Abstract
In spite of the crackdown on the independent press (the closure of more than 100 daily, weekly and monthly newspapers in 1999–2004), what we can call a reformist press still exists in Iran. This phenomenon could not and cannot be diminished, although there have been qualitative developments and changes after the worst days concerning freedom of expression in Iran, April 25–28, 2000. Press trials that ignore due process, the imprisonment of journalists, and the continuation of the judiciary’s pressure on the press are some aspects of the power struggle between political factions in Iran.
This chapter addresses three questions. Why did the press crackdown happen? Why and how can a non-authoritarian press survive the attacks of authoritarian regime? What are the developments of Iranian non-authoritarian press in managerial, organizational, editorial and thematic aspects? The answer to the first question is a legitimacy crisis surrounding the religious leadership. The second question can be answered by looking at deep social discrepancies, divisions in the polity, the legal structure of license issuing for the press, alternative ways of information flow, non-violent way of action in reformist positions, social networks and temporary statuses that are not controllable by the government. Answers to the first and second questions deal with the theoretical roots of the development of the Iranian press. Possible answers to the third question involve factors such as the diminishing of an independent press and the monopolization of both an authoritarian and a reformist press in the hands of politicians who are inside the political caste. More editorial control over journalists, especially in critical subjects and relating to sensitive information, decreases in circulation, extensions of red lines and the waning of investigative and critical journalism will also be studied.
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Notes
- 1.
On April 20, 2000, the leader of Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyyed Ali Khamenei, ordered a mass attack on the press in a speech. He said, “There are 10 to 15 papers writing as if they are directed from one center undermining Islamic and revolutionary principles, insulting constitutional bodies and creating tension and discord in society. […] Unfortunately, the same enemy who wants to overthrow the [regime] has found a base in the country. […] Some of the press have become the base of the enemy.” He announced that he would not tolerate this situation any longer (Asr-e Āzādegān Daily, April 21, 2000).
- 2.
This title has a charismatic ring in post-revolutionary Iran. Weber calls charismatic authority “revolutionary in the sense of not being bound to the existing order” (From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, tr. by H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 296).
- 3.
This title has a ring of traditional authority between traditional Shi’i.
- 4.
He said in a speech that his authority was indisputable, apparently rejecting criticism from reformists who said he is not above the law (persianoutpost.com, January 26, 2000).
- 5.
Iran Daily, April 27, 2000.
- 6.
Iran’s political regime in the second decade after the Revolution was a mixture of authoritarianism and sultanism, while it was authoritarian/semi-totalitarian in the first decade. If we consider leadership (a leader exercises power within formally ill-defined norms) and level of plurality (limited, non-responsible pluralism), its prevailing face resembles authoritarian regimes; if we consider its ideology (highly arbitrary manipulation of symbols and no guiding ideology) and level of mobilization (low but occasional manipulative mobilization of a ceremonial type by coercive or clientalistic methods without permanent organization and periodic mobilization of para-state groups which employ violence against groups targeted by sultan or vali-ye faqih), it resembles sultanistic regimes. In the first decade, its ideology (the guiding ideology that was supposed to articulate a reachable utopia) and levels of plurality (no significant economic, social or political pluralism) and mobilization (extensive mobilization into a vast array of regime-created obligatory organizations) were similar to totalitarian regimes and its leadership (a leader exercises power within formally ill-defined norms) was similar to authoritarian regimes (for types of political regime, see Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 44–45).
- 7.
Weber’s Economy and Society presents sultanism as an extreme case of patrimonialism, a form of traditional legitimation of authority; see Chehabi, H.E. & Juan J. Linz (ed), Sultanistic Regimes, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- 8.
Religious brotherhood and sisterhood was the model for relationships among revolutionary people in the first decade after the Revolution.
- 9.
Islamic Republic News Agency, August 6, 2000.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
These percentages are reflected in the votes of different candidates in presidential, parliamentary and municipality elections in 1997–2000.
- 12.
Norouz is published in spite of the verdict issued by press court jury (chosen by the authoritarians), while Bonyān was closed with no trial.
- 13.
Of three main reformist dailies (Norouz, Āftāb-e Yazd and Hayāt-e No) that have been publishing after April 2000, one belongs to the Participation Party (Jebheh ye Moshārekat, the main group among the groups holding the majority in parliament), another is managed by the Assembly of Tehran’s Combatant Clerics and the editor-in-chief of the third one is a member of later group. All independent dailies that began to be published after April 2000 have been closed (Bahār, Dowrān, Nousāzy, Mellat, Bonyān, etc.).
- 14.
Āftāb e Yazd Daily, February 14, 2002.
- 15.
Akbar Ganji and Emaduddin Bāghi, two investigative journalists who helped expose the perpetrators of assassinations of Iranian intellectuals and political activists after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, were tried on charges of acting against the national security of the country and sentenced to long prison terms in 2000.
- 16.
President Khatami is a member of the later group.
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Mohammadi, M. (2019). The Iranian Reform Movement and the Iranian Reformist Press: Survival and Development. In: The Iranian Reform Movement. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90969-1_6
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