Skip to main content

The Security of Machine Learning Systems

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
AI in Cybersecurity

Part of the book series: Intelligent Systems Reference Library ((ISRL,volume 151))

Abstract

Machine learning lies at the core of many modern applications, extracting valuable information from data acquired from numerous sources. It has produced a disruptive change in society, providing new functionality, improved quality of life for users, e.g., through personalization, optimized use of resources, and the automation of many processes. However, machine learning systems can themselves be the targets of attackers, who might gain a significant advantage by exploiting the vulnerabilities of learning algorithms. Such attacks have already been reported in the wild in different application domains. This chapter describes the mechanisms that allow attackers to compromise machine learning systems by injecting malicious data or exploiting the algorithms’ weaknesses and blind spots. Furthermore, mechanisms that can help mitigate the effect of such attacks are also explained, along with the challenges of designing more secure machine learning systems.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Machine learning is a field of computer science that gives software tools the ability to progressively improve their performance on a specific task without being explicitly programmed.

  2. 2.

    Big data refers to extremely large datasets that, when analyzed, can reveal patterns, trends, and associations, but cannot be processed with traditional data processing tools due to data velocity, volume, value, variety, and veracity.

  3. 3.

    Unsupervised machine learning refers to machine learning tasks that infer a function to describe hidden structure from unlabeled data.

  4. 4.

    A decision boundary is a hypersurface that partitions the underlying vector space into multiple sets, one for each class.

  5. 5.

    Artificial neural networks are computing systems inspired by the biological neural networks of brains.

  6. 6.

    A loss function is a function that maps values of one or more variables onto a real number representing the cost associated with those values.

  7. 7.

    Bilevel optimization is an optimization that embeds (nests) a problem within another problem.

  8. 8.

    http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/

  9. 9.

    Mean square error is the average of the squares of errors. It is a measure of estimator quality, is always non-negative, and the closer its value to zero the better.

References

  1. Muñoz González L, Lupu EC (2018) The secret of machine learning. ITNow 60(1):38–39. https://doi.org/10.1093/itnow/bwy018

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. McDaniel P, Papernot N, Celik ZB (2016) Machine learning in adversarial settings. IEEE Secur Priv 14(3):68–72. https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2016.51

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Huang L, Joseph AD, Nelson B, Rubinstein BI, Tygar J (2011) Adversarial machine learning. In: Chen Y, Cárdenas A.A, Greenstadt R, Rubinstein B (eds) Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Security and Artificial Intelligence. ACM, New York, pp 43–58. https://doi.org/10.1145/2046684.2046692

  4. Barreno M, Nelson B, Joseph AD, Tygar J (2010) The security of machine learning. Mach Learn 81(2):121–148. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-010-5188-5

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Barreno M, Nelson B, Sears R, Joseph AD, Tygar JD (2006) Can machine learning be secure? In: Lin, F-C, Lee, D-T, Lin B-S, Shieh S, Jajodia S (eds) Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security. ACM, New York, pp 16–25. https://doi.org/10.1145/1128817.1128824

  6. Biggio B, Fumera G, Roli F (2014) Security evaluation of pattern classifiers under attack. IEEE T Knowl Data En 26(4):984–996. https://doi.org/10.1109/TKDE.2013.57

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Muñoz-González L, Biggio B, Demontis A, Paudice A, Wongrassamee V, Lupu EC, Roli F (2017) Towards poisoning of deep learning algorithms with back-gradient optimization. In: Thuraisingham B, Biggio B, Freeman DM, Miller B, Sinha A (eds) Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security, pp 27–38. https://doi.org/10.1145/3128572.3140451

  8. Carlini N, Wagner D (2017) Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In: 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, pp 39–57. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.49

  9. Szegedy C, Zaremba W, Sutskever I, Bruna J, Erhan D, Goodfellow I, Fergus R (2013) Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv:1312.6199

  10. Papernot N, McDaniel P, Jha S, Fredrikson M, Celik ZB, Swami A (2016) The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings. In: Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, pp 372–387. https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2016.36

  11. Papernot N, McDaniel P, Goodfellow I, Jha S, Celik ZB, Swami A (2017) Practical black-box attacks against machine learning. In: Karri R, Sinanoglu O, Sadeghi A-R, Yi X (eds) Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, New York, pp 506–519. https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3053009

  12. Paudice A, Muñoz-González L, György A, Lupu EC (2018) Detection of adversarial training examples in poisoning attacks through anomaly detection. arXiv:1802.03041

  13. Joseph AD, Laskov P, Roli F, Tygar JD, Nelson B (eds.) (2013) Machine learning methods for computer security. Dagstuhl Manif 3(1):1–30. http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2013/4356/pdf/dagman-v003-i001-p001-12371.pdf

  14. Nelson B, Barreno M, Chi FJ, Joseph AD, Rubinstein BI, Saini U, Sutton CA, Tygar JD, Xia K (2008) Exploiting machine learning to subvert your spam filter. In: Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats, article no. 7. USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/nelson/nelson.pdf

  15. Biggio B, Nelson B, Laskov P (2012) Poisoning attacks against support vector machines. In: Langford J, Pineau J (eds) Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Machine Learning, pp 1807–1814. arXiv:1206.6389

  16. Mei S, Zhu X (2015) Using machine teaching to identify optimal training-set attacks on machine learners. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, Palo Alto, CA, USA, pp 2871–2877. https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI15/paper/viewFile/9472/9954

  17. Xiao H, Biggio B, Brown G, Fumera G, Eckert C, Roli F (2015) Is feature selection secure against training data poisoning? In: Bach F, Blei D (eds) Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Machine Learning, pp 1689–1698

    Google Scholar 

  18. Do CB, Foo CS, Ng AY (2007) Efficient multiple hyperparameter learning for log-linear models. In: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. Curran Associates, Red Hook, NY, USA, pp 377–384

    Google Scholar 

  19. Pearlmutter BA (1994) Fast exact multiplication by the Hessian. Neural Comput 6(1):147–160. https://doi.org/10.1162/neco.1994.6.1.147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Domke J (2012) Generic methods for optimization-based modeling. In: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pp 318–326. http://proceedings.mlr.press/v22/domke12/domke12.pdf

  21. Papernot N, McDaniel, P, Goodfellow I (2016) Transferability in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using adversarial samples. arXiv:1605.07277

  22. Feng J, Xu H, Mannor S, Yan S (2014) Robust logistic regression and classification. In: Ghahramani Z, Welling M, Cortes C, Lawrence ND, Weinberger KQ (eds) Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, vol 1. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 253–261

    Google Scholar 

  23. Steinhardt J, Koh PWW, Liang PS (2017) Certified defenses for data poisoning attacks. In: Guyon I, Luxburg UV, Bengio S, Wallach H, Fergus R, Vishwanathan S, Garnett R (eds) Advances in neural information processing systems 30 (NIPS 2017). Curran Associates, Red Hook, NY, USA, pp 3520–3532. http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6943-certified-defenses-for-data-poisoning-attacks.pdf

  24. Paudice A, Muñoz-González L, Lupu EC (2018) Label sanitization against label flipping poisoning attacks. arXiv:1803.00992

  25. Koh PW, Liang P (2017) Understanding black-box predictions via influence functions. In: Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, pp 1885–1894. arXiv:1703.04730v2

  26. Goodfellow I, Shlens J, Szegedy C (2015) Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv:1412.6572

  27. Evtimov I, Eykholt K, Fernandes E, Kohno T, Li B, Prakash A, Rahmati A, Song D (2017) Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning models. arXiv:1707.08945

  28. Melis M, Demontis A, Biggio B, Brown G, Fumera G, Roli F (2017) Is deep learning safe for robot vision? Adversarial examples against the iCub Humanoid. In: ICCV Workshop on Vision in Practice on Autonomous Robots, Venice, Italy, 23 Oct 2017. arXiv:1708.06939

  29. Grosse K, Manoharan P, Papernot N, Backes M, McDaniel P (2017) On the statistical detection of adversarial examples. arXiv:1702.06280

  30. Gong Z, Wang W, Ku WS (2017) Adversarial and clean data are not twins. arXiv:1704.04960

  31. Carlini N, Wagner D (2017) Adversarial examples are not easily detected: bypassing ten detection methods. In: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security. ACM, New York, pp. 3–14. https://doi.org/10.1145/3128572.3140444

  32. Papernot N, McDaniel P, Wu X, Jha S, Swami A (2016) Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks. In: 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, pp 582–597. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2016.41

  33. Carlini N, Wagner D (2016) Defensive distillation is not robust to adversarial examples. arXiv:1607.04311

  34. Bhagoji AN, Cullina D, Mittal P (2017) Dimensionality reduction as a defense against evasion attacks on machine learning classifiers. arXiv:1704.02654v2

  35. Maclaurin D, Duvenaud D, Adams R (2015) Gradient-based hyperparameter optimization through reversible learning. In: Bach F, Blei D (eds) Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Machine Learning, pp 2113–2122

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Luis Muñoz-González .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Muñoz-González, L., Lupu, E.C. (2019). The Security of Machine Learning Systems. In: Sikos, L. (eds) AI in Cybersecurity. Intelligent Systems Reference Library, vol 151. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98842-9_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics