Abstract
Decentralized anonymity infrastructures are still not in wide use today. While there are technical barriers to a secure robust design, our lack of understanding of the incentives to participate in such systems remains a major roadblock. Here we explore some reasons why anonymity systems are particularly hard to deploy, enumerate the incentives to participate either as senders or also as nodes, and build a general model to describe the effects of these incentives. We then describe and justify some simplifying assumptions to make the model manageable, and compare optimal strategies for participants based on a variety of scenarios.
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Acquisti, A., Dingledine, R., Syverson, P. (2003). On the Economics of Anonymity. In: Wright, R.N. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2742. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45126-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45126-6_7
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