Preventive negotiation is associated with terms such as farsightedness and vision, and so inherently involves uncertainties. Risk is used here to refer to dangerous uncertainty: a shorthand summary for the definition used in the Introduction as “the expectation of negative consequences of current or potential, future phenomena or events.”1 It refers to losses and so is the negative side of opportunity, which is the positive side of uncertainty and refers to gains. Probably chance, as commonly used, spans both. You run or take a chance or risk, but you seize a chance or opportunity: all three are uncertainties with different values. But risk is not just cost, loss, or expected damage;2 it is uncertain damage, the combination of loss and uncertainty. Indeed, risk depends on uncertainty, the replacement of certainty of no damageby no certainty of no damage. However, preventive negotiations do not just have a risk aspect; among other things, risk is their subject.
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Zartman, I.W. (2009). Risk and Preventive Negotiations. In: Sjöstedt, G., Avenhaus, R. (eds) Negotiated Risks. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92993-2_6
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