Abstract
We consider the range assignment problem in ad-hoc wireless networks in the context of selfish agents: a network manager aims in assigning transmission ranges to the stations so to achieve a suitable network with a minimal overall energy; stations are not directly controlled by the manager and may refuse to transmit with a certain transmission range because this results in a power consumption proportional to that range.
We investigate the existence of payment schemes which induce the stations to cooperate with a network manager computing a range assignment, that is, truthful mechanisms for the range assignment problem.
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Ambühl, C., Clementi, A.E.F., Penna, P., Rossi, G., Silvestri, R. (2004). Energy Consumption in Radio Networks: Selfish Agents and Rewarding Mechanisms. In: Solis-Oba, R., Jansen, K. (eds) Approximation and Online Algorithms. WAOA 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2909. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24592-6_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24592-6_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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