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Practical Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

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Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4456))

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Abstract

Due to the low entropy of human-memorable passwords, it is not easy to conduct password authenticated key agreement in a secure manner. Though there are many protocols achieving this goal, they may require a large amount of computation especially in the augmented model which is contrived to resist server compromise. In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient password authenticated key exchange protocol, which is in the augmented model. It is considered much more from the practical perspective. Moreover, the scheme is provably forward secure under the Diffie-Hellman intractability assumptions in the random-oracle model.

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Wu, S., Zhu, Y. (2007). Practical Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol. In: Wang, Y., Cheung, Ym., Liu, H. (eds) Computational Intelligence and Security. CIS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4456. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74377-4_55

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74377-4_55

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-74376-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-74377-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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