Skip to main content

Making Markets Responsible: Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Sociology of Privatized Security

Abstract

The normalization of commercial security epitomized by the disappearance of the term mercenary has gone so far that the main significance of the State Monopoly on the Legitimate use of Force (SMLF) has become one of obscuring the ongoing transformations towards ever-increasing commercial authority over the use of force, an authority enmeshing the public and the private with each other. This is my main argument. I make it an argument by suggesting first that the SMLF be treated as a practical category. I then proceed to show that as such SMLF has little practical pertinence for the governance of the use of force except as a reassuring, soothing background reference. I do this through an analysis of the argumentation through which a district court in Oslo defines appropriate security provision in a case where a Canadian aid worker demanded (and obtained) compensation for not having been well enough protected by his employer, the Norwegian Refugee Council (Dennis v. NRC). Borrowing Ghassan Hage’s terms and distinctions between anti- and alter-politics, I then suggest that the obscuring of commercial authority through the SMLF is undermining the anti-politics of contesting relations of domination in security politics, and in so doing it is also narrowing the scope for alter-politics of re-inventing security politics. I conclude that redirecting attention to the SMLF and the political work it does is therefore essential for coming to terms with the politics of commercial security.

Helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter by Jimmy Casas Clausen, Matt Davies, Marta Fernandes and Andrea Gill are gratefully acknowledged. But above all I owe the editors of this volume a big thank you for their careful reading and constructive suggestions about how to make this readable.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    As I have argued elsewhere, an entire field of studies has grown up around it, with scholars focussing on issues ranging from how the markets are imbricated with gendered, racial or postcolonial identities, with citizenship, urban politics, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian work, foreign policy and much more (Abrahamsen and Leander 2016).

  2. 2.

    The term mercenary is indeed pejorative. In the modern world it is a reference to illegitimate private military professionals. As Sarah Percy explains in her work on “the mercenary norm”, states have always been reluctant to pin down and define who exactly the mercenary is (Percy 2007). They have claimed a monopoly on defining who is illegitimate and the flexibility to change that definition and hence to exclude and include private military professionals.

  3. 3.

    I say rare, because there have been efforts to argue that the term is not pejorative but that its positive connotations and potential should be acknowledged (e.g. Lynch and Walsh 2000; Scoville 2006; Taulbee 1998).

  4. 4.

    Some states—such as South Africa—resist this displacement of the working group and continue to discuss markets in terms of mercenarism and support the UN working group. However, especially before the market became normalized, distancing it from mercenarism was a key occupation of not only the working group but also of many commentators; see, for example, Frye 2005; Scoville 2006; UN 1997; Zarate 1998.

  5. 5.

    Expression borrowed from Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007.

  6. 6.

    I use this expression because it is the Weberian original which I think is helpful because it underlines the (very Weberian) emphasis on legitimacy/the law as opposed to control (more on this below).

  7. 7.

    I use practical to refer to usages that are not primarily conceptual/theoretical in intent but aimed at practice. This is also the meaning of “practical” in the notion of “practical category” referred to below. Also academics and researchers make “practical usages” of their terms in this sense. More on this distinction below.

  8. 8.

    Hage draws a not so strict line between critical sociology and critical anthropology where the former focusses on “oppositional concerns (anti-politics)” and the latter on “the search of alternatives (alter-politics)” (Hage 2015: 2).

  9. 9.

    Many people have suggested that it was a re-emergence because the state control was a historical anomaly (Colas and Mabee 2010; Milliard 2003). However, the extension of the liberal idea that the military/use of force could be governed through self-organizing markets was a historical novelty. As Polanyi persuasively showed, the notion of self-governing markets is an invention of the nineteenth century. That also the use of force could be subject to governance through self-regulating markets is an idea that appears only with neo-liberalism and becomes practically influential only with the end of the Cold War as the turn to post-Fordism and the obsession with risk conjure the possibility of this conviction and its imposition.

  10. 10.

    As stated above (see footnote 2), I use practical category here by contradistinction to theoretical or conceptual. This distinction is foundational to much sociological theory—a source of much debate and confusion. On the one hand, sociologists always (and unlike the natural sciences) face the difficulty that their conceptual/theoretical categories are mostly also practical categories and therefore challenged as such (for an extensive discussion, see Elias 1970, Chapter 1). On the other hand, for the same reasons, sociologists tend to commit the “scholastic fallacy” of assuming that their own categories are the same as those they observe (2000).

  11. 11.

    The full definition reads “A ‘ruling organization’ will be called ‘political’ insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organization with continuous operations (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber 1978: 54 emphasis in original).

  12. 12.

    For a discussion of the category effect in Bourdieu, see, for example, Bourdieu 2002: 110 ff.

  13. 13.

    The kinds of theoretical and conceptual challenges this raises are at the heart of sociological theorizing. Elias, for example, takes it as the point of departure for his discussion of what sociology is (Elias 1970).

  14. 14.

    In fact, it seems to me that this more political theory-oriented debate has still to be engaged. While political theory has been good at engaging in questions revolving around the implications of the evolving security/risk conceptions in the contemporary word, it is not clear to me that the same can be said of its engagement with the concurrent neo-liberalization of political thought and especially not with the overlap between the two epitomized by the rise of commercial security.

  15. 15.

    As Reno, for example, shows in his work on Warlord Politics, this was true even of sovereigns in “failed” states who rested their claim on a monopoly on the legitimate use of force on the delegation of the control and localized authority to “warlords” (Reno 1998).

  16. 16.

    In her book Thomson writes: “How much can practices change and yet remain consistent with the institutions of sovereignty? If this book’s arguments are correct, a shift away from sovereignty to heteronomy or something else would require a fundamental change in the identity of the national state. This would entail an end to or at least significant erosion of the state’s monopoly on the authority to deploy violence beyond its borders. It is not at all clear to me that this occurring” (Thomson 1994: 153).

  17. 17.

    For example, issues such as the forms of governance (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009), the governance of specific subsectors (such as logistics Cowen 2014; Kinsey 2008), comparative studies of governance across countries/contexts (Leander 2013) or the implications for other actors such as humanitarians (Spearin 2015) become important issues. Similarly, scholarship began to reach out to questions of how commercialization related to political issues such as democracy (Avant and Siegelmann 2012), sovereignty (Verkuil 2007), the social contract around conscription (Krahmann 2010) or to the regulation of the use of force (Dickinson 2011).

  18. 18.

    Just to avoid misunderstandings: I am not claiming that these studies entirely escape the state as an epistemological problem. Indeed, its core categorical division, while constantly questioned in the practice, often keeps imposing itself. I make this point in relation to two recently edited volumes in (Leander 2017a, Leander 2017b).

  19. 19.

    Hibou places the concept at the heart of her theory of “neo-liberal bureaucratization”. It usefully captures that what we are talking about is not conventional privatization, but a form of rule through markets where the state retains formal authority. It is merely discharging tasks. The point here is that the SMLF helps keep up the illusion that this is indeed what is taking place.

  20. 20.

    It was not kept sufficiently confidential. Drivers were unexperienced. Instead of going to the less risky Ifo I, the convoy went (for no good reason according to the reports) to the more risky Ifo II. The management allowed delays in the programme.

  21. 21.

    For recent discussion of this aspect of international expert work, see, for example, Leander and Wæver 2017.

  22. 22.

    There is a rapidly growing historical and theoretical work associating markets with religion that often adopts a disturbingly universalizing approach in its treatment of markets, failing to recognize its location in a specific UK/US theoretical tradition that is very influential and increasingly dominant but certainly not universal. See, for example, Lesham 2016; Minow 2003.

  23. 23.

    Kierpaul discusses military contractors. The security network surrounding Dadaab would probably not be termed or self-identify as “military contractors”. However, the lines are obviously floating in situations such as that surrounding Dadaab and IFO II where warlike conditions pertain and conditions are so unstable that convoys have to be accompanied by armed security.

  24. 24.

    I began work on this development in Leander 2009b and began using the acronym COBBES in Leander 2016.

  25. 25.

    It is obviously not invisible as I (along with many others) can observe it and share my observations. A remark warranted only because of the often rather absurd contention that visibilizing entails digging out the invisible in the behind or beyond or beneath (e.g. Latour 2004). Looking at the surface is quite sufficient.

  26. 26.

    Hoppe and Williamson 2016; Wall 2015; Young 2015.

  27. 27.

    For overviews of the issues at stake, see, for example, Joachim and Schneiker 2012b; Spearin 2015.

  28. 28.

    Merkelbach is a “Consultant for various organisations and government” (LinkedIn profile) and as a “renowed [sic.] consultant in Security risk management & ISO 31000 and legal liability/duty of care, working today for various companies” in the profile of Securaxis (see https://securaxis.com/about accessed 29 August 2017 (spelling mistake in original)).

  29. 29.

    The “European Interagency Security Forum” is an independent network of Security Focal Points currently representing 85 Europe-based humanitarian NGOs operating internationally. EISF is committed to improving the security of relief operations and staff. It aims to increase safe access by humanitarian agencies to people affected by emergencies. Key to its work is the development of research and tools which promote awareness, preparedness and good practice.

  30. 30.

    In view of the current refinement of risk assessment practices that increasingly incorporate also understandings that do not draw on an impact/probability logic but on imagined scenarios (on possibility rather than probability) or indeed on the conception that risk prevention should be neither about probability nor possibility but about the “black swans,” the unknown unknowns, this is somewhat surprising but not the subject of the discussion here. For discussions of risk logics in commercial security, see, for example, Leander 2011; Petersen 2008.

  31. 31.

    He has been security advisor for NRC and became Global Security Advisory in October 2013. Previously he worked for Armadillo/Safer Edge in DR Congo, Afghanistan and Rwanda, conducting risk assessments, preparing and implementing security plans and procedures and conducting training; https://no.linkedin.com/in/christopher-allen-a5896a90 accessed 29 August 2017.

  32. 32.

    For one of the most inspiring histories of the Duty of Care, making the argument that this principle itself is tied to the principle of unlimited liability and is no longer needed when liability is more precisely defined, see Davies (1989).

  33. 33.

    Jaffey (1992), Kennedy (2009).

  34. 34.

    https://www.internationalsos.com/newsroom/news-releases/2017-global-duty-of-care-awards-c%2D%2Dnow-open-for-submissions-dec-09-2016.

  35. 35.

    This process included notably the Duty of Care round tables (2014 and 2015 Berlin, and 2016 London).

  36. 36.

    The following organizations support the Voluntary Standards with their logo: Crisis Management Centre (Finland), Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden), the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, OSCE, SU, FDFA and ZIF. See

    http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/about-zif/news/detail/article/veroeffentlichung-der-voluntary-guidelines-on-the-duty-of-care-to-seconded-civilian-personnel.html.

  37. 37.

    In this sense it bears a family resemblance to similar concepts developed by pragmatic theorists including De Certeau’s notion of “tactics” (De Certeau 1984).

  38. 38.

    It is all too common for academics to assume that only academics are suited for such noble pursuits. Bourdieu is right to insist on the academic hubris and the related nefarious effects of assuming that academic knowledge is a privileged position from which to speak. He therefore also (as Hage points out in his discussion of Bourdieu’s work) insists that academics should not allow their personal (progressive/radical) political views to fashion their research as this will simply reinforce an ultimately conservative field doxa/illusion. See in particular Bourdieu 1990, 2000.

  39. 39.

    Non-academic ways of inducing haunting are arguably often more effective as academic efforts tend to draw on a critical language and resources that make sense only to themselves. There is therefore growing interest in innovative forms of research and research communication, especially among sociologists and anthropologists. Andrew Abbott (2007), for example, suggests that “lyrical sociology” (which he opposes to the narrative) should be a possible research strategy for sociologists.

  40. 40.

    De Certeau, for example, criticizes Bourdieu for suffocating the possibilities for tactics—his term for the ways in which domination is subverted and challenged. As he puts it: “the blanket Bourdieu’s theory throws over tactics as if to put out their fire by certifying their amenability to socioeconomic rationality or as if to mourn their death by declaring them unconscious, should teach us something about their relationship to any theory” (De Certeau 1984: 59).

  41. 41.

    This paraphrases Bourdieu’s definition of symbolic violence. See Bourdieu (2005: 185) and for a thorough discussion, Braud (2003).

  42. 42.

    I use conspiracy here in a manner mimicking the critics of critical sociology where the term has gained considerable traction no doubt because of its centrality in the way Boltanski frames his influential arguments (e.g. Boltanski 2009, 2012). No one really conspires except in terms of the effects they have.

  43. 43.

    https://www.nrk.no/nyheter/flyktninghjelpen-domt-i-kidnappingssak-1.12577647 accessed 29 August 2017.

  44. 44.

    http://www.vl.no/nyhet/tidligere-ansatt-krever-millionerstatning-fra-flyktninghjelpen-1.421541?paywall=true accessed 29 August 2017.

  45. 45.

    The 2010 Code Pink Campaign “put the mercy back in mercenary”, launched as a fake press release from Blackwater, was an attempt to let irony provoke reflection on the current shifts. It has since kept constant attention to what it terms mercenaries in its various campaigns including its focus on “A local peace economy”. See http://www.codepink.org/growing_a_local_peace_economy_daily_233.

  46. 46.

    See also the symposium discussion around her article at www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Posts/ID/5353/categoryId/102/Can-Networks-Govern.

  47. 47.

    Obvious sociological alternatives would include, for example, on the sociological conditions of production of knowledge for academics, think tanks, courts or NGOs, such as the NRC, the limits of the categories of knowledge that contribute to the normalization of the self-regulatory authority or specific infrastructures, technologies and devices that re-enact it.

  48. 48.

    On the centrality of tracking devices and their entrance in the market, see, for example, Thumala et al. 2015.

  49. 49.

    We are in dire need of re-engaging domination in the social sciences (Hibou 2011). This should not be confused with an argument linking the unveiling of conspiracies with an ideal of total transparency. Jody Dean is right that such a pursuit can only undermine any and all solidarity and therefore also the trust necessary for politics. As she points out, “eliminating conspiracy thinking, thinking that might challenge the very terms of politics, is necessary if there is to be a politics at all” (Dean 2002: 59).

  50. 50.

    Visibilized here does not refer to pulling out something deeply buried and essentially or invisible to the naked eye but to directing to things that are there for all to see. It is about making the visual visible (Brighenti 2010). It is the strategy of the child pointing out that the emperor showing off the latest fashion is in fact naked in H.C. Andersen’s story.

Works Cited

  • Abbott, Andrew. 2007. Against Narrative: A Preface to Lyrical Sociology. Sociological Theory 25 (1): 67–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abrahamsen, Rita, and Anna Leander. 2016. Introduction. In Routledge Handbook in Private Security Studies, ed. R. Abrahamsen and A. Leander, 1–9. London et al.: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Abrahamsen, Rita, and Michael C. Williams. 2009. Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics. International Political Sociology 3 (1): 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arvidsson, Adam. 2011. General Sentiment: How Value and Affect Converge in the Information Economy. The Sociological Review 59 (2_Suppl): 39–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Avant, Deborah. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Avant, Deborah D. 2016. Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military and Security Services. International Studies Quarterly 60 (2): 330–342.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Avant, Deborah, and Siegelman Lee. 2012. Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq. Security Studies 19 (2): 230–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Badie, Bertrand, and Pierre Birnbaum. 1983. The Sociology of the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berndtsson, Joakim, and Åse Gilje Østensen. 2017. The Scandinavian Approach to Private Maritime Security—A Regulatory Façade? Ocean Development and International Law 46: 138–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boltanski, Luc. 2009. De La Critique. Paris: Gallimard.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012. Enigmes Et Complot: Une Enquête À Propos D’enquêtes. Paris: Gallimard.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Scholastic Point of View. Cultural Anthropology 5 (4): 380–391.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2000. Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002. Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2005. The Social Structures of the Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2014. On the State. Lectures at the College De France 1989–1992. Oxford: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braud, Philippe. 2003. Violence Symbolique Et Mal-Être Identitaire. Raisons Politiques 9: 33–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brighenti, Andrea. 2010. Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bures, Oldrich, and Helena Carappico. 2018. Private Security Beyond Private Military and Security Companies: Exploring Diversity within Private-Public Collaborations and Its Consequences for Security Governance. In Security Privatization: How Non-Security-Related Private Businesses Shape Security Governance, ed. O. Bures and H. Carappico. London: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • De Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chesterman, Simon, and Chia Lehnardt, eds. 2007. From Mercenaries to Markets: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Claus, Lisbeth. 2009. Duty of Care of Employers for Protecting International Assignees, Their Dependents, and International Business Travelers. International SOS White Paper. http://go.internationalsos.com/rs/internationalsos/images/Duty%2520of%2520Care%2520-%2520White%2520Paper.pdf.

  • ———. 2011. Duty of Care and Travel Risk Management – Global Benchmarking Study. AEA International. www.internationalsos.com/~/media/corporate/files/documents/global_duty_of_care_benchma1.pdf.

  • Colas, Alejandro, and Bryan Mabee, eds. 2010. Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires: Private Violence in Historical Context. London and New York: Hurst/Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowen, Deborah E. 2014. The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Davies, Martin. 1989. The End of the Affair: Duty of Care and Liability Insurance. Legal Studies 9 (1): 67–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dean, Jodi. 2002. Publicity’s Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dickinson, Laura A. 2011. Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs. Yale: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichler, Maya, ed. 2014. Gender and Private Security in Global Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elias, Norbert. 1970. What Is Sociology? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frye, Ellen L. 2005. Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining ‘Mercenary’ Can Tame the ‘Dogs of War’. Fordham Law Review 73 (May): 2607–2664.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hage, Ghassan. 2015. Alter-Politics. Critical Anthropology and the Radical Imagination. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haraway, Donna. 1991. A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century. In Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, ed. D. Haraway, 183–202. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hibou, Béatrice. 1999. La décharge, nouvel interventionnisme? Politique Africaine 73: 6–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2011. Anatomie Politique De La Domination. Paris: La Découverte.

    Google Scholar 

  • Higate, Paul. 2016. Cat-Food and Clients: Gendering the Politics of Protection in the Private Militarized Security Company. In Handbook on Gender and War, ed. S. Sharoni, J. Welland, L. Steiner, and J. Pedersen. London: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Higate, Paul, and Mats Utas, eds. 2017. Private Security in Africa: From Global Assemblages to the Everyday. London: Verso Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoppe, Kelsey, and Christine Williamson. 2016. Dennis Vs Norwegian Refugee Council: Implications for Duty of Care. HPN: Humanitarian Practice Network. Accessed June 8. http://odihpn.org/blog/dennis-vs-norwegian-refugee-council-implications-for-duty-of-care/.

  • Jaffey, A.J.E. 1992. Duty of Care. Aldershot and Brookfield: Dartmouth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. 2012a. Warum So Freundlich? Der Umgang Von Ngos Mit Privaten Sicherheits- Und Militärfirmen. In Sicherheitskultur. Analysen Zur Sozialen Praxis Der Gefahrenabwehr, ed. C. Daase, P. Offermann and V. Rauer, 277–300. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012b. New Humanitarians? Frame Appropriation through Private Military and Security Companies. Millennium 40 (2): 365–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, Rosemary. 2009. Duty of Care in the Human Services. Mishaps, Misdeeds and the Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kierpaul, Ian. 2008. The Rush to Bring Private Military Contractors to Justice: The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers, and Law Students after Abu Ghraib. The University of Toledo Law Review 39 (2): 407–435.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kinsey, Christopher. 2008. Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming Military Logistics. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krahmann, Elke. 2010. States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Krasner, Stephen D. 2004a. The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty and Internaitonal Law. Michigan Journal of International Law 25 (4): 1075–1101.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2004b. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failed States. International Security 29 (2): 85–120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krishna, Aradhna. 2013. Customer Sense: How the 5 Senses Influence Buying Behavior. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Latour, Bruno. 2004. Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (Winter): 225–248.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leander, Anna. 2008. Practices Providing Order: The Private Military/Security Business and Global (in)Security Governance. Paper presented at the Theorizing Business in Global Governance, 15–16 November, CBS, Copenhagen. http://www.cbs.dk/content/view/pub/38570.

  • ———. 2009a. Securing Sovereignty by Governing Security through Markets. In Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalising State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond, ed. R. Adler-Nissen and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, 151–170. London: Palgrave.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009b. New Roles for External Actors? Disagreements About International Regulation of Private Armies. In War and Peace in Transition: Changing Roles for External Actors, ed. K. Aggestam and A. Björkdal, 32–52. Lund: Nordic Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2011. Risk and the Fabrication of Apolitical, Unaccountable Military Markets: The Case of the Cia ‘Killing Program’. Review of International Studies 37 (5): 2253–2268.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———, ed. 2013. Commercialising Security: Political Consequences for European Peace Operations. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2016. The Politics of Whitelisting: Regulatory Work and Topologies in Commercial Security. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 34 (1): 48–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2017a. From Cookbooks to Encyclopedia in the Making: Methodological Perspectives for Research of Non-State Actors and Processes. In Methodological Approaches for Studying Non-State Actors in International Security. Theory and Practice, ed. A. Kruck and A. Schneiker, 233–245. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2017b. ‘Widening the Debate’ and Raising Questions. In Security Privatization: How Non-Security-Related Private Businesses Shape Security Governance, ed. O. Bures and H. Carappico, v–vii. London: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leander, Anna. 2018. The Politics of Legal Arrangements: The “Duty of Care” Justifying, Extending and Perpetuating Public in the Private Forms of Protection. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 25 (1): 265–290.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2019. Political Military Companies: Commercializing the Military/Militarizing Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leander, Anna, and Ole Wæver, eds. 2019. Assembling Exclusive Expertise: Knowledge, Ignorance and Conflict Resolution in the Global South. London et al.: Routledge (Worlding Beyond the West).

    Google Scholar 

  • Lesham, Dotan. 2016. The Origins of Neoliberalism: Modeling the Economy from Jesus to Foucault. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lynch, Tony, and A.J. Walsh. 2000. The Good Mercenary. Journal of Political Philosophy 8: 133–153.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merkelbach, Maarten. 2017. Voluntary Guidelines on the Duty of Care to Seconded Civilian Personnel Congress. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/voluntary-guidelines-on-the-duty-of-care.

  • Merkelbach, Maarten and Edward Kemp. 2016. Duty of Care: A Review of the Dennis V Norwegian Refugee Council Ruling and Its Implications. Edited by E. I. S. F. (EISF). https://www.eisf.eu/library/duty-of-care-a-review-of-the-dennis-v-norwegian-refugee-council-ruling-and-its-implications/.

  • Milliard, Major Todd S. 2003. Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies. Military Law Review 176: 1–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • Minow, Martha. 2003. Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion. Harvard Law Review 116 (March): 1229–1270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Munroe, Ann, and Angus W.M. Turner. 2010. Pushing the Envelope: Whose Duty of Care? Journal of the Intensive Care Society 11 (1): 5–8.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Okano-Heijmans, Maaike, and Matthew Caesar-Gordon. 2016. Protecting the Worker-Citizen Abroad: Duty of Care Beyond the State? Global Affairs: 1–10.

    Google Scholar 

  • OSD, Oslo District Court. 2015. Stephen Patrick Dennis Vs. Norwegian Refugee Council. Oslo: Case No. 15-032886TVI-OTI R/05 (25 November).

    Google Scholar 

  • Østensen, Åse Gilje. 2013. Norway: Keeping Up Appearances. In Commercialising Security: Political Consequences for European Peace Operations, ed. Anna Leander, 18–39. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Percy, Sarah. 2007. Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law. International Organization 61 (2): 367–397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petersen, Karen Lund. 2008. Risk, Responsibility and Roles Redefined: Is Counter-Terrorism a Corporate Responsibility? Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21 (3): 403–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pino, Simona. 2015. The Politics of Branding: Irobot, Branding and Common Sense. PhD Dissertation, University of Warwick, Warwick.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reno, William. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scoville, Ryan M. 2006. Toward an Accountability-Based Definition of ‘Mercenary’. Georgetown Journal of International Law 37 (3): 541–582.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spearin, Christopher. 2015. Enduring Challenges of Security Privatization in the Humanitarian Space. In Handbook on Private Military-Security Companies, ed. R. Abrahamsen and A. Leander, 109–117. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taulbee, James Larry. 1998. Reflections on the Mercenary Option. Small Wars and Insurgencies 9 (2): 145–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomson, Janice. 1994. Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thumala, Angélica, Benjamin Goold, and Ian Loader. 2015. Tracking Devices: On the Reception of a Novel Security Good. Criminology & Criminal Justice 15 (1): 3–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • UN, General Assembly. 1997. Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination (a/52/495). New York: UN. http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/annual.htm.

  • Verkuil, Paul. 2007. Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Walker, R.B.J. 1993. Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to International Relations. In The Political Subject of Violence, ed. D. Campbell and M. Dillon, 137–160. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wall, Imogen. 2015. Nrc Kidnap Ruling Is ‘Wake-up’ Call for Aid Industry. All Africa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, Holly. 2015. Steve Dennis and the Court Case That Sent Waves through the Aid Industry. The Guardian.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zarate, Juan Carlos. 1998. The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law and the New World Disorder. Stanford Journal of International Law 34 (1): 75–162.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Anna Leander .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Leander, A. (2019). Making Markets Responsible: Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force. In: Swed, O., Crosbie, T. (eds) The Sociology of Privatized Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98222-9_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98222-9_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-98221-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-98222-9

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics