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Using Dependent CORAS Diagrams to Analyse Mutual Dependency

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Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5141))

Abstract

The CORAS method for security risk analysis provides a customized language, the CORAS diagrams, for threat and risk modelling. In this paper, we extend this language to capture context dependencies, and use it as a means to analyse mutual dependency. We refer to the extension as dependent CORAS diagrams. We define a textual syntax using EBNF and explain how a dependent CORAS diagram may be schematically translated via the textual syntax into a paragraph in English, characterizing its intended meaning. Then we demonstrate the suitability of the language by means of a core example.

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Brændeland, G., Dahl, H.E.I., Engan, I., Stølen, K. (2008). Using Dependent CORAS Diagrams to Analyse Mutual Dependency. In: Lopez, J., Hämmerli, B.M. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5141. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89173-4_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89173-4_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-89095-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-89173-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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