Abstract
In this chapter we consider fundamental optimization problems arising in communication networks. We consider scenarios where there is no central authority that coordinates the network users in order to achieve efficient solutions. Instead, the users act in an uncoordinated and selfish manner and reach solutions to the above problems that are consistent only with their selfishness. In this sense, the users act aiming to optimize their own objectives with no regard to the globally optimum system performance. Such a behavior poses several intriguing questions ranging from the definition of reasonable and practical models for studying it to the quantification of the efficiency loss due to the lack of users’ cooperation. We present several results we achieved recently in this research area and propose interesting future research directions.
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Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by the European Union under the IST FET Integrated Project AEOLUS and EU COST action 293 – Graphs and Algorithms in Communication Networks (GRAAL) – and by a “Caratheodory” research grant from the University of Patras.
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Bilò, V. et al. (2009). Game-Theoretic Approaches to Optimization Problems in Communication Networks. In: Koster, A., Muñoz, X. (eds) Graphs and Algorithms in Communication Networks. Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02250-0_9
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