Abstract
We study the concept of bargaining solutions, which has been studied extensively in two-party settings, in a generalized setting involving arbitrary number of players and bilateral trade agreements over a social network. We define bargaining solutions in this setting, and show the existence of such solutions on all networks under some natural assumptions on the utility functions of the players. We also investigate the influence of network structure on equilibrium in our model, and note that approximate solutions can be computed efficiently when the networks are trees of bounded degree and the parties have nice utility functions.
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Chakraborty, T., Kearns, M. (2008). Bargaining Solutions in a Social Network. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_61
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_61
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1
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