculations of theists are acceptable, it is not clear why the speculations of naturalists and alternative supernaturalists are not.
51.
Regarding ad hoc theorising, Law posits an evil god who has hidden reasons for allowing some gratuitous goods. Even if we cannot see it, it’s all for the worst. See Stephen Law, “The Evil-God Challenge,” Religious Studies 46, no. 3 (2010): 353–373. Another ad hoc explanation would be the ‘promise of Heaven’. Cf. Craig (OG), pp. 166–167. This raises yet more uncomfortable questions for the theist, such as “What is the evidence that Heaven exists?”, “Is the reward of Heaven adequate?”, “Why would God create the Universe if Heaven is so wonderful? Why not just create Heaven?”, and “If the purpose of the Universe is free will, what is the purpose of Heaven? Servitude?” Cf. Philipse (GAS), pp. 299–302. Pragmatically speaking, such false hope could be considered ‘evil’, as it may result in a person’s inaction when it comes to potentially improving their lot in life. Also consider that God could also lie to us for some greater good; his ‘holy’ scriptures and personal communications may be filled with deceit. Cf. Erik J. Wielenberg, “Sceptical theism and divine lies,” Religious Studies 46, no. 4 (2010): 509–523. The theist might contend that God would – or even could – not lie, but that firstly assumes that the existing god is indeed the good God of theism, secondly violates his free will, and thirdly overlooks the reason for sceptical theism; explaining away God’s committing/allowing evil due to the possibility of some greater good. Furthermore, God could simply allow us to be lied to for some greater good, so that he himself does not lie. There is actually precedent for God’s allowing evils – including lies – in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the passive sense, many believers, particularly those who uphold diabolical mimicry, believe that Satan has been allowed to form false religions, deceiving many. In the active sense, the Bible often has God allowing Satan to torment his followers, such as Job and Paul. See Job 1 and 2 Corinthians 12. Many biblical authors even accuse God of lying to them, directly, and via proxies. See 1 Kings 22:23, 2 Chronicles 18:22, Jeremiah 4:10, 20:7, Ezekiel 14:9, 2 Thessalonians 2:11. Isaiah 45:7 is also easily interpreted as meaning that God creates good and evil. Note also that the inadequate state of the biblical texts does seem consistent with an entity sowing confusion.
52.
This contradicts Craig’s view that atheists have more justification for rape. See Craig (RF), p. 175. The onus is now on Craig, in his role as a theist, to explain that God definitely does not have some good but unknown/mysterious reason for wanting his followers to rape and torture innocent people. This especially seems difficult for Judeo-Christian theists. See Numbers 31 and recall Craig’s apologising for Israelite genocide.
53.
This might seem similar to Oppy’s argument from dominance, though he seems to think that it is not particularly Bayesian/probabilistic. See Oppy (BAAG).
54.
This point shall be elaborated soon.
55.
Cf. Paul Draper’s assertion that while naturalism and supernaturalism could be considered equally simple, theism is but one form of supernaturalism, so that naturalism is simpler. Theism is more complex, as it makes more claims about the world. See Paul Draper. “God and the Burden of Proof,” accessed 17/01/2017, http://wp.patheos.com.s3.amazonaws.com/blogs/secularoutpost/files/2014/07/Draper-God-and-the-Burden-of-Proof.pdf. Interestingly, Draper also claims here that naturalism is but one form of atheism, which is in agreement with my wider definition of atheism, and its great plausibility.
56.
For example, consider shifting attitudes about the causes of mental illness and natural disasters.
57.
There may be many more possibilities, including hybrid hypotheses.
58.
The assumption of transcendence, effectively of non-monism, suits the structure of this discussion, and shall eventually be rectified.
59.
Craig does invoke Ockham’s Razor in restricting the discussion to a single cause of the universe. See Craig (RF), 152.
60.
van Fraassen (SI), p. 90.
61.
Swinburne indicates that theism is simpler than the polytheisms due to considerations such as the cooperation of many gods and the expectation of observing different deities’ handiwork. See Swinburne (EG), p. 147.
62.
This number inspired the name of the popular search engine, Google. See Google. “Our History in Depth,” accessed 04/02/2014, http://www.google.com.au/about/company/history.
63.
For a dictionary on curious and interesting numbers, see David Wells, The Penguin Dictionary of Curious and Interesting Numbers (London: Penguin, 1987). The googol, the googolplex, and the number of particles in the universe are discussed on p. 205.
64.
Ibid., p. 202.
65.
Ibid., pp. 209–210.
66.
Wells thinks Asamkhyeya equates to 10^140. See ibid., p. 203. As is lamentably common with Western interpretations of Indian traditions, Wells may have been grossly mistaken. One Asamkhyeya may be as large as 10^74,436,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, as explained by Bhikshu Jin Yong, which shall serve for these calculations. See Jin Yong, “How Large is One Asamkhyeya?,” Vajra Bodhi Sea 2008, no. 462 (2008): 43.
67.
An important number to many Discordians.
68.
There is not enough room in the known universe for this absurd number to be fully written down, in standard-sized font. Astronomer William Millar agrees that this is even the case for the vastly smaller googolplex. See William Millar, The Amateur Astronomer’s Introduction to the Celestial Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 223.
69.
The grammatical choices are intentional and respects that there may indeed be more than one god, and that an existing god may not be the God of theism. This large number was also chosen to be intentionally far greater than any number employed by Craig or his colleagues, when arguing that a naturalistic or non-theistic explanation is highly improbable, such as with his fine-tuning argument.
70.
The problem/evidence of hiddenness would certainly tip the likelihood/consequent probability scales towards deistic forms of polytheism.
71.
There are many monotheisms, ditheisms, and so forth, but we here hold all else equal, leaving us with ‘metahypotheses’, so that we can determine if one god is simpler than two, or three, or four, etc.
72.
Using the short-scale system for naming large numbers, though the results will be identical for those preferring the long-scale system.
73.
Please note that the tediousness of these calculations and descriptions is a poetic device intended to evoke feelings of deep humility and unimportance, in the face of such vastness. The number of alternatives to theism is truly staggering, and ought be overwhelming and mind-boggling.
74.
Craig generally acknowledges that hypotheses with greater explanatory scope are preferable. See Craig (RF), p. 233.
75.
This can limit the discussion of the pantheisms to those entailing only one god, though that is no great problem. Please note, however, that polytheistic pantheisms are certainly live options.
76.
If not independent, several properties can be altered.
77.
Law postulates an evil god. See Stephen Law, “The Evil-God Challenge,” Religious Studies 46, no. 3 (2010): 353–373.
78.
In fact, while advancing a cosmological argument, Gale asserted, “a necessarily existent God who essentially has all of the divine perfections is an impossible being.” He reasons that “since such a being exists in every possible world and is at its greatest greatness in every one of them, given that it essentially has all of its omni-properties, in no possible world is there an instance of a purely gratuitous or unjustified evil; but, plainly, it is possible that there be such an evil, thereby engendering a contradiction.” See Richard M. Gale and Alexander R. Pruss, “A new cosmological argument,” Religious Studies 35, no. 4 (1999): 461–476.
79.
For example, see Exodus 4:11 and Lamentations 3:38.
80.
Exodus 9:12, Isaiah 6:9–10, John 12:40. Jesus seemed to think likewise, explaining why he taught in parables. See Mark 4:11–12, which, incidentally, appears to contradict John 18:19–20.
81.
Cf. Philipse (GAS), p. 250.
82.
In other words, theism claims more about God than is necessary, so posits a more complex god, which is inconsistent with the constant appeals to simplicity.
83.
I am not at all claiming that evil, or good, exists. Indeed, if there were no good and evil, it would seem that theism is impossible, as it posits a god that is all-good. Models of god that makes no such claims would still be possible. For example, a god that is ‘merely’ all-powerful and all-knowing.
84.
This example is specifically included to side step the possible objection that the three omni-properties of God are interdependent.
85.
For a brief description of Ialdabaoth, see Zlatko Pleše, Poetics of the Gnostic Universe: Narrative and Cosmology in the Apocryphon of John (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 51–55.
86.
Swinburne’s strategy is just that. See Swinburne (EG), p. 55. Craig offers a somewhat similar argument, unconvincingly claiming that the intuition that a quasi-maximally great being exists depends on the intuition that a maximally great being exists, so that the latter “has priority”. See Craig (RF), p. 187. On p. 188, Craig endorses Swinburne’s strategy.
87.
Remember that the simplicity objection works against the theist, as the simplest theory of all may be that God does not exist (as in naturalism), or that God is simply one with the universe (as in pantheism). It is also surprising that Craig does not view the ‘infinite’ cosmic singularity as so ‘simple’ that it could be the stopping point, so that the theistic explanation is unnecessary.
88.
Namely, the lack of evidence, god’s hiddenness.
89.
Craig is welcome to discuss how a deistic maximally-great god might be simpler than a deistic quasi maximally-great god, though he would likely be uninterested.
90.
William Bristow. “Enlightenment,” accessed 04/02/2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment. Note that Craig understands the difference between deism and his theism. See Craig (RF), pp. 249, 258. Interestingly, deism, which seems more evidentially justified, came into vogue around the time that evidence became highly valued over religious dogma.
91.
The latter shall be later discussed. I find the assumption that the revelation of the theistic God must be directed to humans to be arbitrary. It would be difficult to argue for this as necessary.
92.
Lucifer was perfect, but then was not (Ezekiel 28:15); his early companions almost immediately defied him (Genesis 3); almost everyone in the world needed to be killed (Genesis 6–9); still not content with his children in the postdiluvian world, God punishes and segregates humanity by multiplying their languages (Genesis 11); only God’s physical manifestation, betrayal, torture, and ‘death’ on Earth could at last set the world to rights (Matthew 27, John 3:16); the latter was not, after all, the ‘final solution’, with God finally threatening to destroy the world, saving only a select few who are to be rewarded with the privilege of praising God’s greatness and wisdom for all eternity (Revelation 5–7).
93.
Consider that a godless universe does not unnecessarily multiply entities, and that the hypothesised singularity – which is and would become the universe – is also said to be infinite. Note that in discussing ‘godless god-models’, I refer to ‘naturalism’, rather than ‘atheism’, as the latter can merely refer to a lack of belief in the theistic god, rather than a strictly godless scenario.
94.
In other words, even if all the notions of simplicity so far discussed were effectively the same, theism could be deemed somewhat more inherently plausible than the polytheisms and some of the alternative monotheisms, but would be less inherently plausible than the naturalisms and pantheisms. And as we shall see, pantheism is also victorious on the consequent side of the equation. Note that if all considerations about ad hocness and simplicity were overlooked, theism is still overcome by the sheer number of alternatives, and their superior likelihoods.
95.
It is unfortunate that Craig seems to think that naturalism is the only reasonable alternative to theism, generally ignoring the problem of pantheisms. Cf. Craig (RF), p. 180. Note also that even if the theist rejects that pantheism would be simpler regarding entities, it should at least be considered equally simple, and thus, must be dealt with accordingly.
96.
It would seem unfair to claim that the God of theism is not infinite or all-encompassing by referring to things that do not exist. Consider also that all things might exist eternally and at all times (cf. Lewis’ modal realism) as a pantheistic god, mice included. Recall Craig’s unsuccessful arguments against pantheism in William Lane Craig, “Pantheists in Spite of Themselves? Pannenberg, Clayton, and Shults on Divine Infinity,” American Theological Inquiry 5, no. 1 (2012): 3–23.
97.
Cf. Philip Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000), p. 125.
98.
Some might claim that my use of the term ‘classical theism’ is technically incorrect, and that I should be discussing (the very similar) ‘theistic personalism’. To Craig, however, “This is a difference among brethren… I don’t like the label theistic personalism… I think it is misleading to make up labels like theistic personalism and attach those to those who don’t hold to Thomism. So I don’t like the label.” See William Lane Craig. “Is it Possible God is Not Personal?,” accessed 06/07/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-it-possible-god-is-not-personal. Appropriately, many pages on his Reasonable Faith website refer to his preferred god-model being ‘classical theism’.
99.
In a similar vein, we can wonder if the theist would recant if we lacked the appealed to evidence, such as the evidence of the Big Bang, which we did not know about for most of human history.
100.
Pantheism as a catch-all hypothesis may be the most plausible and robust of all the god-models, apart from the non-god model that is naturalism. The pantheistic proponent need only take a particular monotheism or polytheism and imagine a pantheistic version of it. The one change that would be required, that god and the universe are of the same essence, is simpler and less ad hoc, whilst also being more in line with naturalism and science.
101.
Craig (RF), p. 233.
102.
Remember that appealing to simplicity might only be helpful when all else is considered equal or if the likelihood ratio is sufficiently favourable. If important evidence were to be ignored, for example, we could be justified in believing the simpler theory that there exist only four or five elements.
103.
WPM. “Our Beliefs,” accessed 05/02/2014, http://www.pantheism.net. This naturalistic pantheism has been described by Richard Dawkins as “sexed-up atheism”. See Dawkins (GD), p. 18. Interestingly, he also referred to deism as “watered-down theism”.
104.
Frank White, The Overview Effect: Space Exploration and Human Evolution, 2nd ed. (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1998).
105.
Levine (Pantheism), pp. 3–5.
106.
Laozi, “The Lao Tzu (Tao-Te Ching),” in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans. Wing-Tsit Chan, ed. Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 141, 152. Cf. Laozi, Tao Te Ching: A New English Version, trans. Stephen Mitchell (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 4, 25.
107.
The main difference seemingly being that naturalistic pantheism posits god as a ‘material something’ while idealistic pantheism posits god as a ‘spiritual something’ or even an ‘illusory something’. This distinction could obviously be merely perceptual, though the aim in this section is not to demonstrate the absolute plausibility of pantheism, but the relative plausibility of certain variations, compared with theism.
108.
I employ the term ‘classical pantheism’ as a nod to the Stoics, who, Baltzly argued, believed in such a god. See Dirk Baltzly, “Stoic Pantheism,” Sophia 42, no. 2 (2003): 3–33. Suitable alternatives could include ‘generic pantheism’, and, simply, ‘pantheism’.
109.
I reject and refute attempts by theologians, burdened by their presuppositions on God’s needing to be non-physical, to define panentheism in a non-mereological way. See Raphael Lataster, “The Attractiveness of Panentheism – a Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke,” Sophia 53, no. 3 (2014): 389–395 and Raphael Lataster, “Theists Misrepresenting Panentheism – Another Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke,” Sophia 54, no. 1 (2015): 93–98.
110.
This seems to be the sort of model of god, or the Primordial Man, endorsed in the Purusha Sukta. See Purushottama Bilimoria and Ellen Stansell, “Suturing the Body Corporate (Divine and Human) in the Brahmanic Traditions,” Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 239–240. Going by the historical records, monotheism and classical theism would seem to be quite the latecomers.
111.
Interestingly, panentheistic themes can be gleaned from Christian writings, such as 1 Corinthians 15:28, Colossians 1:17, and Acts 17:28.
112.
It is worth noting that just as Shults switched from theism to some form of pantheism, so too has philosopher Michael Sudduth swapped theism for panentheism, and Christ for Krishna. See Michael Sudduth. “Philosophy and My Spiritual Journey,” accessed 17/01/2017, http://michaelsudduth.com/philosophy-and-my-spiritual-journey.
113.
There are, of course, many more forms of pantheism (and monism) that have been postulated, but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this project. Of particular relevance are those forms that are somewhat similar to theism, particularly in positing a personal god. Also, more important than established forms of pantheism, in this project, are conceivable forms of pantheism, serving as alternatives to theism.
114.
Neale Donald Walsch, Conversations with God: An Uncommon Dialogue, Book 1 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1996).
115.
Carole M. Cusack, “Science Fiction as Scripture: Robert A. Heinlein’s Stranger in a Strange Land and the Church of All Worlds,” Literature & Aesthetics 19, no. 2 (2009): 73, 90. Cf. Vedic adherents who affirm, “aham Brahmasmi”, or “I am Brahman”, where the Brahman is the infinite reality. See Ted Peters, “Models of God,” Philosophia 35, no. 3 (2007): 281.
116.
Nils Bjorn Kvastad, “Pantheism and Mysticism, Part I,” Sophia 14, no. 2 (1975): 1–15; G. J. Stokes, “Gnosticism and Modern Pantheism,” Mind 4, no. 15 (1895): 320.
117.
Ankur Barua, “God’s Body at Work: Ramanuja and Panentheism,” International Journal of Hindu Studies 14, no. 1 (2010): 1–30; Purushottama Bilimoria and Ellen Stansell, “Suturing the Body Corporate (Divine and Human) in the Brahmanic Traditions,” Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 237–259.
118.
Xiaodong Wu, “The Rhinoceros Totem and Pangu Myth: An Exploration of the Archetype of Pangu,” Oral Tradition 16, no. 2 (2001): 364–380; Xiaodong Wu, “Pangu And The Origin Of The Universe,” in China’s Creation and Origin Myths: Cross-Cultural Explorations in Oral and Written Traditions, ed. Mineke Schipper, Shuxian Ye, and Hubin Yin (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
119.
L. W. King, The Seven Tablets of Creation: The Babylonian and Assyrian Legends Concerning the Creation of the World and of Mankind (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), pp. 75–77, 87; David Toshio Tsumura, Creation and Destruction: A Reappraisal of the Chaoskampf Theory in the Old Testament (Warsaw, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), p. 194; William Morris and Eirikr Magnusson, The Story of the Volsungs (London: Walter Scott Press, 1888), pp. 9–10; Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 312–314.
120.
Deepak Chopra et al. “CNN Larry King Live (Transcript): Interview With Stephen Hawking; Science and Religion,” accessed 07/01/2013, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1009/10/lkl.01.html.
121.
James Cameron, Avatar (Los Angeles, CA: Twentieth Century Fox, 2009), Film.
122.
Colin Campbell, “The Easternisation of the West,” in New Religious Movements: Challenge and Response, ed. Bryan R. Wilson and Jamie Cresswell (London: Routledge, 1999); Carole M. Cusack, “The Western Reception of Buddhism: Celebrity and Popular Cultural Media as Agents of Familiarisation,” Australian Religion Studies Review 24, no. 3 (2011): 308; Carole M. Cusack, Invented Religions: Imagination, Fiction and Faith (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2010): 65.
123.
Ken Hillis, “From Capital to Karma: James Cameron’s Avatar,” Postmodern Culture 19, no. 3 (2009): https://doi.org/10.1353/pmc.2009.0007.
124.
John Lennon, Imagine (London: Apple Records, 1971), Gramophone record; William Adams et al., One Tribe (Santa Monica, CA: Interscope Records, 2009), The E.N.D album CD.
125.
W. S. Urquhart, “The Fascination of Pantheism,” International Journal of Ethics 21, no. 3 (1911): 323; Michael P. Levine, “Pantheism, Ethics and Ecology,” Environmental Values 3, no. 2 (1994): 121–138; Robert S. Corrington, “Deep Pantheism,” Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 1, no. 4 (2007): 503–507.
126.
The exclusivist tendencies of monotheistic religions has been linked with religious violence. See Schwartz (CC); Avalos (FW). Some of this violence concerns idolatry and iconoclasm. See Willem van Asselt et al., eds., Iconoclasm and Iconoclash: Struggle for Religious Identity (Leiden: Brill, 2007). Interestingly, if some form of pantheism were true, the worship of idols – of wood, stone, and so forth – would be perfectly reasonable.
127.
Arnold Toynbee, “The Religious Background of the Present Environmental Crisis,” International Journal of Environmental Studies 3, no. 1–4 (1972): 141–146.
128.
Apart from the potential for more evidential support for pantheisms, these benefits may be mutual. Microbiological research increasingly demonstrates that humans have many other organisms living within; organisms that come from the greater environment, and affect our health. For example, see Eugene Rosenberg and Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg, The Hologenome Concept: Human, Animal and Plant Microbiota (New York: Springer, 2013).
129.
William Lane Craig, personal communication, November 27, 2013. This is a similar approach to that taken by Swinburne, who also feels that his case for theism is so strong that alternatives need not be seriously considered, as revealed in a discussion with Herman Philipse. See Philipse (GAS), p. 330. That these are both personal discussions, rather than published proclamations, may be indicative of the seriousness of this pantheistic challenge to theism. Theistic philosophers might have taken a leaf out of the Roman Catholic Church’s book with regards to the ideal way in which to deal with controversies: silence.
130.
This shall be analysed in the following subsection. See William Lane Craig, “Pantheists in Spite of Themselves? Pannenberg, Clayton, and Shults on Divine Infinity,” American Theological Inquiry 5, no. 1 (2012): 3–23.
131.
Schilbrack (PSR), p. 13.
132.
Max Andrews. “Curriculum Vitae,” accessed 07/02/2014, http://sententias.org/cv.
133.
Max Andrews. “Thanks to William Lane Craig & Reasonable Faith,” accessed 07/02/2014, http://sententias.org/2010/12/17/thanks-to-william-lane-craig-reasonable-faith.
134.
Max Andrews. “Q&A 35: Arguing with Pantheists,” accessed 07/02/2014, http://sententias.org/2013/11/15/qa-35.
135.
Regrettably, the comments section contains an ill-tempered exchange between Andrews and myself. I was interested in arguments against pantheisms that did not rely on the claim that the pantheist must accept a necessary universe (which, as earlier discussed, may not be a point against pantheism at all), which left Andrews disappointed that I was not so interested in or convinced by his insubstantial argument. Critiquing the blog-post musings of a graduate student from Liberty University may seem out of place, but it is another reflection of the dearth of pantheistic-related discussion in analytic philosophy of religion, particularly with regards to convincing arguments against pantheistic plausibility.
136.
This is a somewhat surprising lack of imagination from the philosopher who formulated a much-revered modern version of the ontological argument, and who supposes that humans possess some sort of sensus divinitatus, so that the whole panoply of Christian theistic belief can be accepted, without evidence. See Alvin Plantinga, “Pantheism,” in A Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 466. Note also that most theists can actually agree with the notion that God is all-encompassing, pre-Creation.
137.
Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Panentheism and Classical Theism,” Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 61–75.
138.
Ibid.: 68.
139.
Ibid.: 75.
140.
I have responded to Göcke’s claims in my aforementioned Sophia articles, and also in several forthcoming collaborations with Purushottama Bilimoria, wherein we further clarify what panentheism is and is not. Notably, since our academic debate, Göcke has almost completely changed his view, effectively accepting that panentheism is ‘more attractive’ than theism.
141.
Paul Copan, “The Naturalists are Declaring the Glory of God: Discovering Natural Theology in the Unlikeliest of Places,” in Philosophy and the Christian Worldview: Analysis, Assessment and Development, ed. David Werther and Mark D. Linville (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), p. 50.
142.
Paul Copan, That’s Just Your Interpretation: Responding to Skeptics Who Challenge Your Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2001), pp. 58–59.
143.
Levine (Pantheism), p. x. Schilbrack also recognises that Philosophy of Religion should be more broad. See Schilbrack (PSR).
144.
In other words, the god that is imagined is not actually God. The same could be said for historical descriptions of God, which are arguably idols of paper. Note also that the imagined god may actually exist, but only as a concept in the believer’s brain.
145.
As opposed to mere accidental properties. See Teresa Robertson and Philip Atkins. “Essential vs. Accidental Properties,” accessed 13/02/2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental.
146.
Philipse understands that theists make “a somewhat arbitrary decision concerning which god would be more worthy of worship”, indicating that they merely stated their “preferred nominal essence”. Philipse (GAS), p. 133.
147.
Richard Francks, “Omniscience, Omnipotence and Pantheism,” Philosophy 54, no. 209 (1979): 396.
148.
Similalry, the concept of omniscience could be considered incoherent if we consider how it is that an already omniscient being could know what it is like to learn something that they did not previously know.
149.
William J. Mander, “Omniscience and Pantheism,” The Heythrop Journal 41, no. 2 (2000): 199–208.
150.
Technically these terms are different (the essence of something is what it actually is, while existence refers to whether this thing is instantiated in reality), but lead to the same conclusion when the ontological argument is considered sound. The being must have essence, if it is to exist. In other words, the omniessent being exists, and thus exists as all things.
151.
Craig is aware of this issue, and almost considers a number of fellow theologians to be pantheists in the Hegelian fashion, whilst also admitting that God must be comprised of some sort of substance. See William Lane Craig, “Pantheists in Spite of Themselves? Pannenberg, Clayton, and Shults on Divine Infinity,” American Theological Inquiry 5, no. 1 (2012): 3–23. The article is published in various forms and may be found online, at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/pantheists-in-spite-of-themselves. Craig commits several errors in this article, such as the implication that panentheism should reduce to pantheism, which is not at all obvious. See William Rowe, “Does Panentheism Reduce to Pantheism? A Response to Craig,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61, no. 2 (2007): 65–67. Note that Craig had several years to incorporate Rowe’s critique, yet chose not to do so.
152.
This is indeed Craig’s primary strategy in addressing the issue, though he seems not to recognise that an unembounded being could be considered greater than one that is embounded. Craig also rejects that god is a mereological sum, pointing to the seemingly absurd notion that his hand and a desk form part of one object. In fact, they do. They are collections of atoms, kept apart by various forces. They are both part of the planet Earth, the Milky Way galaxy, this universe, and possibly, a pantheistic god. This is no more an absurd notion than the fact that a hair follicle and the myelin sheaths of neurons form part of one entity: a Chihuahua’s body. Craig could dispute the notion of a cohesive and monistic universe, and is welcome to explain what the Earth actually comprises of, if all the humans are excluded, as well as plants, minerals, other components, and so forth. It is further surprising, given that Craig earlier spoke of the universe (one entity) as originating from the singularity (one entity). Craig’s further claim that “the concept of an absolutely unlimited being is incoherent” is underdeveloped (he seems to be cavilling as the discussion could be limited to boundaries of existing substances, rather than boundaries of all logical possibilities), and irrelevant to the notion that a being with fewer limits or boundaries is surely greater. Craig says that even the pantheistic god is limited (by what it is not) pre-Creation, as it is not, say, the moon, or a mouse. Of course, if some classical pantheism obtains in this real world and there was no creation, god literally is the moon, a mouse, all mice, all men (and not just ‘holy prophets’), and so forth, so is not as limited as Craig believes. He concludes the article with the claim that “God’s metaphysical infinity should be understood in terms of His superlative attributes which make Him a maximally great being” which merely begs the question as to which attributes are attributed to god. See William Lane Craig, “Pantheists in Spite of Themselves? Pannenberg, Clayton, and Shults on Divine Infinity,” American Theological Inquiry 5, no. 1 (2012): 3–23. Note also that my comments here are reminiscent of the Gaia hypothesis. See James Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Recall also the implications of microbiological research that indicates that we are made up of microbes and ‘human cells’. We humans may be Gaia’s microbes.
153.
Note that Craig’s example and ongoing discussion alludes to the superiority of a mathematical infinite that ignores the contemporary (and historical, via Georg Cantor) philosophical discussion that considers such to be transfinite and even finite, rather than truly infinite such as a metaphysical or absolute infinity. See Rudy Rucker, Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 9. For more on the limitations of mathematical infinites, see Adrian William Moore, The Infinite, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2001).
154.
Or at least has fewer boundaries, and is freer in that sense.
155.
Craig (RF), p. 187.
156.
This conclusion is to avoid the scenario that god is a ‘mere’ part of the universe, as are humans. An alternative perspective is to consider whether god is a mere part of reality, as are humans, or is reality itself. Formerly theistic theologian LeRon Shults seemed at one point to struggle with the notion that God would only be a mere part of the whole. See F. LeRon Shults and Steven J. Sandage, The Faces of Forgiveness: Searching for Wholeness and Salvation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), pp. 161–164.
157.
There would also be the afore-mentioned difficulty of the ad hoc theistic explanation that the perfect god would quite happily degrade the perfect world (consisting only of this perfect being) by creating an imperfect universe. This appears to be an act of evil, rather than an act of good. Though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems simpler to assume the universe is perfect; that it is exactly as the all-powerful god wishes it to be. And indeed, if the created universe is perfect, as presumably anything that the perfect god creates would be, it is again convenient to assume that the universe is god, as god would seemingly be the only thing that could be perfect.
158.
Recalling the earlier point about whether an omniscient god should be pantheistic, in any case, it seems that the pantheistic god certainly has the ability to know more than the theistic god.
159.
Ignoring, of course, Douglas Gasking’s humorous ontological argument premised on the notion that the god that does not exist yet can still create the universe is greater than the god that can only create when existing, thereby concluding that god does not exist. See William Grey, “Gasking’s Proof,” Analysis 60, no. 4 (2000): 368–370. Also, the philosopher can speculate as to whether the theist would be comfortable with the idea that god has the substance and size of a cockroach and can be stepped on by mere mortals, or if they would much rather that god is of infinite (or maximal) size and substance. In other words, it is intuitive to conceive of god as having greater size, and also as being comprised of more essence or substance. Note also that God’s supposed spiritual nature provides no exemption here, as ‘microparticle’ can refer to whatever it is that truly underlies God and/or the universe. The theist would be unlikely to believe that God is nothing. And if they did, creatio ex nihilo would literally be pantheistic.
160.
Chronicles 2:5–6. On a technical note, though this is not my only argument suggesting the primacy of a pantheistic god, the theistic philosopher might take issue with my occasionally referring to biblical precedent, when it is the god of bare theism that is being discussed. I do so only as support, and such criticisms yield an interesting dilemma. If theists wish to completely avoid referencing biblical sources in discovering the god of the philosophers, they risk this god differing greatly from the god of their preferred revealed tradition. Indeed, I argue that Yahweh is not God, throughout.
161.
Stephen D. Moore, “Gigantic God: Yahweh’s Body,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 21, no. 70 (1996): 87–115. The calculation is my own. The text indicates 160,000,000 “divine” parasangs. Note that the Earth’s equatorial diameter is less than 13,000 kilometres.
162.
The diameter of the Milky Way galaxy alone is more than 100,000 light-years, with one light-year being nearly equal to 10 trillion kilometres. See William Howard Waller, The Milky Way: An Insider’s Guide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 82, 286.
163.
Mark 4:30–32.
164.
Compare the microparticle with the good. It is apparently greater to be more and more good, and a maximally-great entity is all-good. By the same lights, it is reasonable that the maximally-great entity should be all-substantial also.
165.
This also coheres with the (admittedly often unjustified) intuition that ‘bigger is better’. The gods of various religions and mythologies are typically titanic in size, and are rarely – if at all – portrayed as being the size of microbes.
166.
This can be explained away as a false analogy, since perhaps only the sugar is ‘great’, but this could also lead to an argument for panentheism. Consider Schelling’s imaginative notion that “God shit out nature in order to expropriate it from Himself”. See Tyler Tritten, “Nature and Freedom: Repetition as Supplement in the Late Schelling,” Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 268.
167.
There is no obvious incoherence with this premise. Many birds, for example, use part of themselves, their saliva and feathers, to construct their nests. See Michael H. Hansell, Bird Nests and Construction Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 133. It seems unthinkable to deny an omnipotent god the ability to do this, particularly when her comparatively impotent creations are able to.
168.
The opposite could also be stated. Note also that this allowance is overly generous. As mentioned, the perfect god may not create at all, so that the only possible world is one that consists solely of god. A universe containing only god is automatically a ‘pantheistic universe’, and theism is immediately disproved. This universe is still possible in just such a scenario, such as that this universe or multiverse, like the whole ‘body’ of god, is eternal, and forms a part of god’s ‘left ring finger’ or right kidney. That the theist may struggle to imagine such a concept says nothing of its metaphysical possibility. Cf. Göcke’s merely assuming that a creation occurred, and also that “God is not a mereological sum”. See Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Panentheism and Classical Theism,” Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 68.
169.
That there may have been a truly infinite and unembounded god pre-Creation (if the nothing truly is no-thing), who would of its own volition place limitations on itself, would also need to be overlooked.
170.
In the sense that if it did occur, it may as well not have, considering the theological implications that creatio ex nihilo leads to here.
171.
As earlier indicated, such as in §2.3, the onus would seem to lie on the theist to demonstrate the truth of substance dualism, which is completely lacking in evidence. Pantheism is less ad hoc in this sense, sharing a ‘default’ monistic outlook with mainstream forms of naturalism. Note that neuroscientists have never demonstrated that there is true demarcation between the mental and the physical, between the mind and the brain or body. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case. Physically manipulating the brain often causes demonstrable changes in personality and the ability to think or reason. For example, somewhat like what is observed with dementia patients, Phineas Gage famously developed a vastly different personality after suffering physical damage to his brain. See Hanna Damasio et al., “The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from The Skull of a Famous Patient,” Science 264, no. 5162 (1994): 1102–1105. Additionally, epigenetics could indicate that the mind is inherently physical, as our environmental experiences influence the physical and mental attributes of our offspring, via genetic expression. For a primer, see David S. Moore, The Developing Genome: An Introduction to Behavioral Epigenetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). For a specific example, see Valerie S. Knopik et al., “The Epigenetics of Maternal Cigarette Smoking During Pregnancy and Effects on Child Development,” Development and Psychopathology 24, no. 4 (2012): 1377–1390. Note also that leading philosophers of mind tend to reject substance dualism, as even Christian philosophers of religion admit. For example, see William J. Wainwright, “Theistic Mystical Experiences, Enlightenment Experiences, and Ineffability,” in Philosophy and the Christian Worldview: Analysis, Assessment and Development, ed. Werther and Linville (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 215.
172.
Cf. Baruch Spinoza’s neutral monism. See Philip Goff, ed. Spinoza on Monism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
173.
As one of the very few theistic scholars attempting to demonstrate the relative implausibility of pantheistic concepts, it is worth repeating that Göcke is only able to assume that “God is not a mereological sum, neither on classical theism nor on the panentheism I develop”. His assumptions that god cannot be a mereological sum on theism or on his idiosyncratic brand of (not)panentheism says nothing about whether the god that might actually exist is or could be a mereological sum. See Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Panentheism and Classical Theism,” Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 68. Note also that on p. 63 Göcke appears to explicitly reject my body-cells analogy, finding it “inadequate”, despite offering no arguments for the incoherence of this concept.
174.
Note the nuanced intentions of this subsection, which does not attempt to prove that some pantheistic god-model obtains, nor that it would if the ontological argument were sound. The aim of this subsection is for it to serve as a prolegomenon; to demonstrate that crucial yet often unjustified assumptions are made about the maximally-great entity or greatest conceivable being, by theists and pantheists alike, which render this all-important argument – even if it were sound – indecisive.
175.
If the universe was not created, then theism and pandeism are both disproved, though some form of classical pantheism or panentheism, not all of which need involve a creation, could still obtain.
176.
Or the potentiality in the quantum vacuum, possibly serving as a bridge between the ‘physical’ and the ‘non-physical’. Also, pandeism allows for the possibility that all possible worlds emerged from the singularity, or singularities, so that all possible scenarios are actualised. Recall Lewis’ modal realism. See Lewis (OPW).
177.
For more on these divine vibrations, see Vasugupta, The Stanzas on Vibration, trans. Mark S. G. Dyczkowski (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992); Vasugupta, Spanda-Kārikās: The Divine Creative Pulsation, trans. Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1980). The primordial Chaos of ancient Greek mythology, as described by Hesiod in Theogony, 116–122, could also be a pandeistic-type god. See Hesiod, “Theogony,” in Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Homerica, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White, ed. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), pp. 86–87.
178.
For an introduction to the scientific theories alluded to, see Katrin Becker, Melanie Becker, and John H. Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory: A Modern Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
179.
Paola A. Zizzi, “Emergent Consciousness: From the Early Universe to Our Mind,” NeuroQuantology 1, no. 3 (2003): 310.
180.
Pandeism may be less preferable here than alternative pantheisms (and even theism), as god no longer exists (where existence is assumed preferable to non-existence) qua god, while still being preferable to theism due to the non-reliance on creatio ex nihilo and other concerns already discussed. Even this is contentious, as god still exists, just now qua the universe. Since the pantheistic catch-all is preferable, and since deism easily explains god’s hiddenness, perhaps a mixture of these concepts, pandeism, would be the most plausible god-concept of all. This concept can be made even more robust by adding in polytheistic elements.
181.
Some will interpret such experiences according to their pre-existing beliefs, involving Allah, Shiva, and the like, while others will see ‘the all-inclusive One’. Yet others may appeal to ‘new’ gods, such as the Flying Spaghetti Monster. The Flying Spaghetti Monster is a fictional and satirical god created by Bobby Henderson in protest over the possibility that creationism would be taught in American public schools. See James A. Beckford and N. J. Demerath, The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion (London: SAGE, 2007), p. 360.
182.
It can explain other experiences too, but via ad hoc and often counter-productive explanations, such as that Satan is responsible. Richard Swinburne proposed an exclusive and exhaustive classification of religious experiences. In this five-fold classification, pantheisms (including pandeism) again demonstrate greater explanatory scope in explaining more of these experiences, especially (and exclusively) the first type, whereby god is perceived in an ‘ordinary’ object. See Swinburne (EG), pp. 298–303. In the catch-all concept of pantheism, even a piece of toast that looks like Jesus or a simple glass of water can (rightly) be perceived as being god. To the theist’s undoubted disgust, the pantheistic Daoist would even be comfortable in identifying god in faeces. Cf. Zhuangzi, “The Chuang Tzu,” in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans. Wing-Tsit Chan, ed. Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 203.
183.
For a useful literature review of many decades’ worth of philosophical discussion on the evidential problem of evil, including common defences and theodicies, see Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed. The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996).
184.
I am not alone in recognising that the evidential argument from evil does probabilistic harm to theism but not to pandeism. See William C. Lane, “Leibniz’s Best World Claim Restructured,” American Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2010): 76–77.
185.
Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 83; Swinburne (EG), p. 109.
186.
Craig (RF), pp. 152, 187–188.
187.
Not to be confused for certain forms of panpsychism.
188.
Such as that god is simply no longer present, or that not everyone will be able to access their inherent divinity or ‘remember’ (at this present moment at least) that they are divine.
189.
Christopher Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 19.
190.
Craig (RF), p. 233. Though this pertains to historical explanations (which is in any case, the sort proposed by Craig’s climactic Christological argument), Craig makes use of these factors for non-historical explanations also, such as on p. 171. Furthermore, these factors seem reasonable, particularly regarding Bayesian methods, so that they shall here be unproblematically utilised in a comparison of theistic and pandeistic hypotheses.
191.
Or rather, ‘did exist’. Though, in this scenario, the present universe is still god, albeit in an alternative form.
192.
Consider also the aforementioned ‘problem’ of a “temporal effect” arising from a “timeless cause”. Pandeism offers a simpler explanation of such ‘evidence’ than Craig’s brand of theism: the “temporal effect” and the “timeless cause” are one. Craig’s solution was to appeal to a personal agent that can exercise free choice. See Craig (RF), pp. 153–154.
193.
Recall that Craig actually values certain pragmatic reasons very highly. See ibid., pp. 65–88.
194.
Even atheistic or naturalistic – and possibly polytheistic – worldviews would be acceptable, if a broad-minded pandeism obtains.
195.
Consider the words (supposedly) of Solomon, “God is in heaven, and you are on earth”. See Ecclesiastes 5:2. Contrast this with the pantheistic teachings of Bishop John Shelby Spong, who believes that “Human life is capable of entering the infinity of God because the infinity of God can be found in the heart of every human life. The two are not distinct. Humanity and divinity flow together”. See John Shelby Spong, Why Christianity Must Change or Die: A Bishop Speaks to Believers in Exile (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 131.
196.
A contemporary example would be the rise of ISIS. For a nuanced discussion on the religious and non-religious factors involved, see Simon Cottee, “‘What ISIS Really Wants’ Revisited: Religion Matters in Jihadist Violence, but How?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, no. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1248665 (2016).
197.
Given that there are more plausible options, and that they are infinite in number, nothing short of a miracle could prove theism true. Appropriately, that does seem to be the point of Craig’s climactic Christological argument, which is analysed in Part 4.
198.
Craig (RF), p. 247.
199.
William Lane Craig, “Your God is Alive!,” (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2013). This brief answer was followed by some laughter, perhaps because the exchange was seen as fatuous, or because a response was expected of me, but did not eventuate, with Craig finally answering an unasked follow-up question, saying that he sees no problem in reconciling the ‘harsh god’ of the Old Testament, with the ‘loving god’ of the New Testament. He also added that this is the god that Jesus believed in. There is clearly no ambiguity here.
200.
There is actually some question about whether Mormons might be polytheists, or even atheists. See A. A. Howsepian, “Are Mormons Theists?,” Religious Studies 32, no. 3 (1996): 357–370.
201.
Craig does dedicate a chapter of On Guard to the topic of religious diversity and religious pluralism, but it does not contain any arguments to the effect that the (supposed) god of the philosophical arguments must be the theistic (and Christian) God. Rather, the chapter serves to unconvincingly fend off common objections, once his Christian theistic exclusivism is assumed, and perhaps to express some regret that his doctoral supervisor and former mentor – John Hick – eventually adopted religious pluralism. Note that he nowhere explains why it is good for God to create and then to ‘save’ a person, nor why being saved is such a great good that it becomes acceptable for many to be ‘lost’. He also seems to overlook the issue that if God knew certain people would be unsaved, even if exposed to the Gospel message, it may have been best to leave them uncreated. According to Craig – at least he mentions the possibility, which he relies on – God had geographically separated such people from those more willing to accept God’s truth, which means that God could have moved them to another planet, or simply chosen not to create them. This would ‘save’ those who were predetermined to be damned from eternal torment, avoid uncomfortable questions as to why God would design such imperfect and unsalvageable souls in the first place, and remove potential barriers to Christian belief. This concept may also indicate inherent racist attitudes; the sort that inspires and justifies White Man’s Burden and Manifest Destiny. See Craig (OG), pp. 265–286.
202.
In alignment with much of my project, philosopher Tim Mulgan believes that there does exist some sort of god, but utilises the common atheistic arguments against what is commonly perceived as theism. He thinks that humans are not of any great import to this entity, and makes a salient point about unjustified anthropocentrism often underlying the arguments for theism and perhaps the arguments for naturalism. In other words, theists conclude that humans are of prime importance, because it was God’s intention, while naturalists find that the evidence indicates our insignificance and so conclude that supernaturalism is false. See Tim Mulgan, Purpose in the Universe: The Moral and Metaphysical Case for Ananthropocentric Purposivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
203.
Theists may, irrelevantly, cite the Fermi paradox regarding the lack of evidence for alien civilisations. Noted Creationist Ken Ham suspects that there are no intelligent extra-terrestrials and surprisingly asserts that if there were, “any aliens would also be affected by Adam’s sin, but because they are not Adam’s descendants, they can’t have salvation”. See Ken Ham. “‘We’ll Find a New Earth within 20 Years’,” accessed 29/07/2014, http://blogs.answersingenesis.org/blogs/ken-ham/2014/07/20/well-find-a-new-earth-within-20-years. One novel solution holds that much of the observable universe is a simulation designed to make it appear as though humans are the only intelligent beings. See Stephen Baxter, “The Planetarium Hypothesis: A Resolution of the Fermi Paradox,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 54, no. 5/6 (2001): 210–216. Bostrom has even argued that it is likely that we are in a simulation. See Nick Bostrom, “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?,” Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 211 (2003): 243–255. In that case, the universe as we know it really was designed. However, the ‘real world’ may be one in which it is very probable for people to exist without God. Finally, perhaps, as Aldous Huxley ruminated, we are living inside another planet’s hell!
204.
Cf. Revelation 12:4.
205.
See Exodus, Psalms 23, 1 Peter 5:4. Note that the archaeological evidence contradicts Jewish claims of Israelite servitude in ancient Egypt. For one, an exodus of such a great many people (depending on interpretation, Exodus 1:9 indicates that there were more Israelites than Egyptians in Egypt), particularly the bulk of the work force, should have left evidence of widespread economic and social upheaval. See James Weinstein, “Exodus and the Archaeological Reality,” in Exodus: The Egyptian Evidence, ed. Ernest S. Frerichs and Leonard H. Lesko (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1997), p. 87; Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology’s New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of its Sacred Texts (New York: Free Press, 2002), pp. 62–69. Even respected Jewish rabbis such as David Wolpe doubt the historicity of the Exodus, and other aspects of the traditional Jewish origin tales. See Teresa Watanabe. “Doubting the Story of Exodus,” accessed 06/07/2015, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/13/news/mn-50481.
206.
These two types of chimpanzees are the closest living relatives to humans. See Anne Fischer et al., “Evidence for a Complex Demographic History of Chimpanzees,” Molecular Biology and Evolution 21, no. 5 (2004): 799–808. Also, Frans de Waal has done much interesting work with ‘intelligent’ animals such as chimpanzees. For example, see Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2016).
207.
H. G. Wells, The Time Machine (London: Penguin, 2012).
208.
Felis sapiens plays a prominent role in the surrealist humour of Rob Grant and Doug Naylor. Like humans, these cat people thought themselves very important, created religions, fought holy wars, and obeyed unreasonably sexually restrictive commandments such as “Thou shalt not partake of carnal knowledge with more than four members of the opposite sex at any one session”. See Grant Naylor, Red Dwarf: Infinity Welcomes Careful Drivers (London: Penguin Books, 1989), pp. 123–128.
209.
Consider also that humans are not the oldest extant species on Earth, or the most numerous. There are also possibly many more older and life-sustaining planets throughout the universe.
210.
This references the God of Judeo-Christianity. See the biblical books of Genesis and Mark. Philosophers might wonder why God did not reveal himself to the far more numerous Chinese. This alludes to the related issue that the religiosity of many derives from cultural contingencies. For example, it was merely due to epistemic luck that the humble fisherman was living in Palestine during Jesus’ lifetime, and was thus able to adopt the one true faith, unlike the hapless native of South America.
211.
It is believed that humans and Neanderthals interbred, with many humans today containing Neanderthal nuclear DNA. See Paul H. Mason and Roger V. Short, “Neanderthal-human Hybrids,” Hypothesis 9, no. 1 (2011): 1–5.
212.
It is not inconceivable that polytheistic gods would also not interfere, such as if they took a vote and decided to grant free reign to their creations, as with the Prime Directive of Star Trek or the Watchers’ commitment to non-interference in the Marvel Universe.
213.
Cf. T. J. Mawson, Belief in God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 10.
214.
A time period that conveniently includes the emergence of writing, and precludes the emergence of cameras and the Internet. It is also a time period that purposely advantages the Abrahamic theisms.
215.
See Jacob Neusner et al., Do Jews, Christians, and Muslims Worship the Same God? (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2012), pp. 1, 27, 56, 86. Also consider the position of mainstream Christians in accepting some extra revelations, as well as the belief in the trinity, in differentiating from Judaism, but rejecting others, and so avoiding Islam. Surely the strict monotheistic God of most Muslims is different to the triune God of most Christians.
216.
Note that the Trinitarian view of God may indicate some remnant of polytheism. Cf. Michael C. Rea, “Polytheism and Christian Belief,” Journal of Theological Studies 57, no. 1 (2006): 138–141. The concept of the triune god of Christianity may also prove problematic for Craig, who upholds it, since it is not entailed by the arguments thus far presented or by theism, and is not accepted by all Christians, let alone all theists.
217.
Philipse (GAS), pp. 61–62; Kurt Noll, Canaan and Israel in Antiquity: An Introduction (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), pp. 129–134, 249; Michael C. Rea, “Polytheism and Christian Belief,” Journal of Theological Studies 57, no. 1 (2006): 136–142. See also Ara Norenzayan, Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). For an extensive discussion on the rise of Atenism, perhaps the world’s first monotheistic religion, at least in the way that early Judaism could be described as monotheistic, see Erik Hornung, Akhenaten and the Religion of Light, trans. David Lorton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). For a thorough treatment of the natural origins of religion, see Robert N. Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). Note also that many believers would accept naturalistic hypotheses about religions’ origins, in order to explain the rise of the many ‘false religions’. This obviously raises the question, “Is this also the case with my religion?”
218.
Biblical scholar Mark S. Smith has discussed Yahweh’s elevation from a lesser divinity to the highest divinity, at length. See Mark S. Smith, The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel’s Polytheistic Background and the Ugaritic Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 5–6, 143–144. With so many gods acknowledged, yet Yahweh eventually seen as the one true God, it does seem that Yahwism was – at least originally – a monolatrism rather than a strict monotheism. For a discussion on the monolatry of the Bible and the biblical remnants of a tradition that has Yahweh invading Israel from the South, in order to eventually replace El or El Shaddai, see Noll (CIA), pp. 249, 122–124.
219.
Craig’s Christian particularism is proudly self-proclaimed. See Craig (OG), p. 283.
220.
Craig (RF), pp. 277–278.
221.
There certainly could be a probabilistic argument of the ‘might makes right’ sort. It seems relatively less plausible that an all-powerful god would watch on as all her followers are eliminated, and belief in her ceased. This arguably is of no help to Christianity, with Islam quite likely to overtake it in terms of numbers of adherents.
222.
Craig’s exclusivism is again made very obvious in the chapter “Is Jesus the Only Way to God?”, in his On Guard. See Craig (OG), pp. 265–286.
223.
This task may be even more onerous than doing the same for the ‘generic gods’ of alternative god-conceptions.
224.
See William Lane Craig and Peter Slezak, “Your God Raised Jesus from Death?,” (Sydney: University of Technology, Sydney, 2013).
225.
This is demonstrated by Craig’s mixed feelings regarding the fact that many Muslims appreciate ‘his’ kalām cosmological argument, and his belief that it is very important “that Christians be trained to share these arguments, lest they be co-opted by Muslims”. Apart from the irony that Craig believes that the kalām cosmological argument is a Muslim argument, this might indicate Craig’s preference for evangelistic efforts over purely scholarly pursuits. See Craig (RF), p. 193.
226.
1 Kings 11:7, Numbers 25:3, 1 Kings 14:23, 1 Kings 18, Exodus 32, Leviticus 20:2. Note that Exodus 15:11 clearly exalts Yahweh ‘among the gods’.
227.
Karel van der Toorn, Bob Becking, and Pieter Willem van der Horst, eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 180–181, 275, 379–382.
228.
The popular Kenite hypothesis has the ancient Israelites appropriating Yahweh from the Midianites and perhaps also the Edomites. This may be why the Midianites are given a crucial role in the Torah, with Moses – who would promote Yahweh worship, and oppose Baal worship – marrying the daughter of a Kenite/Midianite priest, who happened to honour Yahweh. For an interesting discussion of the hypothesis, see Joseph Blenkinsopp, “The Midianite-Kenite Hypothesis Revisited and the Origins of Judah,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 33, no. 2 (2008): 131–153. The Edomites were supposedly the descendants of Esau, the brother of Jacob/Israel and according to Deuteronomy 23:7, were not to be despised. It is worth noting that while many gods/religions are denigrated in the Tanakh, the same cannot be said for the nearby Edomites and their god, Qos; perhaps because Qos and Yahweh were at one stage the same god. 1 Chronicles 15:17 mentions the name “Kushaiah”, which could mean “Qos is Yahweh”. See Justin Kelley, “Toward a New Synthesis of the God of Edom and Yahweh,” Antiguo Oriente 7, no. 1 (2009): 255–280.
229.
Exodus 12:12, Numbers 21:29, 33:4, Deuteronomy 10:17, 11:16, 32:43, Joshua 24:2, Judges 11:24, Psalms 89:7, 95:3, 97:7, Daniel 11:39; Deuteronomy 32:8–9, Psalms 82. For more on Yahweh and the high god ‘El’, and their appearances in the Masoretic Text, the Septuagint, and the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Smith (OBM), pp. 142–145. Consider also the evolution – within the biblical texts – of the increasingly transcendent (and less-anthropomorphic) Yahweh from merely the – or a – god of the Israelites, to (perhaps as a defiant reaction to Israelite defeats) a universal god of ‘the whole earth’, who probably directed other nations to punish Israel; the Israelites could have simply – like other peoples – adopted an alternative, and evidently ‘more powerful’ god, such as that of their conquerors. See Karen Armstrong, A History of God (London: Random House, 1999), pp. 24, 52–97. Armstrong is not alone in noting the development and exaltation of Yahweh from a limited Canaanite deity, due in part to external imperialistic pressures. For example, see Shawn W. Flynn, YHWH Is King: The Development of Divine Kingship in Ancient Israel (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Yahweh also becomes more ‘transcendent’ over time, a far cry from his very anthropomorphic portrayals in Genesis 3 and 18. Note also that the Septuagint, though a Greek translation, is far older than the standard Hebrew Masoretic text (which forms the basis for most Old Testament translations today), so could indicate older and more authoritative Hebrew traditions. Interestingly, also note that such Jewish defiance, which some may alternatively call stubbornness or resilience, may have contributed to the development of Christianity as well, as with the mainstream view that disillusionment over Jesus’ death led to the adoption of the belief in a suffering/dying and rising Messiah. The same could apply to alternative views of Christian Origins as well, since almost all such theories involve the Jews finding a spiritual solution to a physical problem.
230.
Margaret Barker, The Great Angel: A Study of Israel’s Second God (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992); Valerie Tarico and Thom Stark. “Polytheism and Human Sacrifice in Early Israelite Religion,” accessed 23/12/2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/valerie-tarico/polytheism-and-human-sacr_b_777340.html. The latter reference also has Stark explaining that human sacrifice “was an acceptable part of [early] Israelite and Judean religion”. Any conservative Christian believer scoffing at this notion need only consider Jesus’ role in their faith. See also this webpage, whose publisher, the Quartz Hill School of Theology, is associated with the Quartz Hill Community Church: QHST. “Ugarit and the Bible,” accessed 12/01/2017, http://www.theology.edu/ugarbib.htm.
231.
See 2 Kings 3. A human sacrifice proved to be the decisive factor.
232.
Karel van der Toorn, Bob Becking, and Pieter Willem van der Horst, eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 99–105, 915–916. For more on these gods, see John Day, Yahweh and the Gods and Goddesses of Canaan (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002). Note that a preferred god may become continually greater over time on account of religious rivalries, akin to ‘my daddy is stronger’ schoolyard taunts, until an infinite or maximally great god is arrived at. Also, there has been some discussion on Yahweh’s association with the Sun. See J. Glen Taylor, “A Response To Steve A. Wiggins, ‘Yahweh: the God of Sun?’,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 21, no. 71 (1996): 107–119; J. Glen Taylor, Yahweh and the Sun: Biblical and Archaeological Evidence for Sun Worship in Ancient Israel (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993); Mark S. Smith, The Early History of God: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient Israel, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2002), pp. 148–159.
233.
Genesis 10–11.
234.
Mark S. Smith argued that the Israelites derived much of their culture and religion from the Canaanites. See Smith (EHG). According to several Israeli archaeologists and historians, the ancient Israelites were Canaanites. See Finkelstein and Silberman (BU), p. 118; Anita Shapira, “The Bible and Israeli Identity,” AJS Review 28, no. 1 (2004): 40–41. Archaeologist William G. Dever finds that there is “overwhelming archaeological evidence today of largely indigenous origins for early Israel”. See William G. Dever, What Did the Biblical Writers Know and When Did They Know It?: What Archaeology Can Tell Us about the Reality of Ancient Israel (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002), p. 99. See also Jonathan N. Tubb, Canaanites (London: British Museum Press, 1998), pp. 13–16, who says that “Ammonites, Moabites, Israelites and Phoenicians undoubtedly achieved their own cultural identities, and yet ethnically they were all Canaanites”, and that “Israel was, in reality, a sub-set of Canaanite culture”. Ann Killebrew is yet another who doubts the biblical accounts, finding it reasonable to believe that “early Israel consisted largely of indigenous Canaanites”. See Ann E. Killebrew, Biblical Peoples And Ethnicity: An Archaeological Study of Egyptians, Canaanites, Philistines, And Early Israel 1300–1100 B.C.E. (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), p. 96. See also Thomas L. Thompson, The Mythic Past: Biblical Archaeology and the Myth of Israel (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 234; Niels Peter Lemche, The Canaanites and Their Land: The Tradition of the Canaanites (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), p. 152. For the cynically inclined, it would certainly seem rather convenient that the ‘promised land’ happened to be the land these people – or their close brethren – already occupied. For a somewhat similar discussion of the identity of contemporary Jews or Israelis, see Shlomo Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People (London: Verso, 2010). It is obviously controversial to argue that certain contemporary Muslim Palestinians are ‘true ethnic Jews’ whilst majority Israelis are more related to ancient Yemenites and Khazars. Nevertheless, there is some scientific support for the questioning of the Ashkenazi Jewish racial identity, which may explain why many contemporary Jews seemingly have more in common with Turkic and Eastern European peoples, than with other people of the Middle Eastern region. See Marta D. Costa et al., “A substantial prehistoric European ancestry amongst Ashkenazi maternal lineages,” Nature Communications 4, no. 2543 (2013): doi:https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms3543.
235.
Such as Yahweh’s comprehensive victory in Psalms 74:14.
236.
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Goddesses and the Divine Feminine: A Western Religious History (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2006), p. 78.
237.
Joseph Fontenrose, “Dagon and El,” Oriens 10, no. 2 (1957): 277–279; Benjamin Urrutia, “About El, Asherah, Yahweh and Anath,” American Anthropologist 75, no. 4 (1973); Mark S. Smith, “The Near Eastern Background of Solar Language for Yahweh,” Journal of Biblical Literature 109, no. 1 (1990): 38. Eusebius has Sanchuniathon (via Philo of Byblos) equating El with Kronos and Saturn. See Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, trans. Edwin Hamilton Gifford, vol. 1 (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), pp. 41–45.
238.
John Pairman Brown, “Yahweh, Zeus, Jupiter: The High God and the Elements,” Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 106, no. 2 (2009): 175–197.
239.
Uranus was also the son of Gaia.
240.
See Hesiod, “Theogony,” in Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Homerica, ed. Evelyn-White (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), pp. 86–89. Note that it is here not vitally important whether Hesiod intended to portray Gaia as emerging from or alongside Chaos. What is important is that the gods associated with Yahweh are far removed from the top of their respective divine hierarchies.
241.
These writings are preserved only in Chapter X, Book I of Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica. See Eusebius (PG1), pp. 37–41. On p. 43, El/Kronos is said to have emasculated the rapacious Uranus. Cf. Hesiod, “Theogony,” in Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Homerica, ed. Evelyn-White (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), pp. 90–93. On Elyon and Beruth deriving from some Chaos-like entity, the relevant portion confusingly begins with a mythological cosmogony, and then ends with a euhemeristic account. This might further remove El/Kronos from the initial all-being, but as with the previous footnote, is of little import.
242.
Many more links have been found between the gods of the Greek and Middle Eastern peoples. For a discussion on the similarities between Gaia/Uranus/Kronos/Zeus and Tiamat/Apsu/Ea/Marduk, see Richard S. Caldwell, The Origin of the Gods: A Psychoanalytic Study of Greek Theogonic Myth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 78–81.
243.
For more on this topic, see Ruether (GDF), p. 77; Day (YGGC), pp. 13–34; Thomas L. Thompson, “How Yahweh Became God: Exodus 3 and 6 and the Heart of the Pentateuch,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 20, no. 68 (1995): 57–74. Thompson leaves open the possibility that the Yahweh of Genesis 6 actually replaces several of ancient Palestine’s ancestral gods. Another useful resource that presents multiple views and discusses many of these Yahwistic topics is Diana Vikander Edelman, ed. The Triumph of Elohim: From Yahwisms to Judaisms (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1995).
244.
William Lane Craig and Richard Hess. “Jewish Beliefs about God: Ancient Israelite Polytheism?,” accessed 21/02/2014, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/jewish-beliefs-about-god.
245.
Ibid. Note that Hess was unable to conclusively rule out that El is a separate deity, and admitted that there were indeed polytheists amongst the Israelites, who believed in Yahweh as one of many gods. His primary defensive tactic is to point out that El (like Baal) does not necessarily have to refer to the name of a god, but could also refer to a title, which is rather unsophisticated and ignores the history of the terms. Additionally, the many similarities between Yahweh and similar Mediterranean and Levantine gods were left unaddressed. Finally, he offered no argument as to why the Septuagint’s version of Deuteronomy 32:8–9 should be taken as less authoritative than what is found in the much later Masoretic text.
246.
There have indeed been dualistic believers who thought Lucifer benevolent and who were harshly treated. For example, see P. Czarnecki, “Luciferianism in the thirteenth Century – A Forgotten Off-shoot of Catharism,” Studia Historyczne 47, no. 1 (2004): 3–19. Also consider the plight of the Kurdish Yazidis, who are still heavily persecuted by dogmatic and exclusivist theists.
247.
A popular view among certain Gnostics. See Elaine H. Pagels, “‘The Demiurge and His Archons’: A Gnostic View of the Bishop and Presbyters?,” Harvard Theological Review 69, no. 3–4 (1976): 301–324; Elaine H. Pagels, “Conflicting Versions of Valentinian Eschatology: Irenaeus’ Treatise vs. the Excerpts from Theodotus,” Harvard Theological Review 67, no. 1 (1974): 49; Sebastian Moll, The Arch-Heretic Marcion (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), pp. 47–71. Interestingly, some (typically ‘Gnostic’) believers, such as the Manicheans, saw the ‘serpent’ of the Eve and Adam tale in Genesis as being Jesus, in a classic ‘inversion’ of the story. See Iain Gardner and Samuel N. C. Lieu, eds., Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 17. Indeed, it would seem appropriate that the god seeking to keep his people in ignorance is evil, while the tricky angel or other deity (Prometheus? Lucifer the ‘light bringer’? Jesus?) attempting to impart knowledge on (and thus ‘save’?) humankind is the hero, particularly if they suffer for it. One potential link between Jesus and Lucifer in the eyes of such Christians may be John 10:34, which has Jesus saying ‘ye are gods’ (in a re-interpretation of Psalms 82), and Genesis 3:4–5, which has the serpent promise Eve that her disobedience will have her become like God. They may have also associated John 3:13–14, which has Jesus comparing himself with the serpent lifted up by Moses, and claiming that only the one who came down from Heaven can ascend to Heaven, with various beliefs about Lucifer’s fall, including the tricky serpent’s being forced to crawl upon the ground as punishment in Genesis 3:14; the identical chapter and verse numbers concerning the first book of the Torah and the last of the Gospels is surely a coincidence. Interestingly, Isaiah 14:12 and Revelation 22:16 seem to associate both Jesus and Lucifer with the morning star; and Jesus is described as a lion in Revelation 5:5, while Satan is likened to a lion in 1 Peter 5:8. There are also some contemporary Christian concerns about whether various biblical versions should describe Christ as the cornerstone or the ‘satanic’ capstone, but that perhaps goes too far.
248.
For more on Prometheus’ debt to Enki, see the chapter entitled, “Pandora, Prometheus and the Myths of Enki”, in Charles Penglase, Greek Myths and Mesopotamia: Parallels and Influence in the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). Note also that this all seems to reveal the bankruptcy of claims that ‘later Gnostics’ produced an inversion of the ‘original story’.
249.
See 1 Corinthians 14:33 and John 8:44.
250.
Note that if we are to take the obviously mythical ‘original sin’ tale in Genesis 3 to be quite literal, it is apparent that Yahweh lied to Eve and Adam about their impending deaths, while the serpent told the truth that they would not, and that they would instead acquire knowledge. They did not die for quite some time, with Adam reaching the ripe old age of 930, as per Genesis 5:5. Even in a theological interpretation, the couple likely avoided a ‘true death’ by earning immortality in Heaven; something they might have missed out on had they obeyed Yahweh. They might have lived forever on Earth in ‘blissful ignorance’ or servitude, depending on the interpretation, as can be gleaned from earlier forms of the tale.
251.
This may include the Apocrypha, the Pseudepigrapha, the so-called Oral Torah (as in the Talmud), the Dead Sea Scrolls, other intertestamental texts, various rabbinical and kabbalistic writings or their sources, and so forth.
252.
With no supernatural truths buttressing these religions, it is expected that schisms and ‘religious evolutions’ would occur.
253.
Oppy (AAG), p. 17.
254.
This directly contradicts 1 Corinthians 14:33, which says that God is not the author of confusion, but of peace. Interestingly, such a passage would be very appropriate for a devious and deceitful god, in that she would be lying about lying.
255.
Of course, much of the content of the Old Testament regarding god-sanctioned sexism, bigotry, genocide, theft, slavery, rape, and possibly paedophilia would already be seen my many modern liberals as indicative of a malevolent being, as many Marcionites and other ‘Gnostics’ came to realise. The exemplar could be Numbers 31, which details the many war crimes committed against the unfortunate Midianites.
256.
My main criticisms also apply to, and effectively refute, other cases for theism, such as that found in Swinburne (EG).
257.
See Craig (RF), p. 164.
258.
Ibid., pp. 54–55, 275–280.
259.
For completeness, many naturalistic scenarios would also lead to people believing in the supernatural. Indeed, that may explain our present situation; recall the earlier discussions about pareidolia and contextual priming in §2.7.
260.
There are many more reasons for schism, and schisms occur among numerous religious traditions. See James R. Lewis and Sarah M. Lewis, eds., Sacred Schisms: How Religions Divide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
261.
For a useful summary of some of the problems regarding the transmission and reliability of the biblical texts, see Bart D. Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture: The Effect of Early Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
262.
For a critique of many of the criteria for authenticity that are so prominent in historical Jesus research, see Porter (CAHJR). For a more recent – and damning – treatment, see Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne, eds., Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity (London: T&T Clark, 2012).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Department of Studies in Religion, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Raphael Lataster

Authors

Raphael Lataster
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Lataster, R. (2018). The Case for A-Theism. In: The Case Against Theism. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90793-2_3

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90793-2_3
Published: 15 June 2018
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-90792-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-90793-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics