Abstract
We look at a new way of specifying and verifying cryptographic protocols using the Coalgebraic Class Specification Language. Protocols are specified into CCSL (with temporal operators for ”free”) and translated by the CCSL compiler into theories for the theorem prover PVS. Within PVS, the desired security conditions can then be (dis)proved.
In addition, we are interested in using assumptions which are reflected in real-life networks. However, as a result, we present only a partial solution here. We have not proved full correctness of a protocol under such loose restrictions. This prompts discussion of what assumptions are acceptable in protocol verification, and when practical concerns may outweigh theoretical motivations.
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Hughes, J., Warnier, M. (2003). The Coinductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols. In: Wirsing, M., Pattinson, D., Hennicker, R. (eds) Recent Trends in Algebraic Development Techniques. WADT 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2755. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40020-2_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40020-2_15
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