Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the role of heterogeneous payoff values and social diversity in a spatial version of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Typically, a fixed number of agents play the game over a specified number of rounds. At each time step, the agents receive a fixed reward based on the strategy they have adopted and the corresponding payoff (or reward) matrix. We argue that such restrictions are unlikely to be fulfilled in real-life situations. Subsequently, we introduce additional features into the game. Here, each agent has an additional age attribute that can be used to control the number of iterations of the game an agent actually participates in. We also introduce dynamic payoff values that are correlated with particular agent experience levels. Numerical simulations show that the proposed heterogeneous agent model promotes the evolution of cooperation in some circumstances.
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Rezaei, G., Kirley, M. (2008). Heterogeneous Payoffs and Social Diversity in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In: Li, X., et al. Simulated Evolution and Learning. SEAL 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5361. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89694-4_59
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89694-4_59
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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